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ABSTRACT
Even though U.S. foreign policy has gained considerable traction over the years in terms
of a serious issue domain at both the mass level and within the academy, we are still just
beginning to understand how the American people inform their views in this area of government
activity. We often notice that support among the American public is mixed when it comes to
U.S. foreign policy standing to benefit different groups. Americans tend to be supportive of
foreign policies that may benefit one group of people while giving lukewarm support if another
group of people may benefit. Prior studies on public opinion and foreign policy routinely adhere
to traditional theories in describing political attitudes and never think outside of rigid theoretical
boxes, thus greatly limiting their scope of analysis. Extending the research on mass opinion
toward U.S. foreign policy, I argue social identity theory can help explain American’s tendency
to exhibit different levels of support toward U.S. foreign policy. In short, groups support policies
that will benefit their own ingroups. This project discusses the phenomena in social identity
theory known as “self-enhancement” – which I believe is key to understanding why domestic
groups choose to support U.S. foreign policy that benefits particular groups over others.
Employing data from the 2010 Global Views study conducted by the Chicago Council on
Global Affairs, survey data from the 2016 Cooperative Congressional Election Study, as well as
an original survey experiment utilizing Qualtrics, I show the self-enhancement tactic known as
racial solidarity increases the desire of different social groups as expressed through race to feel
more warmly towards specific countries and people of similar race to their own. I also show that
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racial solidarity provokes individuals to place more value on such countries’ strategic
relationship to the U.S. and to express more support toward supplying such countries and people
with U.S. humanitarian aid and resources. The findings of this dissertation suggest that
Americans are not as calculated, rational, or strategic as one may think when it comes to
formulating their attitudes toward our nation’s foreign policy. Rather, just as we see on the
domestic front, Americans engage in symbolic politics and allow race to occupy an important
role even in foreign policy. The evidence suggests that American citizens tend to think in terms
of what is best for their social group when it comes to foreign policy as opposed to the welfare of
the nation as a whole.
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
In 1999, thousands of ethnic Albanians from Kosovo sought to relocate to the United
States in order to escape a bitter and unrelenting civil war in their home country. Over 11,000
people lost their lives in this major conflict in the Balkans. According to a 1999 Gallup Poll,
66% of Americans were in favor of the U.S. taking in these refugees from Kosovo (Jones, 2015).
Also throughout the 1990s, the African nation of Burundi was highly unstable, and the violence
there was agitated enough that many observers feared a genocide was imminent. In a June 1996
Program on International Policy Attitudes (PIPA) poll, only 57% expressed support for
contributing U.S. troops to a United Nations (UN) peacekeeping mission there
(WorldPublicOpinion, 2008). While the two previous examples are from the 1990s, an example
from the post-9/11 world is important to consider as well. In a 2003 survey, a PIPA poll asked
Americans: “In the future, do you think that the U.S. and other Western powers have a moral
obligation to use military force in Africa, if necessary, to prevent one group of people from
committing genocide against another, or don't you think so?” (WorldPublicOpinion, 2008). Only
55% stated the United States has such a moral obligation (WorldPublicOpinion, 2008). This
question was undoubtedly prompted in part by the genocide in Rwanda which has been estimated
to have taken between 500,000 and 1,000,000 lives from April to July 1994 (BBC, 2011). When
the survey asked the same question replacing Africa with Europe, over 74% said the United
States does indeed have such a moral obligation (WorldPublicOpinion, 2008). The same
question, except different continents and (implied) skin tone of people likely to receive American
help, with drastically different responses.
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In each of the above cases, foreign populations sought to enlist the help of the United
States in order to help cope with their own country’s crisis. As these different polls illustrate
however, support among the American public is mixed when it comes to policies benefitting
different groups around the world. What accounts for this variation? I argue in this dissertation
that part of the answer lies in social identity theory. Groups support policies that will benefit
their own ingroups. America has a predominately White population, and Europe, including the
ethnic Albanians fleeing from Kosovo, is also predominately White. On the other hand, Africa,
including the refugees seeking to flee from the mayhem in Burundi, is predominately Black
(Blacks only make-up about 14% of the U.S. total population), and therefore received less
overall American support for policies designed to assist them.
This dissertation deals with public opinion, social identity, and views towards foreign
policy. Evidence has accumulated that people often divide the world into ingroups and
outgroups. However, we know very little about how ingroups are formed between groups with
minimal contact with each other. We also know very little as to why domestic groups may
support polices for certain overseas groups, even if the particular policy will provide them with
no tangible benefit. This project discusses the phenomena in social identity theory known as
“self-enhancement” – which I believe is key to understanding why domestic groups choose to
support U.S. foreign policy which benefits particular groups over others. I argue the selfenhancement mechanism increases the desire of different social groups to support policies which
will ultimately benefit groups at home, as well as overseas populations they consider as part of
their ingroup. I also argue the self-enhancement mechanism causes certain social groups to have
warm feelings toward countries that contain large populations of people they consider as part of
their ingroup. In this sense, African Americans will likely support a given foreign policy decision
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if it will benefit predominately Black populations. This is because the success of the overseas
ingroup will provide domestic members of the group with a sense of pride and self-esteem. The
image of the members of the domestic ingroup will be enhanced if the status of the overseas part
of the ingroup increases. In this vein, attitudes toward international policy are formed in part,
through actual and perceived experiences, with the social group(s) individuals choose to identify
with.
An advantage to investigating the role of social identity through the prism of race groups
is that it allows me to forgo the adventure of constructing an ad hoc social group simply to
evaluate my theory (Bishin, 2009). Examining race groups allows me to rely confidently on
groups that have been well-identified in previous research. At the same time, because Whites as
a group with a distinct social identity has not been investigated to the extent as have different
minority groups (i.e., Hispanics, African Americans, Asian Americans, etc.), this examination
adds to the burgeoning – but relatively nascent – literature on the political implications of White
social identity.
The role of social identity through the prism of race is also important because when used
as a conceptual tool, race and its intersectional consequences provides a more nuanced critique
of social relations (Lusane, 2006). It also helps scholars to realize that race itself is a salient and
important factor in the formation of foreign policy (Plummer, 2002).
The Influential Role of Public Opinion on U.S. Foreign Policy
Mounting evidence shows people often divide the world into ingroups and outgroups
(Conover and Feldman, 1981; Converse, 1964; Green, Palmquist, and Schickler, 2002; Hogg,
Terry, and White, 1995; Tajfel, 1981). Even with the increased research into social identity
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theory, we still know very little about how ingroups are formed between groups with minimal
contact with each other. We also know very little as to why domestic-based U.S. groups may
support foreign policies for certain overseas groups, even if those particular policies will not
provide them with any tangible benefit. This project discusses the phenomena in social identity
theory known as “self-enhancement” – which is an important component to understanding why
domestic groups choose to support U.S. foreign policies which benefit particular overseas groups
over others. One potential reason is because the success of the overseas ingroup will provide
domestic members of the group with a symbolic sense of pride and self-esteem. The image of the
members of the domestic ingroup will be enhanced if the status of the overseas part of the
ingroup increases. In this vein, American public attitudes toward U.S. foreign policy are formed
in part, through actual and perceived experiences, with the social group(s) individuals choose to
identify with.
If social identity plays a role in shaping how Americans form their political attitudes
toward foreign affairs, then what are the implications? One implication is that new international
challenges threaten America and the American public will have to maturely exercise wise
foreign policy decisions as we steadily grapple with a highly globalized and inter-connected
world. The United States is “the world’s politically, economically, and militarily most powerful
entity” (Brzezinski, 2016). After triumphant feats in two world wars, as well as a 40-year Cold
War, the American position on the world stage is undoubtedly remarkable from a historical
perspective.
Though old adversaries such as Russia still occasionally menace the American foreign
policy establishment, it is no longer our nation’s most pressing national security concern. Since
9/11, the America national security establishment has devoted significant resources towards
4

combatting the rise and spread of international terrorism. The rapid rise of China and of its
inevitable attempt to assert itself as a major power with its own ambitions, has given
policymakers across the country increased concern about a brewing clash in Sino-American
relations. Also, the increasing economic success stories across the African continent has set-off a
globally competitive race to secure African resources in a manner reminiscent of the Berlin
Conference of 1884 (French, 2004; 2014).
These and other challenges make it especially necessary for America to exercise prudent
decision-making in its foreign policy. If we can better understand why different groups of
Americans support policies benefitting particular groups overseas, then we will be one step
closer to making the most appropriate foreign policy decisions in alignment with our national
interests and democratic values. (Huntington, 2005). As Aldrich, Gelpi, Feaver, Reifler, and
Sharp (2006) find, because the public has coherent foreign policy attitudes, can use these
attitudes in making voting decisions, and because policymakers consider public opinion
consequences as they craft their foreign policies – public opinion can influence foreign policy. In
their analysis then, they find politicians making decisions more aligned with their constituents in
an area we often do not link with representation. Aldrich et al. (2006) also find that politicians
make decisions that are congruent with the views of their constituents in an area we often do not
link with representation – foreign policy.
The public may also have an impact on foreign policy decisions due to the need for a
president to maintain or garner political capital (Neustadt, 1960; Sullivan, 1991). The central
element in political capital is approval ratings. High approval ratings provide presidents with
more flexibility in dealing with Congress and other influential political actors. Costly and
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unpopular foreign policies may exhaust political capital and impair the president’s ability to
implement foreign and domestic agendas.
Several strands within the international relations literature also shed light on the public’s
unique ability to influence foreign policy. For instance, research focusing on the phenomenon
known as the “democratic peace” shows how democratic leaders are kept in check by their
domestic audiences (the public). Very succinctly, democratic peace theory maintains democratic
states are more pacifist in their foreign policy than other forms of government, and democracies
do not wage war upon one another (Levy, 1989).
Within the burgeoning literature on this topic, there are two major explanations as to why
democratic states tend to have more peaceful interstate relations with each other. The first
explanation concerns the structural/institutional constraints which are generally believed to be
inherent in democratic systems of government (Buena de Mesquita and Lalman, 1992). This
explanation holds democratic states are more peaceful in their foreign relations because their
leaders are subject to a higher degree of accountability for the actions they undertake. Structural
and institutional constraints “such as constitutional checks and balances, the term limits,
accountability, political competition and pluralism will preclude the leaders of democracies from
engaging in war” (Andris, 2012, p. 17). If leaders of democratic states foolishly commit their
countries to undesirable international engagements then the inherent system of responsibility and
answerability will cost them domestic support, and perhaps an eventual vote of no-confidence at
the next scheduled elections.
The second explanation concerns the common practices and usual customs that
democratic states traditionally share and adhere to (Ray, 1993). "States, to the extent possible,
externalize the norms of behavior that are developed within and characterize their domestic
6

political processes" (Maoz and Russett, 1993, p. 625). Within democracies, disputes are
generally adjudicated and/or resolved through other peaceful conflict resolution mechanisms.
Democracies externalize this system of conflict management in their foreign relations and expect
similar treatment from other democratic states in return.
Leaders may also tie their own hands by creating audience costs through the issuing of
public threats (Fearon, 1994). Audience costs relate to the costs paid when the leader of the state
invokes the national honor of the nation but then backs down. A leader of a democratic nation
faces two audiences: the opposing leader and other actors within the international domain, and
his/her citizens at home. If a democratic leader backs down then they may be turned-out of
office. Because democracies rarely lose wars, Fearon contends a democratic leader’s domestic
audience costs are important because it is at home where he/she faces the most sanctions
(Fearon, 1994). McManus (2014) finds empirical support for an association between a
democratic leader’s audience costs and winning an interstate dispute. In examining U.S.
presidential statements of resolve during militarized interstate disputes, McManus shows a
positive relationship between statements of resolve, and greater chances of prevailing in a
dispute. Levendusky and Horowitz (2012) show however, the effect of audience costs, to a large
extent, depends on the way in which the president (or executive) frames his/her reasons for
backing down. Thus, they illuminate not all audience costs will be the same. Scholars have
shown that audience costs are not automatic however. Potter and Baum (2014) demonstrate
elections play a large role in disseminating news dealing with foreign affairs to the public. They
show countries with a robust mass media and competitive political parties helps to fulfill the
function of whistle-blowing and ensuring the public has knowledge of executive missteps.
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Other scholarship also lends credibility to the argument that public opinion influences
foreign policy. For instance, Knecht (2010) argues the relationship between public opinion and
foreign policymaking changes at different stages throughout the course of the foreign policy
event. He contends there are five such stages: problem definition, option generation, policy
decision, implementation, and policy review (Knecht, 2010, p.20). By conceptualizing foreign
policymaking decisions, Knecht offers unique insights as to the role public opinion plays in
influencing foreign policy. Examining the influence public opinion may have on foreign policy
from multiple perspectives give us a broader understanding of this unique relationship. It goes
beyond the conventional way of observing only one aspect of the decision-making process such
as the decision to use military force or to sign a treaty (Knecht, 2010). He calls such an approach
a “snapshot” which at times may prove beneficial, but one which nonetheless fails to take into
account other choices made within the same foreign policy case in which public opinion may
have had an effect. As an example, he illustrates how George H.W. Bush’s uncertainty regarding
public opinion during the Gulf conflict was instrumental in prompting him to seek United
Nations Security Council approval, to meet Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz in January 1991,
and to conclude military operations short of the Iraqi capital (Knecht, 2010).
Knecht also sheds light on the relationship between public opinion and non-crises
situations. Utilizing the Ethiopian famine as a case study, he reveals how media attention to these
sorts of non-crisis events may ebb and flow. This back and forth attention to non-crisis events by
the media may generate greater or lesser constraints for foreign decision-making at the
presidential level. As his analysis reveals, when media attention was at its apogee the Reagan
administration responded by donating record amounts of aid. Once this decision was made and
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implemented however, attention quickly dissipated and the level of aid returned to a level more
in alignment with the broader U.S. policy concerning the area.
Knecht and Weatherford (2006) also conclude after their examination of 34 foreign
policy cases, the public’s issue-attention cycle varies systematically across foreign policy crises
and non-crises. Key to the association between public opinion and foreign policy is the salience
of foreign policy issues to the public. As Knecht and Weatherford write, “electorally accountable
leaders will give closer consideration to the potential electoral impact of their decisions the more
attentive the public is” (Knecht and Weatherford, 2006, p.705).
Knecht’s insightful examination of multiple stages within the foreign-policymaking
process is not a new phenomenon however. For instance, Foyle (1999) adopted a decision-stages
framework from which to assess the influence of public opinion on foreign policy decisions. His
four stages include: problem presentation, option generation, option selection, and policy
implementation. His analysis reveals public opinion plays the greatest role in influencing foreign
policy decisions during the option generation stage. Foyle also argues presidents do not approach
the role of the public in influencing foreign affairs in a uniform manner. Some presidents chart
their own course in determining the level of influence the public may wield in shaping foreign
policy. He calls these types of presidents “guardians.” Ronald Reagan is an example of this
category. Other presidents are not as cavalier. He calls these types of presidents “delegates”
because they seek to dutifully enact foreign policies in consonance with public desires (Bill
Clinton would fall under this category). A third model falling between the guardian and delegate
model, is what Foyle calls the executor model. This model describes presidents who believe in
the importance of including public opinion within the foreign policy-making process, but not in
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its implementation. President Carter falls under this category. To all other presidents not falling
under any of these aforementioned models, Foyle describes them as pragmatists.
Graham (1989) also articulates a four-stage process. His steps include: agenda setting,
negotiation, ratification, and implementation. According to his analysis, public opinion has the
greatest influence during the agenda stage as well as the ratification stages. According to
Cohen’s (1999) four-stage process involving problem identification in agenda setting, position
taking in agenda setting, policy formulation, and position taking on roll call votes before
Congress – the problem identification stage is where public opinion may have the maximum
influence on foreign policy decisions.
Contrary to early works in this area, public opinion in the realm of foreign policy is quite
robust and comes with a set of implications very similar to political attitudes toward domestic
policy. Not only do politicians listen to the voices of their constituents on topics related to
foreign policy, but they also strive to ensure their policies in this area do not stray too far away
from their opinions. Public opinion also makes its presence known during crucial segments of
the foreign policy-making stage, thus ensuring that the people’s voices are taken into account.
Normatively, at least in a democracy, the people are sovereign. If the people are to
exercise their sovereignty even in the realm of foreign policy then they must have some general
understanding of foreign policy. This dissertation seeks to better understand how Americans
come to formulate their attitudes toward U.S. foreign policy. I believe social identity plays a
crucial role in explaining how individuals form their thoughts toward this complex area of
policy. Previous research into public opinion and foreign policy, usually list partisanship,
ideology, and economic interests, as the primary influences on individual attitudes toward
foreign policy. Little attention however, is given to the notion that political attitudes regarding
10

foreign policy could be explained by understanding how they socially identify with their racial
ingroup. This is interesting because research shows many ways in which social identification
with one’s (racial) ingroup affects people’s attitudes toward domestic issues, and there are
theoretical reasons to suspect this extends to foreign policy as well.
Outline of Dissertation
Chapter 2 of this project examines the literature on American public opinion towards
foreign policy. Here, my goal is to explain what this literature shows about how Americans form
their attitudes toward foreign policy in general. I also go over how public opinion has been
thought to be a factor in influencing American foreign policy. I also describe social identity
theory and explain how it works in shaping the way individuals process their attitudes toward
U.S. foreign policy.
After this section, I explain how I test the role of social identity in shaping attitudes
toward foreign policy with a combination of survey data taken from the 2010 Global Views
Study, a survey experiment with data collected from an undergraduate sample at the University
of Mississippi, and a survey project utilizing data collected as part of the 2016 Cooperative
Congressional Election Study (CCES). I observe public opinion as it relates to U.S. foreign
policy benefitting different races of people. From a body of well-established research, I utilize
race as a functional measure of social identity along with a measure of group consciousness.
Chapter 3 examines social identity theory’s relationship to race and public opinion
concerning feelings toward different countries. The dependent variables are questions taken from
the 2010 Global Views Study. I utilize these specific variables because they allow me to view a
range of areas in which social identity may influence people’s views on foreign policy. This
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range includes attitudes regarding America’s strategic relationship to different countries around
the world and general feelings about different nations. Specifically, I find that out of the 22
countries Americans were asked about, respondents tend to feel the warmest when asked about
countries predominately consisting of similar races to their own. In this chapter, I also examine
how social identity influences people’s perceptions of how important different countries are to
the United States. I find that people’s positive responses coincided with countries that shared
similar races as their own. For instance, an overwhelming majority of African Americans believe
Nigeria’s relationship to the United States is the most important while the majority of White
Americans believe that Great Britain’s relationship to the United States is the most important.
In Chapter 4, I present my survey experiment from an undergraduate sample at the
University of Mississippi. I seek to determine if people’s attitudes toward U.S. foreign policy is
informed in part by their social identity. The survey experiment tests whether Americans base
their support for U.S. foreign policies, on their level of group consciousness. Specifically, I test if
they give more support to sending U.S. humanitarian resources to countries whose populations
are predominately similar to their own in terms of race. I also conduct an experiment to
determine if foreign policy attitudes are shaped in part by the race of those believed to benefit
from U.S. humanitarianism.
Chapter 5 presents the results from the 2016 CCES. With this survey experiment, I
observe the particular foreign policy that Americans support in response to an overseas
humanitarian crisis given their level of social identity. Specifically, I examine American foreign
policy attitudes as it relates to using force overseas to prevent a genocide, as well as to joining
other countries in peacekeeping efforts. The independent variables of interest are social identity
and a measure of group consciousness.
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The concluding chapter provides contexts for the findings in the previous chapters along
with limitations of the results and avenues for future research. From a normative perspective, I
discuss that our role as responsible citizens within a democratic republic does not end with
domestic affairs. Rather, citizens must also continue to find ways to allow our international
policies to reflect the values and ideals we cherish the most. By examining the process through
which people inform their attitudes toward U.S. foreign policy, we become one-step closer to
being able to have a more positive influence on affecting our government’s overseas decisionmaking.

13

CHAPTER TWO
THEORY AND LITERATURE REVIEW
Theoretically, this examination of social identity and public attitudes toward foreign
policy is important from several perspectives. By moving the focus to recipients of U.S. foreign
policies, I am able to examine the influence of social identity when inter-group contact and
knowledge is minimal. This project is also theoretically important because it adds to our
understanding of the types of cues the mass public utilizes in shaping opinions about government
policy in the international arena. My research further adds to the debate concerning symbolic
versus self-interest politics and it provides support for the theory that individuals behave
symbolically even when foreign policy rather than domestic policy is at stake. I seek to build on
the growing literature striving to explain how phenomena related to social identity may help to
explain views toward U.S. foreign policy. This project also contributes to the scholarship on
mass political psychology, notably that on ethnic and racial identity, as well as to scholarship on
recipients of foreign assistance. It seeks to show how the race of beneficiaries may fashion mass
support for the supply of U.S. humanitarian resources within the international arena. As Baker
(2015) notes, much of the research on race and domestic support for government assistance
programs have upheld the conflict or racial resentment paradigm (see Feldman and Huddy 2005;
and Gilens 1999), which maintains that individuals are more selfish toward other racial and
ethnic groups than toward members of their own ingroup. Due to these proclivities revealed
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within the literature, critically examining how the social identity of foreign recipients of U.S.
goodwill and assistance shapes mass opinion is an important undertaking.
Classic Accounts Regarding Public Opinion and Foreign Policy
As the role of social identity and its relationship to political attitudes is further explored,
it is important to review past theoretical explanations regarding the formation of political
attitudes toward international affairs. Below is a brief review of some of the classic accounts, as
well as contemporary theoretical and empirical arguments, proffered within the literature to
explain the formation of American public opinion towards foreign policy and international
affairs.
Perhaps one of the earliest and most prominent studies on the relationship between the
American public and foreign affairs was undertaken by Alexis de Tocqueville in Democracy in
America (1835 [1981]). According to Tocqueville, in contrast to other forms of government
where issues concerning foreign affairs were largely insulated from the general public,
democratic states were at a disadvantage because of the level of control the public could
ultimately wield in terms of decision-making in the international context. From Tocqueville’s
standpoint, the will of popular opinion could be quite extreme, causing leaders to make costly
and unwise decisions on the world stage. Early 20th century scholars found the public to be
largely unconcerned with foreign affairs however, and thus, unlikely to significantly influence
government decisions in the realm of foreign affairs (Almond, 1950). In his research on the
American public and foreign policy, Almond concludes public opinion towards foreign policy
can be characterized best as resembling a mood, and this mood can easily shift as the American
public is largely uninformed in foreign policy affairs and prone to sudden changes as world
events unfold and become known to them. Thus, this early scholarship viewed public opinion
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towards foreign policy as unstable and incoherent. Public opinion scholars such as Lippmann
(1922) suggest foreign opinion came in disassembled chunks and pieces primarily because
Americans in the aggregate do not have access to information concerning policies and decisions
toward events overseas. Converse (1964) also argues a lack of ideological consistency regarding
public views toward foreign policy.
In a highly influential article examining political representation in America, Miller and
Stokes (1963) find the ability for constituents to exercise control over the congressional behavior
of their elected representatives varied from issue area to issue area. They find constituency
control to be the “strongest in the case of civil rights, weaker in the case of social welfare, and
weakest in the case of foreign involvement” (Eulau and Karps, 1977, p.234). Despite this early
pessimism however, further research began to take a different view on how American public
opinion influences foreign policy. For instance, Campbell, Converse, Miller, and Stokes (1960)
find public opinion about foreign policy is coherent, especially as it relates to the liberalconservative continuum. Also, Isaacs points out “the American people [today] have access to the
direct information they need to make informed judgment; they occasionally overcome their
indifference and form opinions about complex foreign and domestic policy matters” (Isaacs,
1998, p. 324). If access to information was once an issue, then the rise of the internet and cable
news programs have greatly aided in overcoming this information handicap.
Despite the rise of access to information however, still another major theoretical
contention centers on whether the foreign policies enacted by political leaders actually reflect the
sentiments expressed by the public. Monroe (1979) answers this question in the affirmative
through his analyses of aggregate data which shows “that [the enacted] foreign policies
correspond with what a majority of Americans favors in more than 90% of the cases examined”
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(Jordan and Page, 1992, p. 227). More recent scholarship also finds the public does in fact
possess coherent beliefs about foreign policy (Aldrich, Gelpi, Feaver, Reifler, and Sharp, 2006).
Previous Empirical Measures of Public Opinion on Foreign Policy
Research seeking to better understand the American people’s willingness to tolerate warrelated casualties is one of the ways scholars have examined the complex framework of
aggregate foreign policy opinions. In his analysis of domestic support for the Vietnam War,
Milstein (1969) finds public support for the conflict decreased as the number of casualties
increased. Jentleson (1992), in his “pretty prudent public” theory demonstrates how the
American people cautiously give greater levels of support to use military force in humanitarian
interventions than for regime changes. Arguing that none of the factors usually attributed to
informing public attitudes toward the use of military force seem to be significant, he notes
Americans generally tend to have a pragmatic sense of strategy (Jentleson, 1992). In other
words, the American people generally judge each individual conflict which potentially calls for
the use of U.S. military force on its own merits. Jentleson and Briton (1998) note the public uses
their pragmatic sense of strategy as a heuristic in determining whether the use of military force is
an appropriate option for dealing with conflicts. Subsequent research by other scholars also
finds empirical support for this argument (e.g., Hermann, Tetlock, and Visser, 1997; Holsti,
2004). Eichenberg (2005) observes civil war situations yield lower levels of U.S. public support
than situations which call for restraining despotic aggression. He thus illustrates Americans are
more reluctant to take sides in a civil war and when it comes to committing U.S. troops to solve
particular internal matters. An examination of individual-level survey data generated by the
Chicago Council (2005) also reveals that 52 percent of U.S. respondents favored the military
option for overthrowing a dictator.
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Among minority groups in particular, the results are mixed and varied when it comes to
the literature dealing with attitudes toward the use of armed force. When looking at African
Americans, this confusion becomes easily apparent. Much of this may be due, perhaps, to the
rather sparse academic work centering on race and foreign policy. Some notable advances within
the literature are worth mentioning however. Early studies on American public opinion toward
foreign affairs showed African Americans were both more isolationist and inarticulate toward
international issues than other race groups (Almond, 1950). Years after these early probes
however, Walton (1985) shows that African Americans are both interested in world affairs, and
they also pay particular attention to issues surrounding Sub-Saharan Africa. For instance, during
the independence movement in Africa from the 1960s till the late 1970s, African Americans at
the mass level were supportive of the African people’s right of self-determination and criticized
foreign intervention as a ploy to prolong Western imperialism on the continent. Throughout the
Cold War, African American elites and members of Congress routinely opposed American
military forces abroad because they believed such actions diverted precious resources that could
have been invested into American communities (Copson, 2003). Mueller (1973) observes that
Blacks tended to be more "dovish" than Whites throughout U.S. involvement in the Korean and
Vietnam wars. In their work on African American public opinion, Smith and Selter (1992) show
that Blacks were less anti-communist than Whites throughout the Cold War. In looking at U.S.
foreign policy, Holsti (1996) notes that African Americans tended to lend greater support than
Whites to interventions toward countries with predominately Black populations. In examining
previous wars fought by the U.S., Nincic and Nincic (2002) show Black Americans were more
likely than Whites to "support an immediate pullout, [were] more prone to encourage the search
for a peaceful solution, and much less likely to favor escalation" (p.553). Though this analysis is
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insightful, it focuses solely on attitudes toward support for “wars,” thus greatly limiting the
generalizability of the findings.
Public Opinion and Non-Crisis Foreign Policy
The above analysis of public opinion and foreign policy focused mainly on issues
stemming from crises, however, because my study also focuses on attitudes related to non-crises
situations, it is prudent to briefly examine the research on attitudes related to such events. Noncrises situations have come to be understood as “situations in which the option of using military
force is extremely unlikely and/or the time horizon for both making a decision and implementing
the policy is comparatively long” (Knecht and Weatherford, 2006). Examples of non-crises may
include nuclear arms control agreements, international economic or security agreements, and
foreign aid. A great deal of the scholarly research suggests non-crises do not evoke the attention
of the public the way in which crises might (Almond, 1960; Foyle, 1999). This may be because
non-crises typically only receive scant attention from the media. Only when the government has
made a policy decision will the media devote more coverage, and thus, will the public pay more
attention. Non-crises also often involve complex subjects which many Americans may not
understand. This line of thinking may not be necessarily true in every such situation however.
For instance, research shows the public was highly attentive to non-crises issues such as the
Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT) talks, the debates surrounding the North American
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the boycotts of the 1980 Olympic games in Moscow, the
Ethiopian famine, the Camp David Accords, the Kyoto Protocol, and apartheid in South Africa
(Bosso, 1989; Graham, 1994; Knecht and Weatherford, 2006; Powlick and Katz, 1998).
Besides reactions to national crises and important non-crises situations, deeply rooted
psychological factors have also been associated with influencing attitudes related to foreign
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affairs. One such factor attributed to influencing attitudes of racial and ethnic groups, both at the
macro and individual level, is the idea of group consciousness. Group consciousness has been
defined in many ways by scholars but its most common components usually consist of: “group
identification (the individual identifies as a member of a racial minority group), polar affect
(prefer interactions with the members of his or her racial group), polar power (compares the
group’s status and resources to that of other racial groups), and systematic blame (primarily
blames a discriminatory system for his or her racial group’s position” (Austin, Middleton, and
Yon, 2012, p. 631). Among African Americans, shared historical experiences rooted primarily in
the Transatlantic slave trade and further institutionalized discrimination practiced after
emancipation helped to foster and exacerbate a heightened sense of group consciousness.
Scholarship on group consciousness suggests a positive relationship between group membership
and political participation. The more connected people feel to their particular ethnic and social
groups the more likely they are to play an active role in politics. This idea is perhaps best
expressed by Dawson’s (1994) concept of “linked fate.” Put simply, linked fate can be thought of
as one’s perception that an individual’s fate is linked to that of the group (Dawson, 1994).
Applying this concept more broadly, perhaps African American’s sense of identification with
Black populations throughout the world and their support for policies beneficial to these groups
can be seen as a mechanism through which they can enhance the standing of Black people
globally. For example, in a famous speech before the United Nations, former Ghanaian president
Kwame Nkrumah, advocated strongly for African Americans to adopt and embrace the ideals of
Pan-Africanism. African American leaders such as W.E.B. DuBois, Ralph Bunche, and many
others traveled widely throughout Africa and Europe to meet with leaders and other leading
activists in efforts to advance the cause of Blacks both at home and abroad.
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Social Identity Theory
Green, Palmquist, and Schickler (2002) argue when people make decisions regarding
their partisanship, one of the questions they ask themselves is what type of social groups are
primarily associated with each major party. Once people have these groups in mind, the authors
note people then mentally discern which assemblage of groups best describes them (Green et al,
2002). I argue in a policy domain such as foreign policy where the issues at stake are complex
and less clear cut than American domestic policy, the social identity they associate with helps
shape their political attitudes. In this study, the focus is on social identity as expressed by race.
Social identity theory, as originally imagined in the United States by Campbell,
Converse, Miller, and Stokes (1960) in the The American Voter, is explained as reference group
theory. As Miller (1991) aptly described it, "our individual sense of personal identity is derived
from groups to which we belong" (22). According to Campbell et al. (1960) – hereinafter
referred to as the Michigan Model – in formulating their attitudes, people assign themselves to
the particular group(s) they feel themselves as belonging to as opposed to being arbitrarily
assigned to a group by a social scientist. Once a person’s reference group has been empirically
determined, it becomes possible to make better predictions with respect to their political
behavior. The Michigan Model authors maintain people identify with different groups and other
social gatherings in ways similar to how they identify with political parties. These attachments
form early and usually remain stable throughout the course of one’s life.
Today, reference group theory has evolved into social identity theory. One early
proponent of social identity theory defined it as “that part of an individual’s self-concept which
derives from his knowledge of his membership of a group together with the value and emotional
significance attached to the membership” (Tajfel, 1981, p.255). In their exploration of social
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identity theory, Green, Palmquist, and Schickler (2002) conclude partisan identification is akin to
social group identification. These authors stress people identify with their political party in ways
similar to identifying with their particular ethnic group. In thinking of their own idea of
partisanship, the authors argue people think of other groups that associate with either the
Democratic or Republican parties. Based on the type of groups or associations that come to
mind, people will fall alongside those particular groups which best resembles themselves.
According to Conover and Feldman (1981), an affinity for a relevant social group can be
instrumental in shaping political opinions, as well as forming negative feelings towards
outgroups. Converse (1964) also notes the significance of social identity in shaping political and
social attitudes. Thus, social identity theory emphasizes group-belonging and emotion, rather
than rational calculations.
Social identity theory also maintains that group membership(s) provides individuals with
a sense of selfhood and social identification (Turner and Oakes, 1986). According to Tajfel and
Turner (1979), the type of social and political comparisons individuals make about their (and
other different) group(s) is driven, to a large degree, by their desire for positive identity. In this
vein, individual's favor and bolster distinctive group characteristics associated with their own
ingroup in their comparisons to various outgroups. Hogg, Terry, and White (1995) argue
individuals do this in order to achieve positive self-esteem.
The social identity one takes on from a given group membership both describes and
prescribes one's attributes as a member of the group (Hogg, Terry, and White, 1995). This
includes how group members should think, act, and behave. As specific aspects of these
identities become salient, ingroup members come to view these attributes as normative, while
they view certain attributes of outgroup members as stereotypical. Depending on the nature of
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relations between the groups, intergroup behavior may also acquire discriminatory and
competitive properties (Hogg, Terry, and White, 1995). In the case of minority groups such as
Asians and Latinos, both of which also happen to be predominate immigrant groups in America,
their racial group identities may be as primary to their conscious formation as it is for African
Americans. Due to their predominately immigrant status however, they may also have multiple,
hybrid, and constantly shifting social identities (Jones-Correa and Leal, 1996; Lien and Lee,
2001). Several scholars have demonstrated how different contexts such as pan-ethnic identity
(Padilla, 1984), religious identity (Pachon and DeSipio, 1995), and minority group status (Bobo
and Johnson, 2000) may shape the political perceptions of Asian Americans and Latinos. This
makes it especially difficult to categorize these minority groups into certain social boxes due
simply to their race or ethnicity. Social identity may also be relevant for Whites. As Miller,
Gurin, Gurin, and Malanchuk (1981) note, though racial group identity has been shown to be
subconscious among Whites, its influence may still affect their political attitudes and decision
making.
Social identity theory actualizes two elemental sociocognitive processes in order to
account for social identity phenomena: a) self-enhancement and b) self-categorization. Selfcategorization is important to understand because it is the process by which people divide the
world into “them” and “us,” or “ingroups” and “outgroups.” (Tajfel, 1979). Self-categorization is
one of the basic assumptions of this project. People self-categorize through the answers they give
towards various questions on social surveys such as, race, age, religion, and residential state. I
focus on the sociocognitive process known as self-enhancement however, in order to help
explain variation among the public in their attitudes toward U.S. foreign policy.
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Self Enhancement
The notion of self-enhancement assumes that people's thoughts and attitudes relating to
their own groups are driven by their wishes to maintain or achieve a positive self-image (Gunther
and Mundy, 1993; Gunther and Thorson, 1992). Thus, with self-enhancement ingroups favorably
compare themselves with outgroups to boost or bolster their own relative standing.
Self-enhancement takes many different forms, and may activate different behaviors
among groups predicated on their unique histories, social standing, and political transformations.
In this sense then, people adopt different strategies to self-enhance or self-promote (e.g., van
Knippenberg, 1978; Wagner, Lampen, & Syllwasschy, 1986). For some social groups, selfenhancement may increase their sense of group consciousness, and further enable them to view
their destinies and/or political image as intertwined with the fate of other members of their
ingroup. Self-enhancement may also cause some groups to become less trusting of political
figures such as government entities and/or public officials. Such groups may enhance the status
of their group by recognizing and uniting their efforts against government policies and actions
they deem as adverse to their interests. Group consciousness may also cause groups to become
less trusting of other groups or political entities if they have been the source of their
victimization in the past. Self-enhancement will cause ingroup members to become more
motivated to protect the status and interests of their group (Hinkle & Brown, 1990; Tajfel &
Wilkes, 1963; Verkuyten & Brug, 2004). To become more politically distrustful then, becomes
part of the norms exercised by the ingroup as a way to act as antibodies against present and
prospective abuse and mistreatment. Self-enhancement may also cause some social groups to
become more compassionate of outgroups due to what they believe is their moral responsibility
as the dominant or privileged ingroup (Jardina, 2014). In the context of political attitudes toward
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international affairs, a social group’s attitude toward foreign policy maybe influenced by the type
of strategy they adopt to self-enhance.
Cultural Affinity Hypothesis and Ethnic Affectations
There have been a number of other cognitive outcomes proffered within the literature on
social identity seeking to explain how social identity may influence attitudes about both foreign
and domestic affairs. Such cognitive outcomes include group polarization (Wetherell, 1987)
group cohesiveness (Hogg, 1987), and ethnocentrism (Grant and Brown, 1995; Kinder and Kam,
2009). Each of these cognitive outcomes however, are simply different mechanisms used to selfenhance the status of the ingroup. I focus here on ethnocentrism because it has been shown
within the literature to affect group opinions in regards to foreign policy. According to Kinder
and Kam (2009), ethnocentrism is a mental habit. They define it as “a predisposition to divide
the human world into in-groups and out-groups…it is a readiness to reduce society to us versus
them” (Kinder and Kam, 2009, p. 8). Ethnocentrism then is prejudice, but not merely directed at
a particular outgroup or unwanted other, but prejudice broadly conceived. Ethnocentrism helps
people to make sense of the world around them and to make the safest choices according to their
own bounded rationality. Members of the ingroup are seen as trusting and reliable while people
of the outgroup are deemed dangerous and unworthy of trust until proven otherwise (Kinder and
Kam, 2009). In terms of ethnocentrism and foreign policy, Kinder and Kam (2001) show
ethnocentrism undercuts American support for economic assistance to help rebuild Eastern
Europe after the fall of the Soviet Union. In the wake of the Cold War’s global fight for
supremacy between the United States and the Soviet Union, Americans still viewed former
Communist states with great suspicion. They also found ethnocentrism caused Americans to
reduce support for economic sanctions on the apartheid regime in South Africa. On the whole,
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Kinder and Kam reveal ethnocentrism plays an important role in producing feelings of
indifference among the American people in regards to troubles facing those living outside of the
U.S. (Kinder and Kam, 2009). While these authors look at the influence of ethnocentrism as it
relates to public opinion in general, they do not probe deeper and examine different elements of
American public opinion. For instance, their analysis focused primarily on “Americans v. other,”
but it did not take into account different social groups as expressed by race nor how they relate to
political attitudes toward foreign and international policy. By failing to account for different
segments of the American public, these authors do not show how various domestic groups
respond to such U.S. actions given their social identities besides that of their U.S. citizenship.
Here however, I look at particular race groups in order to determine how their social identity as
expressed through race shapes their attitudes toward foreign policy.
Some social groups in the U.S. are also likely to advocate for policies that stand to benefit
groups in other countries whom they identify as part of their ethnic kin, or diaspora (Huntingdon,
2005). I highlight trade diasporas here because they have been shown to have a significant
influence in predicting political behavior of people identified as part of different economic
diasporas throughout the world. According to Tung and Chung, the term diaspora is derived from
“two Greek words that mean a scattering or sowing of seeds and refers to the displacement or
dispersion of members of an ethnic group from their country of origin, either forcefully or
voluntarily, to foreign lands” (2009, p. 371). Though history usually views members of diasporas
as unfortunate victims, Cohen hypothesizes the spread of globalization may have benefited these
groups because they could now "establish a dual presence in their adoptive country of residency
and their country of origin, to partake in opportunities and developments in both countries"
(Tung and Chung, 2010, 372). More than just members of a displaced group of foreigners,
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diasporas can also be seen as a sophisticated system of different social, political, business, and
fraternal networks of inter-related communities and groups. Thus, trade diasporas can influence
people’s attitudes because they provide information through various channels of communication
and points of contact (Rauch, 2001). This allows members to acquire and share similar
viewpoints, thus promoting a collective idea towards political events.
Nelson (1979) reveals ethnicity is just as strong a factor in informing one’s political
attitudes as is their socioeconomic status. Evidence illustrating activities undertaken by ethnic
groups to promote the interests of their ancestral homelands via the U.S. political system has
been well-documented. For instance, Mearsheimer and Walt (2006), Plummer (1996), and
Tillery Jr. (2011), among others, provide illustrations of efforts undertaken by U.S.-based ethnic
groups to lobby and utilize the U.S. foreign policymaking process to promote different
initiatives, political causes, economic agendas, and security policies beneficial to their ancestral
homelands. Reasons for these efforts include: solidarity for shared democracies (Mearsheimer &
Walt, 2006), compensation for past crimes and transgressions (Fosu, 1999; Mearsheimer & Walt,
2007; Tillery, 2011), and for collective solidarity efforts to promote transnational
macroeconomic policies for members and states of their respective ethnicities (Fosu, 1999).
African Americans provide an example of how an ethnic group’s political preferences are
shaped in part by their ethnicity and affectations toward their ancestral homelands. The idea of
solidarity with Africa has played a role in the experience of African Americans upon their arrival
to America. In more contemporary years, this solidarity among African Americans with Africa
and its diaspora manifested itself in many forms, but after the Berlin Conference of 1884-85 and
the scramble for African territory, it took the form of continued independence for the African
states of Liberia and Ethiopia (Gramby-Sobukwe, 2005). The state of Ethiopia has been a source
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of pride for African Americans because it is the only African country to remain independent
from European or Arab colonialization. Throughout the Cold War, many African Americans
celebrated as they witnessed country after country in Africa gain their independence. PanAfricanists such as Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana and W.E.B. DuBois, among others, organized
Blacks throughout the entire African diaspora in an effort to unite and formulate common
solutions to some of their common problems (Plummer, 1996).
Another example of an ethnic group’s foreign and domestic political attitudes shaped in
part by their ethnicity and affectations toward their ancestral homelands can be observed through
the behavior of Mexican-Americans. The political preferences of Mexican Americans as it
relates to their ancestral homeland are a bit more complex to trace than those of many other U.S.based ethnic groups. This is primarily due to the fact that Mexicans belong not only to just “the
immigrated second generations, but also to the third and later ones, as well to a group that cannot
be classified in generation terms because their ancestors were never immigrants” (Alba et. al.,
2014). Recent literature on aggregate Hispanic and Latino opinion however, provides useful
insights into sentiments and rapport with Mexico. Research conducted by Sanchez (2006) shows
that group consciousness has a greater impact on Latino political attitudes when the issues are
directly related to ethnicity. Thus, issues such as English-first policies, voter-identification laws,
and other such racially and ethnically motivated political issues are viewed by Latinos from a
shared lens. Alba (2013) also writes Mexican Americans are hampered by an inability to
compete in a post-industrial economy due to historical and present-day racism, as well as their
humble socio-economic positions. These factors undoubtedly contribute to their sense of group
consciousness and to their perspectives toward the concept of linked-fate with members of their
ethnicity. Telles and Ortiz (2008) give credence to the notion that the Mexican American
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experience in the U.S. is shaped largely by their race and ethnicity. Issues pertaining to U.S.
immigration policy also shape Mexican American perspectives in a unique way. Research by
Espenshade and Calhoun (1993) further attests to the cultural affinity hypothesis, which posits
that cultural similarities and networks causes people to have more accommodating views toward
others of similar race or heritage, by revealing that in terms of immigration, Latino “cultural
similarity and network ties to immigration gives them an affinity for immigration that produces
more accommodating views about immigration in general” (Jimenez, 2007, p.601). Compared to
the views of other races and ethnic groups in America, Latino views towards immigration were
more sympathetic, considerate, and supportive. This is important because immigration not only
benefits the host country, but also the country of origin. Thus, policies that can enhance the
economic well-being of those in Mexico are appealing to Mexican Americans because they can
also assist in enhancing their image in wider American society. They also pay particular attention
to how such policies will benefit their image and political status in the United States as well.
According to Jiminez (2007), Mexican Americans are acutely aware that their ascendancy into
core political institutions in America would not be possible without the significant presence of a
large Mexican immigrant population. Thus, their relations with their ancestral homelands and
their political behavior here in America stem not only from cultural attachments, but also from a
need to strategically self-enhance their status here in America. Such a technique is especially
useful in seeking to obtain more equitable social, political, and economic policies because their
population size could be seen as threatening to reelection-minded politicians.
My analysis of the role that social identity plays in influencing political views toward
foreign policy builds on these explanations. To be influenced by one’s ethnicity via their
membership within a diaspora, reasons related to ethnocentrism, or due to a sense of cultural
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affinity is consistent with social identity theory. My argument builds on this line of research by
giving more attention to the self-enhancement mechanism of social identity theory as it relates to
the formulation of political attitudes toward foreign policy. I also demonstrate that one does not
necessarily have to belong to the same ethnic tribe or country of a particular group in order for
the self-enhancement mechanism to become active. Rather, socially identifying with a particular
group allows people to take on certain thoughts and ideas in support of that group.
In sum research shows Americans are not very informed as to political news and
information (Converse, 1964), and also that their knowledge on international political news is
even less informed (Almond, 1950). Though the public may be largely uninformed as to political
information, scholars have uncovered different mechanisms the public utilizes to make-up for
this knowledge gap and to make decisions healthy enough to keep our democratic society
steadily afloat (Popkin, 1991; Lupia, 1994). Such mechanisms include credible signals and cues
from political parties and partisan figures (Aldrich, 2011), retrospective evaluations and relevant
past histories (Downs, 1957; Fiorina, 1981), family, friends, and co-workers (Campbell et. al,
1980), political campaigns and the media (Popkin, 1991), and presidential rhetoric (Baum, 2004;
Baumgartner and Jones, 1993), among others. I continue building on this literature by revisiting
the notion of social identification as a cue Americans utilize in evaluating and informing their
political attitudes toward foreign affairs. In other words, I examine the role social identity theory
plays in shaping and forming political attitudes in the realm of foreign policy. Much work
concerning social identity theory’s influence on individual and group behavior centers almost
exclusively on political phenomena from within a domestic context. This work helps to extend
research on social identity theory by applying its underlying mechanisms to the international
arena. As such, I utilize various strands from the political psychology literature to explore the
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type of support Americans exhibit towards policies which could potentially benefit various social
groups abroad.
Ideology and Partisanship
In order to understand the role of social identity on political attitudes, I provide an
overview of political attitude formation in general. Americans in general may not have an
informed opinion on every subject concerning government and foreign policy, but several
strands of research dealing with public opinion, political behavior, and political psychology
reveal that this does not stop them from developing a mental and social frame of reference to
help make their navigation through the political terrain much easier (Delli Carpini and Keeter,
1996; Sears and Funk, 1990).
Classic and Contemporary Accounts of Attitude Formation
Scholarship on attitude formation, attitude structures, and the acquisition of political
orientations in America usually begin with The American Voter (1960). Though not the first text
to deal with political attitudes, The American Voter helped to lay the foundations of perhaps the
most fundamental theory regarding the formation of political attitudes as it concerns the
American people. According to The American Voter, one can refer to political attitudes or an
attitude structure “when two or more beliefs or opinions held by an individual are in some way
or another functionally related” (Campbell, Converse, Miller, and Stokes, p.189, 1960).
Underlying this definition is a psychological element which provides the outline for a system of
opinions, values, and beliefs, which influences one’s outlook on politics and towards the world.
Another term utilized to gauge the political orientations of Americans is “belief systems.”
Philip E. Converse defines a belief system "as a configuration of ideas and attitudes in which the
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elements are bound together by some form of constraint or functional interdependence" (p.5,
2006). The magnitude of such constraints varies from person to person, and one’s level of
sophistication is primarily predicated on understanding the organization of their values and
principles (Converse, 1964). According to Converse (1964), most people do not have strong
belief systems, nor do they interpret politics through an ideological lens. The American Voter
also acknowledged that attitude structures were limited and that most Americans do not adhere to
a coherent ideology in academic terms.
Later studies began to reveal a different story about American’s political understanding
and sophistication however. Research by Nie, Verba, and Petrocik (1979) showed that citizens
began to increasingly show signs of organization and coherence in their political thinking
between 1960 and 1970. In fact according to Nie et al., (1979) after 1960, at least around 40% of
Americans had relatively stable political opinions in comparison to around 25% after 1950.
However, some researchers explained this away as merely survey responses from citizens based
on highly salient topics and issues at the time of measurement (such as civil rights), but not
necessarily as signs of increased coherent ideologies among the American people (Bishop and
Frankovic, 1981). Sullivan, Pierson, and Marcus (1978) and also Bishop, Turcharber, and
Oldendick (1978) contend that revisions and modifications within the survey question wording
around 1964 could be the reason for these results as well. Evidence presented by Nie and
Rabjohn (1979) gave further credence to the argument that ideological constraint among the
American people in fact increased.
Thus, due to this controversy, both in methodological terms and in differences in
interpretations, it may be reasonable to conclude ideological coherence in American public
opinion has increased since the 1950s. Though this shift may not be as pronounced as once
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assumed, the liberal – conservative structure does seem to characterize public opinion better
today than it did in the past.
Closely related to ideology is partisanship. Party identification continues to be one of the
strongest and most consistent predictors of political behavior. There is a massive amount of
evidence showing party identification has a tremendous impact on the structure, formation, and
development of political attitudes. 1 In fact, party identification has become fundamental to the
study of both American public opinion and political behavior. According to The American Voter,
political parties exert a substantial influence on the way citizens encounter the political
environment (Campbell et al., 1960). Contemporary analyses show party identification impacts
public opinion on even cultural and racial issues (Layman and Carsey, 2002; Bafumi and
Shapiro, 2009). Research also highlights partisan influence on public opinion as it relates to
foreign policy (Berinsky, 2007; Gartner, 2008; Snyder, Shapiro, and Bloch-Elkon, 2009).
While there is a long literature on the exact mechanisms of partisan identification and its
influence, I focus here on the most relevant view as it connects to social identity. Berelson,
Lazarsfeld, and McPhee (1954) are perhaps some of the earliest scholars to have dealt with the
role socialization plays in the formation of partisanship in America. Known as the Columbia
School, their central claim was that sociological contexts provide the best framework for
understanding party identification. According to Berelson and his colleagues, political attitudes
are a product of an individual’s social settings. The primary social setting ultimately determining
one’s trajectory as it relates to political attitudes and social disposition is the family. Their
argument is that the family is the core group in which people shape their political ideas and
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Here I focus on the sociological view of partisanship. Of course, there are competing arguments for the role of
partisanship and its formation including the Downisian approach and the Michigan model.
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preferences. In studying the formation of party identification, the authors of this study focused on
the city of Elmira, New York, because it was reminiscent of a typical American city in regards to
its population, business landscape, media environment, and social demographics. The authors
conducted a panel study during the 1948 Dewey v. Truman presidential election in which they
interviewed subjects a few times throughout the year. Their findings revealed that people tend to
inherit voting preferences from their immediate families. This finding among the younger voters
was especially pronounced. The authors also revealed that people’s other social groupings such
as their friend networks and co-workers in their work environment influenced their voting
preferences. This is because they observed that people typically associate or befriend people who
share similar political persuasions as themselves.
Similarly, Green, Palmquist, and Schickler (2002) explore social identity theory and
conclude that partisan identification is akin to social group identification. These authors view
partisan identification functioning in ways similar to one’s ethnic group affiliation or even
religious affiliation. In thinking of their own partisanship, the authors believe that people think of
other groups that associate with either the Democratic or the Republican parties. Based on the
type of groups or associations that come to mind, people will fall alongside those particular
groups which best resemble themselves. This type of decision is grounded in social group
identity theory.2 That is, people assume political beliefs that are consistent with those groups
which they identify. For instance, a young Jewish voter may choose to identify with young
voters, Jewish voters, or young Jewish voters. Green and colleagues also contend that
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partisanship is pretty stable throughout one’s life because a person’s social identity is pretty
stable.
Ultimately, whether one identifies with a political party because of some sense of
psychological attachment, social identification, or for some other reason, the main concern here
is that the party in turn provides individuals with a set of ideas and beliefs from which to
perceive a range of political issues – including foreign policy.
Social Identity and Political Socialization
Moving to a focus on social identity theory, I discuss social identity theory’s selfenhancement mechanism on public opinion towards U.S. foreign policy. I highlight racial group
solidarity as the self-enhancement mechanism in this chapter. In terms of foreign policy,
individuals seek to enhance the status of their own ingroup by exhibiting support for such
policies they deem consistent with standing in solidarity with the race group with which they
socially identify. Individual’s predisposed symbolic beliefs perpetuate this process. In the rest of
this section, I explain racial group solidarity and symbolic politics in more detail. I then describe
how social identity theory can help explain the usefulness in exploring racial group solidarity and
symbolic politics in seeking to better understand how Americans come to process their attitudes
about foreign policy. In this vein, I discuss social identity as expressed through racial identity,
group consciousness, and symbolic politics. This discussion details the various components of
racial identity, group consciousness, and symbolic beliefs which may prompt individuals to
identify socially and behaviorally with their respective race groups.
From the above description, we now have a clearer understanding of how ideology and
party identification may influence the formation and nature of individual political attitudes. What
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the above does not articulate however, is the role social identity also plays in the conditioning of
one’s political self. According to Aristotle, “man is by nature a social animal.” This means that
men are influenced by, and are especially made for their social environment. Thus, ideology and
partisanship may tell us much about an individual’s political preferences, but the picture remains
unfinished until we have a better understanding of their social development and context. The
following explains how and why a person’s political socialization is important in helping to
understand their overall political development, preferences, and behavior. According to Saggar
(2007), “social identity is linked to, and largely driven by, racial or ethnic categories of political
community or political collective interest.” Thus, an examination of the process of racialization
of political identity and behavior is useful at this point. The scholarship on political socialization
usually addresses the topic in relationship to time. That is, it typically seeks to understand what
are the origins and nature of people’s political views and how do they operate throughout the
course of the human life span?
Some of the earliest research focusing on the development of race, ethnicity, and racial
prejudice observed children from Canada and America (Aboud, 1988). These studies show that
very early in life, before age 3, children hold racial stereotypes and exhibit racially biased
behavior. In Katz and Kofkin’s (1997) study exploring the nature of children’s early
1

understanding of race and gender, when children age 2 2 were instructed to pick whom they
would rather play with from a host of unfamiliar peers, a majority of Black and White children
chose playmates with a same-race face. By the time they reach age 3 however, a majority of both
Black and White children preferred a White playmate (Katz and Kofkin, 1997). These findings
suggest both differences and similarities in developmental trajectories of Black and White
children in America. Per this study, White children continue to exhibit a bias in favor of whites
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until they reach age 7 or 8. On the other hand, Black children demonstrate a preference for
Whites until around age 6. At age 6, Black children demonstrate a bias in favor of their own race
in terms of choosing a potential playmate. This early preference for Whites shown by Black
children was originally thought to stem from issues concerning low self-esteem (Clark and Clark,
1939; Aboud,1989 provides a great overview). This argument comes from the classic “Clark
Doll Experiment” where Dr. Kenneth Clark and his wife Mamie asked Black children to choose
between a Black doll and a White doll. Though the dolls were the same except for their skin
color, most of the children thought the White doll was nicer. As opposed to issues stemming
from low self-esteem, later scholars argue this early bias favoring Whites was due instead to the
recognition among children that White tends to be associated with higher social status (Aboud,
1988). Whatever the case may be, these studies reflect a divergence in social attitudes among
children of different races very early in their maturity and developmental stages of life.
Children expressing in-race group preferences do not automatically endorse hostility or
dislike for other race groups. Cameron, Alvarez, Ruble, and Fuligni (2001) show children in
America associate positive traits to members of their own particular race group and are neutral in
relation to other races. Their study also indicates that ingroup preferences predicated on race are
stronger for children that are part of the majority race than for minority-race children. Thus,
“collective identities may become quite significant to children’s self-concept” (Bennett and Sani,
p.34, 2004).
Research suggests that around ages 8-10, children develop greater understanding and
awareness of race, stereotypes, and prejudice. According to Alejandro-Wright (1985), children
around this age are similar to adults in their reception to the notion that race is stable.
Furthermore, in her study, which utilized a cognitive-developmental approach to examine how
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Black girls in America develop racial categories, Alejandro-Wright observes that children begin
understanding race labels in the biological/physiological sense at around age 10 (Charlesworth,
2010). Children around this age also begin assessing reasons for why others may in fact be
prejudiced. Quintana (2007) demonstrates children understand that a person’s socialization of
prejudice begins at home. Studies also indicate that adolescents (ages 16-17) begin assuming
attitudes regarding particular public policies similarly to those held by adults (Hughes and
Bigler, 2011).
Besides demonstrating preferences for some racial groups, research also shows children
understand themselves to be within a particular race or ethnic group, and that they come to terms
with being a member of their respective race group (Aboud, 1988). According to Ruble et al.
(2004), in comparison to White children, children in minority race groups are more likely to
consider their race as central to their sense of self. The stability of an early sense of ethnic
identity is uncertain however. For instance, contextual factors play a significant role in
influencing a youth’s level of ethnic identification. One of the primary contextual factors
contributing to a youth’s level of ethnic identification is their schooling. In a study examining
consistency and inconsistency in adolescents' ethnic identification (i.e., self-reported ethnicity)
across the six middle-school semesters, 85% of those identifying as Black/African American in
the 6th grade did so again when asked in their 8th grade year if they attended a predominately
Black school (Nishina, Bellmore, Witkow, and Nylund-Gibson, 2010). If they were enrolled at a
predominately Latino school, then only 65% of those identifying as Black in the 6th grade did so
again in their 8th grade year (Nishina, Bellmore, Witkow, and Nylund-Gibson, 2010).
The years leading up to the end of elementary school are also important in the
development of a youth’s social identity. In these middle to late childhood years, ethnic minority
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youths are thinking about their feelings and attitudes regarding their racial and ethnic identity
(Marks, Szalacha, Lamarre, Boyd, and Garcia Coll, 2007). As Verkuyten (2002) explains,
developing positive sentiments toward their own racial and ethnic group protects youths from
perceptions of discrimination. It is around their adolescent years, the period following their
search for self, that youths make a commitment to an ethnic identity (Phinney, 1990). According
to Brown, Alabi, Huynh, and Masten (2010), in the United States, African American and Latino
youths develop ethnic identities earlier than White/European American youths. By the time they
reach college age, ethnic identification becomes a durable and steady component of a minority
youth’s personhood (Sears, Fu, Henry, and Bui, 2003). This ethnic identity is multidimensional
and has been shown to be an important aspect of a minorities’ sense of self (Quintana, 2007;
Ashmore, Deaux, and McLaughlin-Volpe, 2004).
Racial Identity
Social scientists often use race to refer to certain distinctions stemming from physical
appearances such as physiognomy, skin color, and eye shape. According to Helms (1994), within
the U.S., race is a socially defined construct that has been employed as a politically oppressive
categorization scheme. Racial identity theory explores the extent to which individuals perceive
themselves to share a common racial heritage with their respective racial group (Helms, 1990).
Historically, social and political conflict emanating from race relations have been critical issues
in the U.S. and the issue of race relations has not seen significant improvement (Jones, 1997).
Sidanius, Pratto, and Bobo (1996) note there still persists easily recognizable friction between
many racial groups in this country. Thus, the legacy of slavery, the forced removal of and near
extinction of Native Americans, the annexation and conquest of former Mexican lands, and other
such undertakings by a primarily dominant White society have left a deep imprint in the heart of
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American society. The legacy and still quite prevalent issue of race has many psychological and
political implications on individuals within the country. For one, it has led to a highly-bifurcated
idea of the country’s present state of racial affairs among Americans. Many Whites believe the
U.S. to be a country of equal opportunity for all in regards to jobs, housing, and education; most
people of color however, believe they live in a separate and unequal America (Robinson and
Ginter, 1999; Sears, 1998; Sigelman and Welch, 1993). Research reveals African Americans and
Whites act more positively to people of their own race due to ingroup preferences (McCormick
and Kinloch, 1986), while Sue and Sue (1990) report in certain interracial situations, people of
color may take on a level of suspiciousness toward Whites.
Racial Group Solidarity
Racial solidarity is often realized as the product of different contextual factors such as
racial identity, racial consciousness, general awareness of the group’s relevant history, and racial
pride – among other concepts (Durant and Sparow, 1997; Turner, 1967). It has been
conceptualized as an ability to identify with members of the group and a willingness to accept
certain personal sacrifices on its behalf (Bledsoe, Welch, Segelman, and Combs, 1995). Because
racial solidarity encapsulates ideas and concepts such as race consciousness, identity, and group
awareness, it is generally used as a term to collectively frame these amalgamating concepts.
Racial solidarity plays a key role in the political beliefs and behaviors of different race
groups. The influence of group solidarity began to draw attention in the 1960s and 1970s when
social scientists realized – contrary to popular belief – African Americans participated in politics
at rates higher than White Americans after controlling for socio-economic status (Orum, 1960;
Verba and Nie, 1972). Some scholars believe group solidarity provided them with extra
motivation to participate in politics (Olsen, 1960; Verba and Nie, 1972).
40

Despite these findings, other research has not consistently showed a positive relationship
between group solidarity and different forms of political behavior. For instance, Tate (1991),
with the 1984 National Black Election Study (NBES), reveals feelings of group solidarity to be
secondary to the larger influence of church membership. She finds racial solidarity to be only
slightly related to political behaviors such as taking part in political campaigns or voting in
elections. According to Verba, Scholzman, and Brady (1995), group solidarity has a negligible
impact on participation. Using different measures of psychological engagement such as political
efficacy, political interest, information, and partisan intensity, they show political interest and
awareness (information) proved to be the strongest indicators for political participation.
Though research examining group solidarity has focused primarily on African
Americans, recent research examines its influence as it relates to other minority groups as well.
In the case of Asians, Lien (1994) does not find a robust positive relationship between solidarity
and political behavior. Leighley and Vedlitz (1999) observes although indicators of participation
varies between Latinos, Blacks, and Whites, social connectedness did explain differences in
political behavior between these race groups. Thus, social closeness among race groups helped to
account for the group’s likelihood of engaging and thinking in a collective sense about politics.
Racial Group Solidarity from Different Angles
Group solidarity is a multidimensional concept and it manifests itself in varying ways
according to group types and levels of intensity. Though literature demonstrates group solidarity
leading to increased political activity such as political participation, it also shows that it could
cause groups to shrink away from the political process. Greeley (1974) contends group solidarity
may slow political activity by causing ethnic groups to resist acculturation into mainstream
society and to miss opportunities to involve themselves in political affairs. Such a decision may
41

also influence their level of political representation because politicians are usually more attentive
to those who may provide them with the most benefits in terms of money, manpower, and votes
(Rosenstone and Hansen, 1993).
Blum (2007) points out there are three different bases for solidarity, each bearing on
racial solidarity. These three distinct bases include identity groups, shared experiences, and
political commitments. As he describes, “Not all members of the same identity group necessarily
share the same experiences of adversity; nor do they, nor those who do share those experiences,
necessarily share political values about what to do about that adversity” (Blum, 2007, p.69).
With identity-based solidarity, Blum contends that mere shared identity, and not particularly the
perspectives or experiences associated with it, is the basis for solidarity (Blum, 2007, p.57). In
this sense then, just being African American, Muslim, or gay prompts one to feel solidarity with
their respective group(s). This is not to say however, that all members of an identity group will
have a sense of solidarity. Some members may identify with a group to a large extent, some to a
lesser extent, and still some may not identify with a group at all. The absence of identification,
Blum writes, means an absence of shared connections and thus little solidarity with the group in
question. On the other hand, “some persons feel a kind of connection, attachment, and even
loyalty, to the abstract whole group that they may not to concrete members in known groups”
(Blum, 2007, p.58). The second basis for solidarity is shared experiences or something
undergone by each member of the group (Blum, 2007). Not every member in the group will
undergo the same experience or to the same level of magnitude or intensity as other members.
An example being discrimination. For example, people of minority groups may experience
discrimination, but may experience it in different kind, form, and shape than other members of
the group. The third basis for solidarity Blum mentions is political commitments (political values
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and principles are also included in this third group). Solidarity can center on limited or largescale political goals. Membership includes people of different identities and experiences, but
share in similar political commitments. Thus, this mode of solidarity is based on shared values as
well. For instance, Blacks may favor benign foreign policies for Blacks because of shared
notions of freedom, peace, and equality.
There may also exist within a given group competing strategies and narratives related to
expressing their fealty to the group. Because of this, it is not unheard of for a single group to
express multiple forms of solidarity. Shelby (2001) articulates two main views from which
African Americans view political solidarity: common oppression and collective selfdetermination. He notes adherents to the common oppression view stress that “Blacks should
unite and work together because they suffer a common oppression and they can overcome or
ameliorate their shared condition only though Black solidarity” (Shelby, 2001, p.232). For
collective self-determination, Shelby notes they believe “Blacks should unite and work together
because they are an oppressed people, a people with their own distinctive racial, ethnic, cultural,
and/or national identity; and as a people, Blacks have interests that are best served by their
becoming a self-determining group” (Shelby, 2001, p.232). These two strands of Black group
solidarity represent a long-documented debate among African Americans over increased
immersion with mainstream U.S. culture or withdrawal into their own separate political and
social structures. Marx (1967) described these two competing forms of group solidarity among
Blacks as “Black militancy” and “Black nationalism.” Other scholars put this debate in terms of
“Black integrationists” versus “Black separatists.” Political ideals and rhetoric serving Black
integrationist purposes are usually associated with figures and organizations such as Martin
Luther King Jr., the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), and
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Barack Obama. Those usually associated with serving Black separatist purposes include Marcus
Garvey, the Nation of Islam, and the Black Panther Party. Though each of these forms of racial
group solidarity articulate different mechanisms for advancement, they each strive to promote
the same goal of racial justice.
Also, different forms of group solidarity and political participation have varying levels of
personal costs associated with them and could have an impact on people’s level and choice of
engagement (Downs, 1957). Engaging in political behavior such as protesting or boycotting
requires a different type of personal sacrifice than does voting (McAdams, 1982). Whereas the
former may require a person to endure ridicule, loss of job/wages, or some other injury, the latter
may only cost a person an hour or two of standing in line. Thus, when examining group
solidarity, one must be sure to specify their assumptions very clearly in order to prevent
confusion.
Social Identity among White Americans
As mentioned earlier, though group consciousness has been primarily studied from the
perspectives of and attributed mostly with African Americans, recent scholars have also begun to
observe how group consciousness develops among Whites. Jardina (2014) writes this is because
there is increasing evidence that in the contemporary political environment, some Whites
perceive themselves to be a distinct and aggrieved political group. As she notes, “two decades of
mass immigration to the U.S., the election of America’s first black president, and the nation’s
growing non-white population have dramatically changed the political and social landscape”
(Jardina, 2014, p.1). McIntosh (1990) describes the concept of “white privilege” and how Whites
are taught early on to view racism as something that disadvantages others, but not necessarily
themselves. Helms (1990, 1995) notes White Americans go from a sense of naivety regarding
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social differences between African Americans and Whites, to embracing and appreciating these
differences between the races. McIntosh conceptualizes white privilege as an indivisible
weightless knapsack of special provisions, maps, passports, codebooks, visas, clothes, tools, and
blank checks (McIntosh, 1989, 1990). Cited examples of white privilege include pro-White
favoritism within the criminal justice system (Plant and Peruche, 2005), and the reality of White
ethnic enclaves (Sidanius, van Lear, Levin, and Sinclair, 2004). As Greenwood and Christian
(2008) colorfully, but perhaps too simplistically put it, white privilege may be likened to the
functions of White people as water is to the functions of fish: they remain oblivious of its
presence and life-sustaining attributes until it is brought to their attention or it is taken away.
Thus, as social and demographic shifts continue to take effect across the country’s
landscape, and as political institutions continue to evolve and embrace the ideas of a wider
multitude of diverse peoples, the dominance of Whites as a racial group in this country could be
perceived as being in jeopardy (Jardina, 2014). These fears are not wholly unfounded. The U.S.
Census Bureau predicts racial minority groups will constitute a majority of the U.S. national
population in 2042, thereby creating a majority-minority nation within the next 30 years (Craig
and Richeson, 2014). According to the U.S. Census Bureau (2012), non-Hispanic White
Americans will drop from 62% to 47% of the total U.S. national population between 2015 and
2050.
Because of this threat to their privilege and political dominance, Whites are increasingly
“identifying with their racial group, and this attachment has important political consequences”
(Jardina, 2014, p.1). A growing body of research indicates somewhere between 30 and 40% of
the American White population maintain a racial identity (Hutchings, Jardina, Mickey, and
Walton, 2010; Schildkraut, 2014). Craig and Richeson (2014) notes America’s increasing
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diversity leads White Americans to increasingly embrace conservative political ideology.
Danbold and Huo (2014) also suggest Whites’ declining share of the U.S. national population
threatens their status as America’s prototypical ethnic group. They suggest these demographic
and other social changes may threaten the long-standing association between being White and
being All-American. These authors conceptualize the term prototypically threat as “the potential
loss of a subgroup’s standing as most representative of a superordinate category” (Danbold and
Huo, 2014, p.211). As Outten, Schmitt, Miller, and Garcia (2012) explain, television news
headlines, such as this remind Whites of their declining group status, and lead to increased fear,
bias, and anger toward minorities.
In response to threats to their group status, Whites may adopt attitudes toward
government social, political, and economic policies consistent with keeping minority groups at
bay. For instance, Bobo (1998) shows White opposition to school busing, affirmative action, and
other social redistributive policies reflects a growing sense of fear that such policies may disrupt
their dominant societal position. Sears and Funk (1990) argue White’s positions on government
policy reflects their racial animus against minorities. In a study concerning White’s attitudes
toward affirmative action policies, Lowery, Unzueta, Knowles, and Goff (2006) show their level
of support was mediated not by the expected benefit to minorities, but by the expected harm to
Whites. Another tool used to serve dominant group interests, and often cited within the literature
on race, identity, politics, and inter-group relations is the strategic selection of ideologies and
framing techniques. One such example is that of colorblindness. Colorblindness refers to the idea
that racial differences are only skin deep and therefore may be ignored. Plaut (2010) writes
colorblindness may negatively affect racial attitudes among Whites. A colorblind ideology has
been shown to alienate minority workers when it becomes part of normal business operations
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within an organization (Pluat, Thomas, and Goren, 2009). Spoor and Schmitt (2011) show
members of advantaged social groups may react to threats to their group by increasing the degree
to which they identify with their advantaged group. In this sense, Whites whom feel threatened
will increase the level to which they identify with members of their race.
From this examination, one may conclude a sense of racial identification and group
consciousness vibrantly exists among White Americans. This social identification among Whites
stems from both actual and perceived threats to different elements of their dominant societal
positon (Wong, 2002). From transformative immigration policies, to increasing birthrates of nonWhites, to the election of the nation’s first African American president, and a growing chorus
echoing the realities of their diminishing collective status, a sense of racial identification and
group consciousness have perhaps manifested among Whites to a new level.
The seminal scholarship of V.O. Key (1949) illuminates the central role political context
plays in racial politics. Political context being the historical, political, economic, and social
phenomena which shapes the political environment. Because of Key’s keen insights, the impact
of racial context has been a mainstay in the study of American politics. Observing political
phenomena in America’s southern region, Key notes how Whites perceived African Americans
as a significant threat to their social, economic, and political well-being – and the political
implications which stem from such a perception. Key and his research team observed more racial
conflict in areas where the proximity of Whites and Blacks were closest. They reasoned the
political character and tone of individual states within the South varied roughly with the Negro
proportion in the population (1949, 5). Since Key (1949), research on the influence of racial
context has been conducted at different echelons in American society in order to gain more
insights on a diverse range of political and social phenomena. The impact of political context on
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racial attitudes and behavior have been examined at the state level (Huckfeldt and Kohfeld,
1989), the county level (Carsey, 1995), and at the local level (Huckefeldt, 1979; Huckfeldt and
Kohfeld, 1989).
Thus, physical threats to certain race groups have been shown to have political
consequences. It is less clear whether more social threats engender attitude shifts or other
political consequences however. Through this prism, a perceived threat to the societal status of
members of their ingroup, like other domestic threats, can engender greater racial solidarity
among Whites. Thorisdottier and Jost (2011) show threats to White’s economic system, their
political party, and their personal well-being led politicians from the center-right to adopt more
rigidly conservative stances.
Symbolic Politics
This section focuses on different reasons for which social identity may have a large
impact on someone’s political preferences? It also provides an explanation of why someone
would support or oppose a particular public policy even if they do not stand to personally
benefit? I argue self-enhancement may also manifest itself through what may be termed as
symbolic beliefs (Sears, Hensler, and Speer, 1979). Symbolic beliefs are early acquired affective
“responses to familiar political symbols such as Democrats and Republicans, conservatives and
liberals, Blacks and Whites …[and have a] clear and strong influence over the political attitudes
or behavior in question” (Law and Heldman, p.514, 2009). As people encounter new political
issues through their lives, they “respond to these new attitude objects on the basis of cognitive
consistency” (Sears et al., p.671, 1979). Symbolic predispositions such as liberal or conservative
ideology, party identification, and racial prejudice have been shown to have major effects on
policy attitudes (Sears et al., 1979). As Kinder and Sears (1980) note, this is because symbolic
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beliefs are sociocultural whereby in their youth people form prejudices, biases, and other values
that are normative in their social environment. This is in contrast to the theory whereby political
attitudes and preferences are guided by one’s material self-interests (Page, 1977; Riker and
Ondeschook, 1973). In fact, subsequent research in this area uncovers very little evidence to
support this “pocketbook” interest theory regarding the American people. For instance, White
residents in Los Angeles who felt directly under attack with the possibility of having their
neighborhood forcibly desegregated, or who felt endangered by the possible occurrence of Black
violence within their neighborhood, were no more likely to exhibit support for the conservative
White former police chief, over the liberal Black city councilman in the 1969 and 1973 Los
Angeles mayoral elections (Kinder and Sears, 1981). Also, residents of Los Angeles who were
personally affected by the 1974 energy crisis were no more or less likely to exhibit support for
President Nixon or the political system than were people living in Los Angeles who did not
suffer any direct injuries by the crisis (Sears, Tyler, Citrin, and Kinder, 1978). In another
example, Sears, Hensler, and Speer (1979) show that Whites residing in places where busing for
school integration was taking place or was threatened to occur, or who had kids attending public
school, were no more likely to oppose busing than Americans without such markers of selfinterest. Similarly, Lau, Brown, and Sears (1978) found that even when adults had family
members or close friends doing military service in Vietnam, they were no more opposed to the
Vietnam War in 1968 than citizens without anything personally at stake in the war. Thus, the
conclusion here seems clear: tangible self-interest narrowly defined, seldom plays a role in
citizen’s political attitudes and conduct (Lau and Heldman, 2009). Later examinations of this
literature do uncover a few exceptions however when the stakes are extremely high – but still not
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enough to change the conclusion drawn here (Citrin and Green, 1990; Lau, 1990; Sears and
Funk, 1991; Sears and Citrin, 1985).
As this section reveals, a citizen need not be tangibly (narrowly defined) affected by a
particular domestic public policy in order to oppose or support it. I contend that a similar
conclusion regarding public opinion may be reached in the realm of foreign policy. Some U.S.
foreign policies may be perceived as symbolic and thus evoke a response consistent with their
predisposed system of values and political socialization. In other words, one’s social identity
causes them to engage in symbolic politics even when it comes to U.S. government policy at the
international level. As it relates to U.S. foreign policy, I argue that social identity as expressed
through race is a mechanism which causes citizens to engage in symbolic politics.
Expectations
I am interested in knowing whether social identity influences political attitudes toward
foreign policy. The main argument in this dissertation is that social identity causes Americans to
be more likely to support foreign policies that benefit people they tend to socially identify with. I
build off previous research showing American society to be one that is still very much conscious
of racial differences. Not only do African Americans see themselves as part of a distinctive
group apart from other Americans, but research also shows White Americans are developing and
thinking of themselves more in terms of a collective and distinct group. This social identification
with one’s race group among Americans not only has political consequences in terms of
domestic politics, but it also affects their views toward foreign policy The more one identifies
with his/her race group, the more likely they are to also support foreign policies benefitting
others of their race group.
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The empirical analysis that I present in the next few chapters bear this out. As I analyze
my survey and survey experiments, I conduct different statistical tests to examine the type of
influence (if any) that social identity plays in shaping American views toward foreign policy. In
order to empirically evaluate this relationship, I utilize a dataset from the Chicago Council on
Global Affairs, I conduct an original survey experiment, and I employ a dataset from the 2016
Cooperative Congressional Election Survey. The specific hypotheses in terms of relating
dependent variables to independent variables are explained in more detail in the empirical
chapters.
As this chapter has demonstrated, the political socialization of individuals in America is
influenced by a number of factors and has several political implications. People’s political views
are shaped by their earliest relationships from their family home-unit, to the schools they attend.
These early notions are reinforced throughout life and people begin to understand the group(s)
they belong to, and what space the group occupies in society. Though people may belong to
many different groups at any given point in time, the particular race group they socially identify
with rarely changes. This dissertation goes beyond the Democrat/Republican divide often used
within political science to explain attitude formation toward political topics by outlining a theory
regarding socially identifying with one’s race and the effect it has on foreign policy attitudes. As
the group thinks, so too does the individual and one’s subsequent political viewpoints are thus
influenced by what they believe is in the interests of the group. It goes without saying that some
people place more emphasis on the importance of their social group identification than others
might. This chapter has shown this to be true and it has also put forth many other social and
political factors that may induce or reduce one’s level of social identification with a given group.
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Given the relative importance that social identity theory has in explaining political
phenomena at the domestic level, it is surprising that political scientists have devoted little
scholarship to examining the relationship between social identity, symbolic politics, and group
consciousness as it relates to foreign policy. As this chapter demonstrates, much of this
scholarship has been devoted to studying social identity from the context of America versus
other countries. But this type of analysis fails to appreciate the many contending (as well as
cooperating and neutral) social groups in America that operate at the societal-level. A few
studies have shown how a sense of linked-fate among a given minority group may increase their
level of social identity. Even fewer studies have disaggregated public opinion between majority
and minority groups and established a baseline rationale for heterogenous political attitudes
toward foreign policy. Of the few studies that have applied social identity theory to the foreign
policy context, none have taken into account how socially identifying with one’s race group
influences public opinion levels. Data limitations have also been an issue when examining
political preferences among minority groups, especially as it relates to foreign concerns. This
dissertation fills this gap by examining how race groups in America consciously and/or
unconsciously seek to enhance the status of their own ingroup through the self-enhancement
mechanism known as racial solidarity. It shows this process is exacerbated by individual’s
predisposed symbolic beliefs. This dissertation also adds to the literature by analyzing whether
group consciousness influences the level of racial solidarity people express toward foreign
policy. The next chapter is the first of three empirical chapters I use to analyze these
relationships.
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CHAPTER THREE
EXAMINING SOCIAL IDENTITY LINKS TO FOREIGN POLICY IN THE 2010
NATIONAL GLOBAL VIEWS STUDY
“Social condition is commonly the result of circumstances, sometimes of laws, oftener
still of these two causes united; but when once established, it may justly be considered as itself
the source of almost all the laws, the usages, and the ideas which regulate the conduct of
nations; whatever it does not produce; it modifies” – (Alexis de Tocqueville, [1835] 1958)
The above quotation from the celebrated Frenchman’s careful study of the system of
democracy in America is demonstrative of the conspicuous influence social conditioning played
in American politics over two centuries ago. To Tocqueville, social conditions played as large a
role in the lives of the early Americans, as it did in almost every major capital city in Europe. As
we see in his astute observation, the social conditions of man may heavily influence their ideas,
which in turn influences their personal politics.
This chapter looks at the influence of social identity theory on public opinion towards
U.S. foreign policy using existing survey data. The self-enhancement mechanism highlighted in
this chapter is known as racial group solidarity. I use racial identity as the measure of racial
solidarity. In terms of foreign policy, individuals show solidarity with other members of their
race by supporting policies that prove beneficial to them. The evidence presented in this chapter
moves us a step closer to understanding how powerful the effects of social identity actually are in
our personal lives and how they may translate into serious political consequence in a highly
pluralistic society.
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Hypotheses
The basic argument in this chapter is that Americans view other nations favorably if the
country in question has a racial make-up similar to their own. Americans not only think in terms
of ingroups and outgroups in relationship to domestic policy, but also in regards to U.S. foreign
policy. I build off the theory discussed in Chapter 2 that individuals support government policies
benefitting their own particular ingroup over others (Kinder and Kam, 2010). The theoretical
argument is even when it comes to foreign policy, American attitudes are partly formed in a
similar fashion. I expect White Americans to exhibit more favorable positions toward majority
White countries. I also expect for Black Americans to exhibit more favorable positions toward
majority Black countries. In regards to countries with neither a majority Black nor White
population, I have no clear expectations for White and Black American’s positions toward those
countries. I do not expect any distinguishable pattern to emerge as it relates to non-majority
White or Black countries.
Given these expectations, four hypotheses emerge listed with the independent variables
discussed below:
H1a: White Americans will have greater positive views toward majority White countries
than Black Americans.
H1b: Black Americans will have greater positive views toward majority Black countries
than White Americans.
H2a: White Americans will be more likely to list majority White countries as having an
important strategic relationship with the United States than Black Americans.
H2b: Black Americans will be more likely to list majority Black countries as having an
important strategic relationship with the United States than White Americans.
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Data and Methods
In 2010, the Chicago Council on Global Affairs (CCGA) contacted a national sample of
American households in order to better understand the foreign policy attitudes of the American
people. Households for this “Global Views” study were selected by using random-digit dialing
(RDD) and address-based sampling methods. The Global Views 2010 survey is ideal for this
study because of the extensive depth and range of foreign policy topics in which it covered.
Respondents were asked over 100 questions on various issues regarding world affairs, U.S.
international policy, attitudes toward other countries, among other topics. The report also
included questions covering respondent’s perceptions and attitudes toward various aspects of
U.S. foreign policy. The Global Views 2010 survey is based on the results of a nationwide
survey of 2,596 adults conducted between June 11 and June 22, 2010 (see Global Views 2010 for
more details).
To test the hypotheses, I conduct a series of t-tests to compare the average level of
support Blacks and Whites exhibit on the importance of various countries to the United States’
interests and their feelings of warmth towards various countries. The t-test is useful here because
it shows the mean level of warmness that each race group feels toward given countries and their
people. More importantly however, is that the independent t-tests also provide a test of statistical
significance. I then present the results of a logistic regression model on views of the importance
of a country (across various countries) to control for important factors besides race that may
influence foreign policy views.

55

Dependent Variables
I focus on two dependent variables in this chapter: a feeling thermometer measure of
positive, or warm, feelings towards individual countries, and views on a country’s strategic
importance to the United States. Table 3.1 lists the specific question wording and coding. The
positive feeling or warmth variable is a feeling thermometer with scores ranging from 0-100.
The strategic importance variable takes a 1 if a respondent answered very or somewhat important
and a 0 if they answered not very or not at all important.
Table 3.1 List of Questions Operationalizing Foreign Policy Issue Domains Taken from the 2010
Global Views Study by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs
“Please rate your feelings toward some
countries and peoples, with one hundred
meaning a very warm, favorable
feeling, zero meaning a very cold,
unfavorable feeling, and fifty meaning
not particularly warm or cold. You can
use any number from zero to one hundred,
the higher the number the more favorable
your feelings are toward that country or
those people.” The countries used for this
study are: Pakistan, Germany, Mexico,
Israel, Great Britain, China, Saudi
Arabia, France, Brazil, India, Japan,
Russia, Venezuela, Iran, Cuba, Iraq,
Palestinian Authority, South Africa, North
Korea, South Korea, Indonesia, Turkey.
1.) "Here is a list of countries. Thinking
about the role each of these countries
plays in the world, how important is
each country to the United States?”
The countries respondents were asked
about include: China, Great Britain,
Canada, Japan, Israel, Mexico, Saudi
Arabia, Germany, Iraq, Russia, Iran,
Afghanistan, South Korea, Pakistan,
India, Brazil, Turkey, and Nigeria.

Warmth Measure:
Foreign Policy Concerning Individual
Attitudes toward other Countries and Peoples

Strategic Importance Measure:
Foreign Policy Concerning America’s
Strategic Relationship with Different Nations

Respondents were asked to indicate
their preference in the following
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manner: a) Very Important, b)
Somewhat Important, c) Not Very
Important, d) Not At All Important, e)
Not Sure/Decline.
I recode as follows: Very
Important=1; Somewhat Important=1;
Not Very Important=0; Not At All
Important=0; Not
Sure/Decline=Discarded

Independent Variable
Social Identity via Racial Identification: The independent variable in this project is social
identity as expressed through racial identification. Social identity as expressed through racial
identification is accounted for by controlling for the particular race group each respondent
identifies as belonging to, specifically Whites and African Americans. In the models, I code the
race variable as Blacks = 1 and Whites = 0 and exclude all others from the analysis.
Other Control Variables
Political Ideology: Ideology is conceptualized by some as the general political belief of
individuals, which implies that the positions they take on matters are predictable across a wide
set of issues (Poole and Rosenthall, 1997). Ideology is determined by asking respondents how
ideological they are based on a 7-point scale going from extremely liberal to extremely
conservative
Gender: I also include gender as a variable in this analysis. Research has shown there are
many consistent and enduring differences between the domestic and international policy
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preferences of men and women (Page & Shapiro, 1992). Gender is a dichotomous variable with
1 indicating female gender and 0 denoting male.
Age: Age is also an ascriptive characteristic that has been linked with influencing
attitudes (Putnam, 1995). Older people tend to have more informed and stable political opinions.
Age is measured in number of years old.
Social Economic Status (SES): A few different measures are included to determine a
person’s SES level. I control for level of income, as well as for education level. Income measures
a respondent’s total family income per $1,000. The variable for education measures the highest
degree earned, or year of schooling that was completed by the respondent.
Partisanship: Party affiliation is measured as a dichotomous variable with Democrats
assigned a score of “0” and Republicans a score of “1.”
Results
To illustrate how social identity may influence the way Americans process their attitudes
regarding foreign policy, I look here at the role race plays in determining how warmly they feel
toward different nations around the world and their respective populations. Below I present
results from a series of independent t-tests where the dependent variable is a thermometer
question asking respondents how warmly they feel toward a selection of countries. Thus, the
empirical question under investigation here is whether racial identification is significant in terms
that Blacks are warmer towards countries with majority Black populations, and Whites towards
countries with White majorities.
The selection of countries used for this question are: Pakistan, Germany, Mexico, Israel,
Great Britain, China, Saudi Arabia, France, Brazil, India, Japan, Russia, Venezuela, Iran,
58

Cuba, Iraq, Palestinian Authority, South Africa, North Korea, South Korea, Indonesia, and
Turkey. Race is the independent variable. This variable is dichotomous with Blacks=1 and
Whites=0.
Table 3.2 t-test Results Comparing Blacks and Whites Feelings of Warmness toward different
Countries
Country

Whites
Mean

n

Blacks
Mean

Difference

t-value

n

European or Majority White
France
Germany
Great Britain
Israel
Russia

55.84
65.36
89.00
58.65
48.09

895
892
1878
889
1869

58.32
54.37
83.00
51.62
46.8

90
106
231
98
2225

-2.48
10.99
6.00
7.03
1.29

-0.92
4.71***
3.01***
2.35**
0.83

African or Majority Black
Brazil
South Africa

56.05
52.66

1872
859

56.66
59.31

224
110

0.61
-6.65

0.4
-2.94***

Asian
China
Indonesia
Japan
South Korea
North Korea

43.43
46.95
61.96
53.76
23.62

1879
854
1877
1866
880

50.3
49.1
53.5
47.27
35.25

222
99
225
221
111

-6.87
-2.15
8.46
6.49
-11.63

-4.23***
-1.01
4.98***
3.66***
-5.03***

Hispanic
Cuba
Mexico
Venezuela

37.08
45.52
41.27

854
867
840

42.76
50.18
47.33

115
95
109

-5.68
-4.66
-6.06

-2.40**
1.73*
-2.44**

Middle Eastern
Iran
Iraq
Pakistan
Palestine
Saudi Arabia
Turkey

24.29
33.41
56.05
31.13
38.84
48.09

840
933
1872
862
872
867

30.74
40.2
56.66
41.61
43.53
45.69

116
101
224
114
112
95

-6.45
-6.79
-0.61
-10.48
-4.69
2.4

2.86***
-2.72***
-0.4
-4.67***
-2.08*
1.05

Standard Error in brackets. Note: *** p <.01, ** p < .01, * p < .05
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I first look at the results in Table 3.2 for different majority White European countries. I
begin with Great Britain and its people. The results show that on average, in comparison to
African Americans, White Americans are 6 points more likely to report higher levels of feelings
of warmness toward Great Britain and its people. This difference is statistically significant at the
.001 level. This finding conforms to my expectation and provides evidence to hypothesis 1a in
that White Americans feel warmer toward countries with majority White populations than do
African Americans.
Looking at other European countries, a trend emerges. For example, White Americans
are 10.99 points more likely than African Americans, to report feelings of warmness toward
Germany and its people. This difference is statistically significant at the .001 level and also
provides evidence to hypothesis 1a. Thus, on average, White Americans also report having
warmer feelings toward the German Republic and its people than African Americans.
Moving to non-White countries, I observe American feelings of warmness toward South
Africa. The results reveal that on average, White Americans report having statistically significant
lower levels of feelings of warmness toward South Africa and its people than African
Americans. African Americans are 6.65 points more likely than White Americans to report
having warm feelings toward South Africa. The t-value associated with this figure is shows this
difference to be statistically significant at the .001 level, thus providing evidence to hypothesis
1b. Looking at American attitudes toward another predominately Black country, Brazil, the
results paint a very similar picture. An independent t-test on African Americans and White
Americans reveal that on average, African Americans report having higher levels of feelings of
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warmness toward the country of Brazil and its people than White Americans. Though the test
statistic in this case is not statistically significant, it does point in the expected direction.
Turning our attention back to another majority White country, I now observe whether
there are significant differences between White Americans and African Americans in the level of
warmness they feel toward the nation of Israel and its people. As expected, White Americans
report feeling warmer toward Israel and its people than African Americans. This difference is
statistically significant at the .01 level and provides even further evidence to hypothesis 1a. On
average, White Americans also have warmer feelings toward France and its people than African
Americans.
Generally speaking, the t-tests show that on average, White Americans report having
warmer feelings toward countries with majority White populations than do African Americans.
On the other hand, African Americans report having warmer feelings toward countries with
predominately Black populations than White Americans. These statistically significant t-values
associated with these results support hypotheses 1a and 1b.
In an additional effort to illustrate the role social identity may play in shaping American
attitudes toward foreign policy, I also examine the influence of race in forming individual
perceptions concerning the strategic importance of different countries to the United States. The
outcome of interest in this analysis is public attitudes toward a country’s strategic relationship to
the United States. Thus, the outcome variable for each model equals 1 if the public believes a
country’s relationship to the United States is important to the United States, and 0 if otherwise. I
model the outcome for each scenario using logit regression. The explanatory variables of interest
are controls for whether respondents are White or Black. Also included in the models (full model
results in the Appendix) are control variables for partisanship, income, age, education, gender,
61

and ideology. This set-up will be useful as I seek to assess the ways in which different race
groups respond to certain countries and the importance of their relationships to the U.S., while
holding other variables constant. The nonlinearity of logit analysis however, sometimes causes
challenges with interpreting the original coefficients. Because of this, I utilize a technique
employed by Stanley, Bianco, and Niemi (1986), and estimate the average marginal impact of
each group characteristics (i.e. race) in terms of an average percentage difference that the group
characteristic makes. This particular type of analysis allows one to better determine which group
characteristics may promote attitudes regarding whether a country is important to the U.S. For
example, this type of analysis allows one to estimate the probability that someone who is White,
will believe Germany’s relationship to the U.S. is important, holding each of the other group
traits of that individual constant (for more examples see Brown, 1995). The countries
respondents were asked about include: China, Great Britain, Canada, Japan, Israel, Mexico,
Saudi Arabia, Germany, Iraq, Russia, Iran, Afghanistan, South Korea, Pakistan, India,
Brazil, Turkey, and Nigeria.
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Results
Table 3.3 Predictive Margins of Race on Attitudes toward Different Countries

Country
European or Majority White
Canada
Germany
Great Britain
Israel
Russia

African or Majority Black
Brazil
Nigeria

Asian
China
India
Japan
South Korea

Hispanic
Mexico

Middle Eastern
Afghanistan
Iraq

Marginal Effects
White

Difference Between Race Groups
Black

(Black vs. White)

0.90
[0.01]***
0.80
[0.02]***
0.90
[0.01]***
0.77
[0.02]***
0.77
[0.01]***

0.84
[0.04]***
0.73
[0.05]***
0.85
[0.03]***
0.79
[0.04]***
0.74
[0.04]***

-0.06
[0.04]
-0.06
[0.25]
-0.05
[0.03]***
0.02
[0.05]
-0.03
[0.43]

0.52
[0.02]***
0.30
[0.02]***

0.60
[0.04]***
0.54
[0.06]***

0.08
[0.05]*
0.24
[0.06]***

0.91
[0.01]***
0.67
[0.01]***
0.89
[0.01]***
0.67
[0.01]***

0.89
[0.02]***
0.73
[0.03]***
0.89
[0.02]***
0.73
[0.03]***

-0.02
[0.03]
0.06
[0.04]
-0.01
[0.03]
0.05
[0.03]

0.72
[0.02]***

0.72
[0.04]***

-0.06
[0.04]

0.60
[0.02]***
0.61
[0.02]***

0.65
[0.04]***
0.69
[0.05]***

0.05
[0.05]
0.08
[0.05]
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Iran
Pakistan
Saudi Arabia
Turkey

0.60
[0.02]***
0.60
[0.02]***
0.78
[0.02]***
0.51
[0.02]***

0.62
[0.05]***
0.64
[0.05]***
0.81
[0.04]***
0.53
[0.05]***

0.02
[0.06]
0.04
[0.05]
0.02
[0.60]
0.02
[0.05]

Standard Error in brackets. Note: *** p <.01, ** p < .05, * p < .10

Table 3.3 presents estimates of the average marginal impact of race on attitudes toward
the importance of a country’s relationship to the U.S. based on the full model results in the
Appendix. Looking firstly at American attitudes toward majority White countries, we see that
White Americans are far more likely to view these countries’ relationship to the U.S. as
important than African Americans. White Americans are more likely to view the relationships of
4 out 5 of the majority White countries as important to the strategic interests of the U.S. than are
African Americans. The probability of an average White American to view the relationship of
Canada as important to the U.S. is 90% as compared to 84% for the average African American.
The probability of an average White American to view Germany as important to the U.S. is 80%,
while the probability of an average African American is 73%. Regarding Great Britain, the
probability of an average African American to view this country’s relationship as important to
the strategic interests of the U.S. is 85%, while the probability of an average White American is
90%. The contrast results in Table 3.3 reveal the difference between the attitudes of Black and
White Americans as it relates to the strategic relationship of Great Britain to the U.S. are
statistically significant. Responses among White and Black Americans as it concerns Russia tell
a similar tale. The average probability of a White American to view Russia as important to the
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U.S. is 77%, while the average probability of an African American is 74%. The only majority
White country that African Americans view as important to the U.S. with greater likelihood than
White Americans is Israel. When asked about the importance of Israel’s relationship to the U.S.,
the average probability of an African American to believe that it’s important is 79%, while the
average probability of a White American is 77%; however, this is a substantively small and
statistically insignificant difference. On the whole, these results conform to hypothesis 2a in that
White Americans will attribute more importance than African Americans to countries whose
racial make-up largely resembles their own particular race.
For hypothesis 2b, the survey only included two majority Black countries: Brazil (the
only South American country included) and Nigeria (the only African country included). As
expected, Table 3.3 shows White Americans to be less likely than African Americans, to regard
the relationships of Brazil and Nigeria as important to the U.S. The average probability of a
White American to view the relationship of Brazil as important to the U.S. is 52% while the
average probability for an African American is 60%. The table also shows that the average
probability of White Americans to regard the relationship of Nigeria as important to the U.S. is
30%, as compared to 54% for the average probability of Black Americans. The contrast results in
Table 3.3 reveal the differences between the attitudes of Black and White Americans as it relates
to the relationships of Brazil and Nigeria to the U.S. are statistically significant. Thus, on average
African Americans were more likely than White Americans to view the relationships of the
majority Black countries of Brazil and Nigeria as important to the strategic interests of the U.S.
These results conform to the expectations. The more a country’s racial make-up resembles an
individual’s particular race group, the more likely they are to believe that that country’s
relationship to the U.S. is important.
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Attitudes related to countries within the Middle East were more varied between White
and Black Americans than those toward the examined European countries. White Americans are
more likely to view the relationships of Iran, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia as more important to the
U.S. than are African Americans. On the other hand, African Americans are more likely to view
the relationships of Turkey and Afghanistan as more important to the U.S. These results do not
follow a general pattern, nor are they suggestive of a minority connection where minorities
favorably view other minorities. If a minority connection did exist, then African Americans
would be more prone to consider the relationships of each Middle Eastern country (or at least a
majority of them) presented here as important to the strategic interests of the United States. I find
no significant differences in these countries so this seems to match my expectation of no
difference or clear pattern as it relates to Middle Eastern countries.
Table 3.3 also displays American public attitudes as it relates to different countries in
Asia. American attitudes concerning countries in Asia are similar to those in regards to countries
within the Middle East. That is, the only pattern they tend to follow is that feelings are mixed
between Whites and African Americans regarding the importance of different countries in Asia
to the interests of the United States. Whites are more likely than Blacks to report the
relationships of China and Japan as important to the U.S. and African Americans are more likely
to report the relationship of South Korea as being important to the U.S.
Conclusion
Consistent with my hypotheses, the results in this analysis reveal that social identity
increases the likelihood of Americans (at least White Americans and African Americans) to
exhibit racial solidarity in their attitudes toward U.S. foreign policy. Consistent with hypothesis
1a, I found that White Americans are more likely than Black Americans to express feelings of
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warmness toward countries in European or majority-White countries. This was especially the
case in regards to Germany, Great Britain, and Israel. On the other hand, and consistent with
hypothesis 1b, I found Black Americans to be more likely than White Americans to express
feelings of warmness toward African or other majority-Black nations.
I also found that when it comes to African or other majority-Black nations, African
Americans are more likely than White Americans, to view their relationship as strategically
important to the United States. The results reveal that when it comes to majority-White countries,
White Americans are more likely than African Americans, to view their relationships with
America as strategically important.
This analysis shows that identifying as either White American or Black American, has a
major impact on how one views U.S. foreign policy. As Green, Palmquist, and Schickler (2002)
note, people view themselves as part of a team and it pleases them to see other team members do
well. Applying this logic to the formation of foreign policy attitudes, we see that Americans
behave no differently in this area than they do when it comes to forming their partisanship in the
domestic arena. Americans feel warmer towards other members of their team (in this case
members of their own race), while also placing importance on countries where members of their
team make-up the majority. On the other hand, they also believe the relationships of other
countries to not be as important to the United States. This analysis reveals the importance of
social identity and political socialization, and argues for further development to understand more
fully the nature of their relationship in regards to public opinion and U.S. foreign policy.
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CHAPTER FOUR
EXPLORING SOCIAL IDENTITY LINKS TO FOREIGN POLICY USING QUALTRICS

“Do not lead an American to speak of Europe; he will ordinarily show great presumption and a
rather silly pride. He will be content with these general and indefinite ideas that in all countries
are of such great help to the ignorant. But ask him about his country, and you will see the cloud
that envelops his intellect suddenly dissipate; his language becomes clear, clean, and precise,
like his thought” – Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America

Introduction
America has a long-held tradition in America of differentiating oneself from others
predicated on their social identity. As the French aristocrat, Alexis de Tocqueville, noted over
200 years ago, early Americans social identification led them assume positive thoughts toward
their own country, while embracing negative thoughts towards Europe. From the earliest periods
in our nation’s history, social identity has had an impact on how Americans view themselves and
others at the international level. In this chapter, I argue and provide evidence that social identity
plays a unique role in the way Americans form their attitudes toward foreign policy. I show that
American views toward U.S. foreign policy vary by their group social identification. Because a
person may socially identify with several groups at once (Stets and Burke, 2000), I conduct an
original experiment in order to isolate the effects that socially identifying with one’s race group
may have on their attitudes toward U.S. foreign policy. I expect people to support foreign
policies that benefit people of their own race.
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Hypotheses
Based on literature discussed and theory developed in Chapter 2, my hypotheses center
on the idea that social identity influences a person’s propensity to show racial solidarity when
they consider U.S. foreign policy. Generally, the first hypothesis is people are more likely to
support foreign policies directed toward their racial ingroup, and the general expectation for the
second hypothesis is the more one identifies with his/her race, the more likely they are to support
U.S. foreign policies beneficial to people of a similar race. I expect both races to express similar
attitudes according to their race and level of social identity. Based on the literature, Black
Americans will support foreign policies that benefit other Blacks around the world. I also expect
to see Blacks with a higher sense of social identity will express more support than other Blacks,
for foreign policies that benefit people of the same race around the world. I expect White
Americans to support foreign policies that benefit other Whites around the world. Analogous to
my expectations for Blacks, I also expect for Whites with an elevated sense of social identity
with their race, to express more support than other White Americans for policies that benefit
other predominately White areas.
In the first part of this chapter, I test the following hypotheses:
H1a: White Americans will be more likely to prefer policies directed towards Ukraine
than Black Americans.
H1b: Black Americans will be more likely to prefer policies directed towards Sudan than
White Americans.
H2a: White ingroup respondents (whites receiving the white picture condition) will be
more likely to support policies directed towards Ukraine than black ingroup respondents.
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H2b: Black ingroup respondents (blacks receiving the black picture condition) will be
more likely to support policies directed towards Sudan than white ingroup respondents.
I test these hypotheses using the two dependent variables discussed in Table 1 below.
Data and Methods
I conduct an original survey experiment to address these expectations. Respondents
participating in this survey were students from the University of Mississippi (N=456), DePauw
University (N=12), Fisk University (N=13), and Louisiana State University (N=1). After
eliminating respondents who did not complete the entire survey, the total was 482 respondents
including 383 Whites, and 83 African Americans. Building an original survey questionnaire gave
me the opportunity to efficiently conduct a study exploring the role social identification plays in
shaping American political attitudes toward U.S. foreign policy, and at relatively little expense.
An original survey for this type of analysis is especially ideal because I’m able to formulate
questions better suited to study the role of social identity than are some of the standard questions
found on national surveys. Generally speaking, surveys are useful because they furnish access to
individual’s opinions, preferences, and feelings and this access affords the ability to gain deeper
insights into how individuals are affected by their social identities.
Nested within the survey is a survey experiment that seeks to isolate the influence of
socially identifying with one’s race. The survey experiment includes information regarding a
general humanitarian crisis scenario. Though everyone was presented with the same text
regarding the humanitarian crisis scenario, some respondents were randomly assigned to receive
a picture of a racial group in distress accompanied with the humanitarian crisis information with
some respondents only receive the text. The respondents were randomly assigned to one of the
following conditions: a) text of humanitarian crisis scenario along with a picture of Black victims
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in distress, b) text of humanitarian crisis scenario along with a picture of White victims in
distress, c) text of humanitarian crisis scenario along with a picture of Hispanic victims in
distress, or d) text of humanitarian crisis scenario without any accompanying picture. Including
pictures of race groups with the information allowed me to examine the level of racial solidarity
people exhibit once their sense of social identity is primed or becomes activated.
In this survey experiment, I sought to determine if people’s attitudes toward U.S. foreign
policy, are informed in part by their social identity. The experiment is used to test whether
Americans base their support for U.S. foreign policies, predicated on the races of those overseas
groups which stand to benefit from such policies. Specifically, I look to see if they give more
support to sending humanitarian resources to countries whose populations are predominately
similar to their own in terms of race, than they would a country whose population consists of
only a limited number of people of their race.
When taking the survey, the respondents completed pre-tests, given information about a
general humanitarian crisis, and instructed to complete post-tests. The pre-test asked basic
demographic information, as well as attitudinal questions about their thoughts regarding
America’s role in providing humanitarian resources to overseas crisis situations. The post-test
were questions regarding whether to contribute U.S. troops to different humanitarian scenarios
throughout the world, as well as to increase or decrease humanitarian-related economic resources
to different geographical areas (Eastern European countries and African countries). The races
examined were Black Americans (I use the terms Black Americans and African Americans
interchangeably) and White Americans.
As with many surveys, one limitation is that they can be quite inflexible. Once the
questionnaire is fielded, researchers are generally stuck with the questions. Even though some
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questions are more suitable for some groups than they are for others, each group must receive the
same standardized set of questions. Inflexibility within the surveys also arises when the
researcher notices some respondents not fully understanding particular questions, and again, the
questionnaire must remain unaltered. Another limitation of this type of research is that because
student populations are primarily utilized, it may not be totally representative of the national
population. However, with including a portion of these questions on the nationally representative
CCES study in the next chapter, I am able to overcome this limitation. I include in the appendix
a draft of my original survey experiment.
Method
In order to test the hypotheses in this chapter, I employ t-tests to determine if there exist
any significant differences between African Americans and White Americans on multiple
segments of U.S. foreign policy. T-tests along with pairwise means comparisons are used to test
my experiment to determine whether the attitudes between Blacks and Whites toward foreign
policy yield statistically significant differences predicated on the race of the victims seen in the
different experimental conditions, as well as on the extent to which they social identify with their
race. I also employ t-tests to determine if any significant differences exist between Black ingroup
members and White ingroup members in their attitudes on several aspects of U.S. foreign policy.
T-tests are also used to determine whether the foreign policy attitudes between ingroup members
are statistically different from other members of their own race. These bivariate tests are
appropriate in survey experiment design as the random assignment serves a control for other
potential variables that may influence respondents’ foreign policy preferences.
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Dependent Variables
I include the list of dependent variables for this chapter in the Table 4.1 below. These
dependent variables cover a few different areas of U.S. foreign policy. By understanding
people’s preferences related to how the U.S. should prioritize its foreign policy, I can gain deeper
insights into the political nature of social identity and the implications it may have on the
political process. The questions included in the survey sought to determine American attitudes as
it relates to how U.S. foreign policy resources should be prioritized and allocated in various
countries around the world.
Table 4.1 Questions Operationalizing Preferences toward U.S. Foreign Policy Priorities
2.) “Because the United States does not
have an unlimited budget for foreign
operations, it must prioritize the
humanitarian crisis situations it
chooses to become involved with.
Given this understanding, please
indicate which humanitarian crisis
situation you believe the United States
should involve itself with FIRST?”

A.) Preferred U.S. Humanitarian Priority

a) ______To be part of an
international force to enforce a
peace agreement between Sudan
and South Sudan?
b) ______To be part of an
international force to help stop the
killing in Ukraine
c) ______To become part of
international force to help stop the
killings in Myanmar (Burma)
I code as follows: First=1, Anything
other than First=0
3.) For the following questions, please
indicate whether you believe U.S.
humanitarian-related economic aid to

B.) Preferences Regarding Recipients of
U.S. Humanitarian Economic Aid
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the given areas should be increased,
decreased, kept about the same, or
stopped altogether. Check only one
response for each statement.
a) Do you believe U.S. humanitarianrelated economic aid to Eastern
European countries should be
increased, decreased, kept about the
same, or stopped altogether?
______Increased
______ Kept About the Same
______ Decreased
______ Stopped Altogether
b) Do you believe U.S. humanitarianrelated economic aid to African
countries should be increased,
decreased, kept about the same, or
stopped altogether?
______Increased
______ Kept About the Same
______ Decreased
______ Stopped Altogether
I code responses as follows: 1=Stopped
Altogether, 2=Decreased, 3=Kept About
the Same, 4=Increased

Independent Variables
The independent variables of interest for the first part of the chapter are race and then
race conditioned by the treatment condition a respondent received.

74

Race: A respondent’s race captures their social identity as expressed through racial
identification. The race groups included in this chapter are White Americans and Black
Americans.
Conditions: When taking the survey, each respondent was randomly assigned a scenario
according to the race of the picture that was presented in their humanitarian crisis briefing. There
are four scenarios: 1) No Picture, 2) Black Picture, 3) White Picture, and 4) Hispanic Picture.
Each scenario is accounted for with dummy variables.
Ingroup: The independent variables for this chapter deal with social identity. I created the
variable Scenario Group by including Whites and Blacks that received the White Picture or
Black Picture treatment. From the Scenario Group, I created the variable Ingroup by assigning a
1 to Blacks that received the Black Picture Treatment and 0 to Blacks that received any other
treatment. Whites received a 1 if they received the White Picture Treatment, and a 0 if they
received any other treatment.
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Results
Table 4.2 Attitudes of toward U.S. Humanitarian Priorities per Observed Picture (all respondents
by condition)

Observed (Mean)
N

Observed (Mean)
N

Observed (Mean)
N

No Picture
0.38
81

No Picture
0.41
81

No Picture
0.21
81

Sudan
Black Picture
0.45
108
Ukraine
Black Picture
0.26
108
Burma
Black Picture
0.29
108
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White Picture
0.34
120

White Picture
0.44
120

White Picture
0.22
120

Hispanic Picture
0.35
107

Hispanic Picture
0.36
107

Hispanic Picture
0.29
107

Table 4.3 Comparisons of Attitudes toward U.S. Humanitarian Priorities per Observed Picture
(all respondents)
Sudan

Pair 1: Black Picture v. No Picture
Pair 2: White Picture v. No Picture
Pair 3: White Picture v. Black
Picture

Contrast
0.07
-.04

Std. Error
0.07
0.7

t
0.99
-.59

-.11

0.06

-1.74

Contrast
-.15
0.03

Std. Error
0.07
0.07

t
-2.10
0.5

0.18

0.06

2.87**

Contrast
0.08
0.01

St. Error
0.06
0.06

t
1.21
0.11

-.07

0.06

-1.22

Ukraine

Pair 1: Black Picture v. No Picture
Pair 2: White Picture v. No Picture
Pair 3: White Picture v. Black
Picture

Burma

Pair 1: Black Picture v. No Picture
Pair 2: White Picture v. No Picture
Pair 3: White Picture v. Black
Picture

Note: *** p <.01** p < .05 * p < .10
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Table 4.4 Attitudes toward U.S. Humanitarian Priorities per Observed Scenario and Race (all
respondents by condition)

Sudan
White

Conditions

N

Mean

Black

Ukraine
N

Difference

t-value

Mean

White

N

Mean

Black

Burma
N

Difference

t-value

Mean

White

N

Mean

Black

N

Difference

t-value

Mean

No Picture

0.37

70

0.45

11

-0.08

-0.52

0.42

70

0.27

11

0.16

0.98

0.20

70

0.27

11

-0.07

-0.54

Black Picture

0.40

85

0.65

23

-0.25

-2.18*

0.31

85

0.09

23

0.22

2.15*

0.29

85

0.26

23

0.03

0.31

White Picture

0.30

93

0.48

27

-0.18

-1.74

0.47

93

0.33

27

0.14

1.29

0.23

93

0.19

27

0.04

0.45

Hispanic Picture

0.32

91

0.50

16

-0.18

-1.41

0.38

91

0.25

16

0.13

1.03

0.30

91

0.25

16

0.05

0.38

Note: *** p <.01** p < .05 * p < .10

Table 4.5 Attitudes toward U.S. Humanitarian Priorities per Ingroup

Sudan

White
Mean
0.30

Ukraine
Burma

Countries

N

N

Difference

t-value

93

Black
Mean
0.65

23

-0.35

-3.23**

0.47

93

0.09

23

0.39

3.54***

0.23

93

0.26

23

0.04

-0.35

Note: *** p <.01** p < .05 * p < .10

Tables 4.2 – 4.5 reports the statistical results of the models that test hypotheses 1 and 2.
To begin, I look at Table 4.2 which presents descriptive statistics of attitudes as they relate to the
country respondents believe should be America’s first humanitarian priority per scenario. As the
table shows, the mean level for individuals to believe Sudan should be the first priority among
those that received a Black picture in their scenario is .45 points, as compared to a mean of .38
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points for those that did not receive a Black picture. Thus, observing a Black picture in one’s
humanitarian scenario seems to increase support for U.S. humanitarian assistance toward a Black
nation. The average for individuals to believe Ukraine should be given first priority among those
that received a White picture in their scenario is .44 points, as compared to an average of .41
points for those that did not receive a White picture. This tells us that observing a White picture
in one’s humanitarian scenario seems to increase support for U.S. humanitarian assistance in a
White nation.
Table 4.3 lists results from my pairwise means test. The pairwise means comparison is
useful because it allows me to test if a pair of mutually distinctive means are statistically
significant. Table 4.3 shows that when it comes to Sudan, the average level of supporting the
humanitarian crisis in Sudan first is .07 points higher for those who observed a Black picture in
their scenario, compared to those who not see a picture at all. For those who observed a White
picture, the average level of providing humanitarian assistance to Sudan first is .04 points lower
than those not observing a picture. When comparing those that observed a White picture with
those that observed a Black picture, the mean level of supporting Sudan first is .11 points lower
for those observing the White picture. These results tentatively suggest that regardless of race,
viewing a White picture leads to lower levels of preferring to provide humanitarian support to
Sudan first, while observing a Black picture increases such support – although the results do not
quite reach conventional levels of statistical significance.
Table 4.3 also shows that when it comes to Ukraine, the mean level of support for
providing humanitarian aid here first is .15 points lower for those observing a Black picture
compared to respondents that did not observe a picture. For those who observed a White picture,
the average level of supporting Ukraine first is .03 points higher than those not observing a
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picture. In comparing those observing a White picture to those that observing a Black picture, the
average level of support for increasing humanitarian aid to Ukraine is .18 points higher for those
who saw the White picture. This difference is statistically significantly at the .05 level. The
evidence here offers support to the proposition that support for U.S. humanitarian aid varies by
the group of people that the respondents perceive to be receiving the aid based on the treatment
picture they see.
Moving beyond the descriptive statistics, I turn to Table 4.4. This table displays t-test
results for an individual’s preferred number one U.S. humanitarian priority according to their
racial identification and the race of the population in their scenario. Across the models for Table
4.4, I find the race of the population in their scenario and their own individual racial
identification play a key role in their choice for which country should be given America’s first
priority. A quick look at this table shows that Whites on average range from .30-.40 points across
conditions for listing Sudan first, from .31-.47 points for listing Ukraine first, and .20-.30 points
for listing Burma first. On the other hand, the averages among Blacks range from .50-.65 points
across conditions for listing Sudan first, .09-.33 points for listing Ukraine first, and .19-.27 points
for listing Burma first. The range of averages across conditions for Whites and Blacks are as
expected with Blacks exhibiting more support for providing assistance first to a predominately
Black nation, and likewise for Whites in regards to a predominately White nation. I direct my
attention to the statistically significant results. Looking at the model relating to Sudan, the results
show that the average for Blacks that observed a population of Black victims is .65 points, as
compared to a mean of .40 points for Whites that observed a population of Black victims. This
means that Blacks who saw a condition where other Blacks are the victims of a humanitarian
crisis, are .25 points more likely than Whites who saw the same condition to exhibit support for
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providing assistance to a Black nation. The t-value associated with this figure is statistically
significant at the .05 level, thus providing evidence to support hypothesis 1.
Focusing now on the model dealing with Ukraine, the results show that the average for
Blacks that received a picture of Black victims is .09 points, as compared to a mean of .31 points
for Whites that received a picture of Black victims. As we observe, in comparison to Whites,
Blacks receiving a picture of Black victims in their scenario are less likely to believe the
predominately White nation of Ukraine should be America’s first priority. In fact, the table
shows that Whites who received a condition where Blacks are victims of a humanitarian crisis,
are .22 points more likely than Blacks who saw the same condition, to believe Ukraine should be
given top priority. The t-value associated with this figure is statistically significant at the .05
level and provides further evidence in support of hypothesis 1. The table further shows that when
it comes to a predominately Black nation, Blacks that observed a picture of Black victims in their
scenario are far more likely to believe it should be America’s first priority compared to Whites
who observed the same picture. Though the t-value associated with this figure does not reach
statistical significance, it does point in the expected direction and provides quite suggestive
evidence.
I turn now to Table 4.5 which presents t-test results between Black and White ingroup
members. As we recall, ingroups were created by including those respondents that were assigned
a condition whereby they observed an image of humanitarian victims of their same race. Both
Models in Table 4.5 show that being a member of either of these ingroups is associated with
higher racial solidarity in regards to U.S. foreign policy. The results show that the average level
for White ingroup members to prefer dealing with the humanitarian crisis in Sudan first is .30,
while for Black ingroup members the average level is .65 points. The difference between the
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groups is -.35 points and is statistically significant at the .01 level — thus lending support to
Hypothesis 2. We now turn our attention to Model 2 in Table 4.5. which deals with the
predominately White country of Ukraine. According to Model 2, the average level for White
ingroup members to prefer dealing with the humanitarian crisis in Ukraine first is .47 points,
while for Black ingroup members the mean is .09 points. The difference of .39 between these
two groups is statistically significant and indicates that Black ingroup members have a lower
mean than White ingroup members of preferring the U.S. to deal with the humanitarian crisis in
Ukraine first. This difference between Black and White ingroup members is statistically
significant at the .01 level, and adds further support to Hypothesis 2.
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Table 4.6 Attitudes toward U.S. Humanitarian Economic Aid per Scenario (all respondents by
condition)
Eastern European Countries
Observed (Mean)

No Picture
2.20

Black Picture
2.24

White Picture
2.27

Hispanic Picture
2.19

N

87

107

124

112

Observed (Mean)
N

African Countries
No Picture
1.80

Black Picture
1.71

87

White Picture
1.95

110

126

Hispanic Picture
1.78
114

Note: *** p <.01** p < .05 * p < .10

Table 4.7 Comparisons of Attitudes toward U.S. Humanitarian Economic Aid per Observed
Picture (all respondents)

Pair 1: Black Picture v. No Picture
Pair 2: White Picture v. No Picture
Pair 3: White Picture v. Black
Picture

Pair 1: Black Picture v. No Picture
Pair 2: White Picture v. No Picture
Pair 3: White Picture v. Black
Picture

Contrast
-.04
-.07

Eastern European
Countries
Std. Error
0.11
0.11

t
0.75
0.54

-.03

0.10

0.76

Contrast
0.10
-0.15

African Countries
Std. Error
0.12
0.12

t
0.77
-1.23

-0.24

0.11

-1.17**

Note: *** p <.01** p < .05 * p < .10
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Table 4.8 Attitudes toward U.S. Humanitarian Economic Aid per Scenario and Race (all
respondents by condition)

White

N

Eastern
European
Countries
Black

Conditions
No Picture

Mean
2.23

75

Mean
2.08

12

0.14

0.55

Mean
1.88

75

Black
Picture

2.27

83

2.17

24

0.10

0.59

1.77

White
Picture

2.29

98

2.23

26

0.05

0.32

Hispanic
Picture

2.17

96

2.31

16

-0.15

-0.67

N

Difference

t-value

White

N

African
Countries
Black

N

Difference

t-value

Mean
1.33

12

0.55

2.15*

85

1.48

25

0.29

1.56*

1.98

98

1.86

28

0.12

0.64

1.84

98

1.43

16

0.40

1.72*

Note: *** p <.01** p < .05 * p < .10

Table 4.9 Attitudes toward U.S. Humanitarian Economic Aid per Ingroup

N

Black
Mean

N

Difference

t-value

Region

White
Mean

Eastern European
Countries

2.29

98

2.17

24

0.12

0.69

African Countries

1.98

98

1.48

25

0.49

2.74**

Note: *** p <.01** p < .05 * p < .10

Table 4.6 presents descriptive statistics of attitudes as they relate to U.S. humanitarian
economic aid per race of humanitarian victims in one’s observed scenario. Lower ends of the
scale represent those who favor the policy, while the higher end represents those who do not
favor. In Model 2 of Table 4.6, those who observed a humanitarian crisis involving Whites had a
lower mean of wishing to increase economic aid to countries in Africa than those who did not
observe a picture involving a White population in crisis. From this, I find that observing a White

84

population in distress does play a role in the level of support respondents exhibit toward
increasing humanitarian economic aid levels to African countries.
Table 4.7 shows for Eastern European countries, the mean level of support for increasing
humanitarian economic aid to Eastern European countries among those that observed a Black
picture is .04 points lower than those that did not observe a picture at all. For those who observed
a White picture, the mean level of support for increasing humanitarian economic aid to this
region is .07 points lower than those that did not observe a picture. The mean level of support for
increasing humanitarian economic aid to Eastern European countries among respondents that
observed a White picture was .03 points lower than those that observed a Black picture.
Table 4.7 also shows for African countries, the mean level of support for increasing
humanitarian economic aid among respondents that observed a Black picture is .10 points higher
than those did not observe a picture at all. For those who observed a White picture, the average
level of support for increasing humanitarian economic aid to this region is .15 points lower than
those not observing a picture at all in their scenario. Also, and as expected, the average level of
increasing humanitarian economic aid to this region among those that received a White picture
was .24 points lower than those received a Black picture – a difference statistically significant at
the .01 level. Thus, the evidence in this table reveals that viewing a White picture in one’s
humanitarian crisis scenario prompts one to exhibit less support for increasing humanitarian
economic aid to countries in Africa. The results also tentatively suggest that observing a Black
picture prompts one to exhibit more of such support in regards to countries in Africa.
Table 4.8 displays t-test results for an individual’s preferred output level concerning U.S.
humanitarian economic aid to Eastern European countries and African countries according to the
race of the humanitarian victims in their observed scenario and their own racial identification.
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The results from Table 4.8 show that a respondent’s race and the race of the population in their
observed scenario plays a significant role in their preferred level of humanitarian economic aid
especially towards countries in Africa. According to the Model dealing with African countries,
the mean for Whites that did not observe a picture at all in their scenario to support humanitarian
economic aid is 1.88 points, while the average for Blacks that did not observe a picture in their
scenario is 1.38 points. Thus, the average for Blacks that did not observe a picture in their
scenario was closer to increasing humanitarian economic aid to African countries than their
White compatriots. The difference of .55 points between these two groups is statistically
significant at the .05 level, thus providing support for Hypothesis 1.
Still focusing on African countries, I look now at respondents that received a picture
portraying Blacks in a humanitarian crisis in their observed scenario. Table 4.8 shows that the
average for Whites that observed a Black population in their scenario to support humanitarian
economic aid to African countries is 1.77 points, while the mean for Blacks that observed a
Black population is 1.48 points. Thus, the mean for Blacks that observed a Black population was
closer to increasing aid to African countries than Whites observing the same picture. The
difference of .29 points between these two groups is statistically significant at the .05 level, thus
providing further support for Hypothesis 1. When informed of a humanitarian crisis taking a toll
on a Black population, White Americans are less likely than African Americans to support the
U.S. policy of providing humanitarian economic aid to African countries.
Table 4.9 presents t-test results between Black and White ingroup members. This table
shows a difference in levels of support for humanitarian economic aid between Black and White
ingroup members, especially as it concerns African countries. The results show that the average
level for White ingroup members to support humanitarian economic aid to African countries is
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1.98 points, while the average level for Black ingroup members is 1.48 points. The difference of
.49 points between these two groups is statistically significant at the .01 level, and thus provides
further support to Hypothesis 2b.
This section of this chapter examines whether there are any significant differences in
attitudes toward U.S. foreign policy within racial ingroups, predicated on the extent to which
they socially identify with their ingroup. Ingroups in this section are the two race groups, African
Americans and White Americans respectively. The focus of the previous section was on
differences between the races. Here, I take into account the reality that not every member of a
particular ingroup thinks the same, has the same political preferences, or even feels any
attachment to the ingroup society arbitrarily relegates them to (Schattschneider, 1960). As
discussed in Chapter 2, social psychologists and political scientists have long utilized group
consciousness as an indicator to gauge how strongly people identify with the particular groups
they belong to – such as their religious group, gender group, etc. As such, the extent to which
individuals socially identify with their race group is measured differently in this section of this
chapter than in the previous part. Looking within the race groups themselves, I examine
respondent’s level of group consciousness toward their race group. Here, levels of group
consciousness will be accounted for by using traditional methods of measurement most often
used within the literature. I used the 1996 National Black Election Study (Tate, 1996) as a point
of reference in order to guide my question wordings in conformity with the body of literature on
group consciousness. Table 4.10 lists the battery of questions used to measure the group
consciousness each individual has in relation to their own racial ingroup. I collapse these
questions into the single summary variable, Group Consciousness, to easily illustrate how much
each individual socially identifies with their ingroup. After this, I created two other variables, the
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Black Group Consciousness variable, and the White Group Consciousness variable. These
variables were created by simply separating African Americans and White Americans from out
of the Group Consciousness variable. I then dichotomized them by separating individuals within
these two variables according to whether their level of group consciousness falls above or below
their respective group means. For example, the group mean level of group consciousness among
African Americans was 3.4 points. Thus, for the Black Group Consciousness variable then, those
African Americans whose level of group consciousness was below 3.4 points was assigned a 0,
and those with group consciousness levels at or above the mean was assigned a 1. In regards to
the White Group Consciousness variable, the group mean level of group consciousness among
White Americans was 2.5 points. Therefore, I assigned those White Americans whose level of
group consciousness was below 2.5 points a 0, and those with group consciousness levels at or
above 2.5 points was assigned a 1. Scores on the lower end of the Black Group Consciousness
and White Group Consciousness variables indicate respondents with low levels of group
consciousness toward their racial ingroup, while scores on the higher end represent individuals
with higher levels of group consciousness within their race.
Table 4.10 Questions Operationalizing Measures for Group Consciousness
1. How often do you believe that what
happens generally to people of your
race will affect what happens in your
life?
2. How often do you feel people of your
race should work together to gain
greater economic and political power?
3. How often do you believe people of
your race have similar economic
interests?
4. How often do you believe people of
your race have similar political
interests?
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5. How often do people treat you
differently (in a disrespectful or
discriminatory way) because of your
membership in your racial group?
I recode responses to these questions in the
following way:
1. = Never
2. = Hardly Ever
3. = Sometimes
4. = Regularly
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Results
Table 4.11 Attitudes of toward U.S. Humanitarian Priorities per Observed Picture (Black
respondents only)

Observed (Mean)
N

Observed (Mean)
N

Observed (Mean)
N

No Picture
0.45
11

No Picture
0.27
11

No Picture
0.27
11

Sudan
Black Picture
0.65
23
Ukraine
Black Picture
0.09
23
Burma
Black Picture
0.26
23

White Picture
0.48
27

White Picture
0.33
27

White Picture
0.18
27

Hispanic Picture
0.50
16

Hispanic Picture
0.25
16

Hispanic Picture
0.25
16

Note: *** p <.01** p < .05 * p < .10

Table 4.12 Comparisons of Attitudes toward U.S. Humanitarian Priorities per Observed Picture
and Level of Group Consciousness (Black respondents only)
Sudan

High Group Cons. v Low Group
Cons

Contrast

Std. Error

t

0.17

0.12

1.37

Contrast

Std. Error

t

-0.08

0.11

-0.08*

Ukraine

High Group Cons. v Low Group
Cons

Note: *** p <.01** p < .05 * p < .10
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Table 4.13 Attitudes toward U.S. Humanitarian Priorities per Observed Scenario and Level of
Group Consciousness (Black respondents only)

Sudan
Conditions

Low

N

Mean

High

Ukraine
N

Difference

t-value

Mean

Low

N

Mean

High

Burma
N

Difference

t-value

Mean

Low

N

Mean

High

N

Difference

t-value

Mean

No Picture

0.20

5

0.67

6

0.45

-1.58

0.40

5

0.17

6

0.23

0.81

0.40

5

0.17

6

0.23

0.81

Black Picture

0.56

9

0.71

14

-1.59

-0.76

0.11

9

0.07

14

0.04

0.32

0.33

9

0.21

14

0.12

0.61

White Picture

0.40

5

0.50

22

-0.10

-0.39

0.40

5

0.32

22

0.08

0.34

0.20

5

0.19

22

0.02

0.09

Hispanic Picture

0.40

5

0.55

11

-0.15

-0.51

0.40

5

0.18

11

0.22

0.90

0.20

5

0.27

11

-0.07

-0.29

Note: *** p <.01** p < .05 * p < .10

Table 4.11-4.13 reports the statistical results of the models examining the influence of
group consciousness on African American attitudes toward U.S. foreign policy. Table 4.11
presents descriptive statistics of attitudes as they relate to the country African Americans believe
should be given America’s top priority for humanitarian resources. The table shows that support
among African Americans range from a mean of .45-.65 points across conditions listing Sudan
first. The table also reveals there is a significant reduction in support among African Americans
when we move from Sudan to Ukraine. Support among African Americans range from a mean of
.09 points to .33 points across conditions listing Ukraine first. These results are as expected with
African Americans giving a higher priority to the predominately Black nation of Sudan over the
majority-White nation of Ukraine.
Table 4.12 lists results from the pairwise means comparison of African Americans with
low and high levels of group consciousness. According to the table, African Americans with high
levels of group consciousness are .08 points less likely to list Ukraine first compared to those
with low levels of group consciousness. Also, African Americans with higher levels of group
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consciousness are .17 points more likely to list Sudan first, compared to those with lower levels
of group consciousness. Although these figures do not reach statistical significance, they
conform to my expectations. Namely, Blacks with high levels of social identity are more likely
to support U.S. foreign policies that benefit other Black people. Blacks with high levels of social
identity are also less likely to exhibit support for foreign policies that prioritize other race groups.
Table 4.13 displays t-test results among African Americans regarding their preferred
humanitarian priority per their level of group consciousness and race of the victims in their
observed scenario. A quick perusal of the table reveals that group consciousness among African
Americans does play a role in forming their attitudes regarding this area of foreign policy. The
table shows that the average of African Americans with low group consciousness range from .20
to .56 points across conditions listing Sudan first as compared to .55 to .71 points among those
with high levels of group consciousness. These statistics are consonant with my theory and
expectations. The more group consciousness one has the more likely they are to exhibit support
for others of their ingroup. The table also shows that the average of African Americans with low
group consciousness range from .11 to .40 points across conditions listing Ukraine as first
compared to .07 to .32 points among those with high levels of group consciousness. These
figures are also consistent with my theory and expectations because more group consciousness
leads to lower support for policies beneficial to people not within one’s own ingroup.
Still looking at Table 4.13, I turn now to the results focusing on Sudan. The results here
show that for Blacks who did not observe a picture in their scenario, the average for those with
low group consciousness to list Sudan as first is .20 points, as compared to .67 points for Blacks
with high group consciousness. When we look at the scenario where Black victims are observed,
we see that African Americans with low group consciousness had a mean of .56 points of listing
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Sudan first, while the average of those with high group consciousness was .71 points. Though
these figures do not reach statistical significance, they still point in the expected direction –
higher social identity among African Americans leads to more support to prioritize Sudan. For
African Americans that viewed White victims in their scenario, those with low group
consciousness had an average of .40 points for listing Sudan first, while those with high group
consciousness had a mean of .50 points. It must be pointed-out here that this figure of .50 points
among those observing a picture of White victims and with high group consciousness is lower
than all the other scenarios among those with high group consciousness.
Jumping down to the results dealing with Ukraine in Table 4.13, a similar story emerges
whereby group consciousness influences attitudes toward foreign policy. Where high levels of
group consciousness among African Americans increased their likelihood of listing the
predominately-Black nation of Sudan first, it decreases their likelihood of listing the
predominately-White nation of Ukraine first. Looking at the condition where no picture was
shown, the results reveal that the average of listing Ukraine as first among African Americans
with low group consciousness is .40 points, in comparison to a mean of .17 points among those
with high group consciousness. Turning now to the condition where Black victims were
observed, the table shows that the average among African Americans to list Ukraine first is .11
points for those with low group consciousness, while it is .07 points for those with high group
consciousness. The condition in which a picture of White victims was shown yields similar
results. African Americans with high group consciousness had a mean of .32 points, while those
with low group consciousness had a mean of .40 points of listing Ukraine as first. In support of
my theory, each condition here shows that African Americans with high group consciousness
had a lower mean than those with low group consciousness, of listing Ukraine as first.
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Table 4.14 Black Attitudes toward U.S. Humanitarian Economic Aid per Scenario (Black
respondents only)
Eastern European Countries
Observed (Mean)

No Picture
2.92

Black Picture
2.83

White Picture
2.77

Hispanic Picture
2.69

N

12

24

26

16

Observed (Mean)
N

African Countries
No Picture
3.67

Black Picture
3.52

12

White Picture
3.14

25

28

Hispanic Picture
3.56
16

Note: *** p <.01** p < .05 * p < .10

Table 4.15 Comparisons of Attitudes toward U.S. Humanitarian Economic Aid per Observed
Scenario and Level of Group Consciousness (Black respondents only)
Eastern European Countries
Contrast
High Group Cons. v Low Group Cons.
-0.31

Std. Error
0.17

t-value
-1.84*

Std. Error
0.20

t-value
0.20

African Countries
Contrast
0.04

High Group Cons. v Low Group Cons.

Note: *** p <.01** p < .05 * p < .10
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Table 4.16 Attitudes toward U.S. Humanitarian Economic Aid per Observed Scenario and Level
of Group Consciousness (Black respondents only)
Eastern European Countries
Low

N

High

African Countries
N

Difference

t-value

Mean

Low

N

N

Difference

t-value

3.60

5

0.11

0.29

11

3.71

14

-0.44

-1.45

3.40

5

3.01

23

0.31

0.58

3.20

5

3.72

11

-0.53

-1.64

Conditions

Mean

Mean

No Picture

3.14

7

2.60

5

0.54

1.46*

3.71

7

Black Picture

2.80

10

2.56

14

-0.06

-0.21

3.27

White Picture

3.00

5

2.71

21

0.29

0.74

Hispanic Picture

3.20

9

2.45

11

0.75

1.68*

High
Mean

Note: *** p <.01** p < .05 * p < .10

I turn now to Table 4.14 which lists descriptive statistics of African American attitudes in
regards to U.S. humanitarian economic aid. Here, subjects gave responses regarding U.S.
humanitarian economic aid policies toward “Eastern European countries” and “African
countries.” Table 4.14 shows that across conditions, the mean of African Americans to support
increasing U.S. humanitarian aid to African countries ranged from 3.14 to 3.67 points. In
comparison, Table 4.14 also shows that the average of African American support precipitously
declines when asked about increasing U.S. humanitarian economic aid to countries in Eastern
Europe. Across conditions, support among African Americans ranged from 2.69 to 2.92 points in
regards to Eastern European countries. In accordance with my theory, we see that having higher
levels of social identity with the Black ingroup increases support for raising the level of U.S.
humanitarian economic aid to Black areas, while also lowering it in regards to majority-White
areas.
Table 4.15 lists results from my pairwise means comparison between Blacks with low
and high levels of group consciousness. My aim here is to determine if the mutually distinctive
means of African Americans with low group consciousness is statistically different from those
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with high levels of group consciousness, as it relates to increasing U.S. humanitarian economic
aid. This table shows that African Americans with high levels of group consciousness are .31
points less likely than those with low levels of group consciousness to support increasing U.S.
humanitarian economic aid to Eastern European countries. This figure is statistically significant
at the .05 level thus providing further credence to my theory that social identity affects attitudes
towards foreign policy. The table also shows that African Americans with high levels of group
consciousness are .04 points more likely than those with low levels, to support increasing U.S.
humanitarian economic aid to African countries. This figure does not reach statistical
significance, but it does move in the direction consistent with my overall theory.
I move now to Table 4.16 where displayed are t-test results reflecting African American
attitudes toward increasing U.S. humanitarian economic aid levels to different regions, given the
respondent’s level of group consciousness and the race of the victims in their scenario. Looking
at the model dealing with Eastern European countries under the condition not showing any
pictures, the average for Blacks to support increasing U.S. humanitarian economic aid to this
region is 3.14 points among those with low group consciousness, as compared to 2.6 points
among those with high levels of group consciousness. This figure is statistically significant at the
.05 level, and thus provides evidence in support of my theory regarding the influence of social
identity in the realm of U.S. foreign policy. The condition where Black victims were observed
shows similar results. Here, African Americans with low levels of group consciousness had a
mean of 2.8 points to support increasing this type of humanitarian aid to Eastern European
countries while the mean among those with high levels of group consciousness was 2.56 points.
Even though both averages are low when pictures of Black victims are viewed, support drops
quite substantially among those with high levels of group consciousness. The means rise among
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those who viewed White victims in their scenario, but support to increase this type of aid to
Eastern European countries is still greater among African Americans with low group
consciousness than those with high levels.
Looking now at the model in Table 4.16 dealing with African countries, across
conditions, support for increasing U.S. humanitarian aid to these areas ranges from 3.2 to 3.7
points among those with low group consciousness, and 3.01 to 3.72 points for those with high
group consciousness. Under this model, African Americans with high group consciousness have
a higher mean of supporting an increase to these areas than those with low group consciousness
when viewing a picture of Black victims. When viewing a picture of White victims, or no picture
at all, African Americans with low group consciousness have higher means of supporting an
increase in this type of aid to countries in Africa than those with high group consciousness.
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Table 4.17 Attitudes toward U.S. Humanitarian Priorities per Scenario (White respondents only)

Observed (Mean)
N

Observed (Mean)
N

Observed (Mean)
N

No Picture
0.37
70

No Picture
0.43
70

No Picture
0.20
70

Sudan
Black Picture
0.40
85
Ukraine
Black Picture
0.31
85
Burma
Black Picture
0.29
85

White Picture
0.30
93

White Picture
0.47
93

White Picture
0.23
93

Hispanic Picture
0.32
91

Hispanic Picture
0.38
91

Hispanic Picture
0.30
91

Note: *** p <.01** p < .05 * p < .10

Table 4.18 Comparisons of Attitudes toward U.S. Humanitarian Priorities per Observed Picture
and Level of Group Consciousness (White respondents only)
Ukraine
High Group Cons. v Low Group Cons.

Contrast
0.03

Std. Error
0.05

t-value
0.65

Contrast
-0.05

Std. Error
0.05

t-value
-1.02

Sudan
High Group Cons. v Low Group Cons.

Note: *** p <.01** p < .05 * p < .10
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Table 4.19 Attitudes toward U.S. Humanitarian Priorities per Observed Scenario and Level of
Group Consciousness (White respondents only)
Sudan
Conditions

Low

N

Mean

High

Ukraine
N

Difference

t-value

Mean

Low

N

Mean

High

Burma
N

Difference

t-value

Mean

Low

N

Mean

High

N

Difference

t-value

Mean

No Picture

0.31

35

0.43

35

-0.11

-0.98

0.51

35

0.34

35

0.17

1.45

0.17

35

0.23

35

-0.06

-0.59

Black Picture

0.46

39

0.35

46

0.11

1.06

0.26

39

0.35

46

-0.09

-0.91

0.28

39

0.30

46

-0.02

-0.22

White Picture

0.36

45

0.25

48

0.11

1.10

0.40

45

0.54

48

-0.14

-1.37

0.24

45

0.21

48

0.04

0.41

Hispanic Picture

0.36

39

0.29

52

0.07

.71

0.36

39

0.40

52

-0.04

-0.43

0.28

39

0.31

52

-0.03

-0.26

Note: *** p <.01** p < .05 * p < .10
Table 4.17 – 4.19 present statistical results of White respondents. Table 4.17 reports
descriptive statistics of attitudes among White Americans in regards to the country they prefer to
be America’s first humanitarian priority per their scenario group. As Table 4.17 shows, the mean
for White Americans to believe that the humanitarian crisis in Sudan should be America’s top
priority is .37 points among those who did not observe a picture. For those who observed a
picture of Black victims, the mean is .40, and .30 points for those who viewed a White picture. I
look also at attitudes among White Americans in regards to believing that the humanitarian crisis
in Ukraine should be given America’s top priority. The table shows that the mean for White
Americans that believe Ukraine should be given America’s top priority is .43 points among those
that did not receive a picture of victims in their scenario. Among those that observed a picture of
Black victims, the mean is .31 points. The highest mean for believing Ukraine should be given
America’s first priority is .47 points, which unsurprisingly comes from those who received a
picture of White victims in their scenario.
Table 4.18 lists results from the pairwise means test. Looking at these results, White
Americans with high levels of group consciousness are .05 points less likely than those with low
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group consciousness to list Sudan first. When it comes to Ukraine however, White Americans
with high levels of group consciousness are .03 points more likely than those with low levels, to
list it as first. Though neither of these figures reach statistical significance, they each point in the
expected direction. White Americans with a heightened sense of social identity are more willing
to support U.S. foreign policies beneficial to the majority-White nation of Ukraine. At the same
time, they are less likely to show support for the majority-Black nation of Sudan.
I move from Table 4.18 to Table 4.19. Table 4.19 displays t-test results among White
Americans regarding their preferred humanitarian priority according to their level of group
consciousness and the race of the victims in their observed scenario. Looking across the models
within Table 4.19, group consciousness plays a role in the level of support White Americans give
toward prioritizing the humanitarian crisis areas in question. A brief perusal of the table shows
that support among White Americans with low group consciousness ranges from .31 to .46
points across conditions listing Sudan first compared to .25 to .43 points for Whites with high
group consciousness. The table also shows that the average among Whites with low group
consciousness ranges from .26 to .51 points across conditions listing Ukraine first compared to
.34 to .50 points for Whites with high levels of group consciousness. This shows that Whites
with high levels of group consciousness are less interested, in comparison to those with low
group consciousness, in listing Sudan – a predominately Black country as first. On the other
hand, Whites with high of group consciousness are more likely to list the predominately-White
country of Ukraine as first. Although these models do not reach statistical significance, they
point in the expected direction.
Looking at the model relating to Sudan in Table 4.19, the results show that the average
for Whites with high group consciousness observing a picture of Black victims is .35 points, as
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compared to .46 points for those with low group consciousness. This makes sense because White
Americans with a higher sense of social identity may wish to only prioritize majority-White
regions. Still focusing on the model dealing with Sudan, the average for White Americans with
low group consciousness is .31 points compared to .43 points for those with high group
consciousness. Without the provocation of a visual of humanitarian victims, White Americans
with higher levels of group consciousness are more likely to prioritize predominately White
countries. Also in the model relating to Sudan, the table shows that the average for White
Americans with low group consciousness that observed a picture of White victims was .36 points
as compared to .25 points among those with high group consciousness. The result arising from
these figures are a bit different than those from the previous two comparisons. This difference
could stem from the fact that group consciousness manifests itself sometimes in the form of
symbolic opposition to other groups.
I now jump down to the model relating to Ukraine in Table 4.19. The results show that
among those not observing a picture, the average for White Americans with low group
consciousness to list Ukraine first was .51 points as compared to .34 points for Whites with high
group consciousness. Looking at Whites that observed Black victims in their scenario, the
average to prioritize Ukraine first among those with low group consciousness is .26 points as
compared to .35 points for those with high group consciousness. For the condition in which
White Americans observed White victims, the mean to prioritize Ukraine first among those with
low group consciousness is .40 points while those with high group consciousness is .54 points.
Unsurprisingly, White Americans with high group consciousness and who observed White
victims in their scenario exhibited the highest level of support to prioritize the predominatelyWhite country of Ukraine.
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Table 4.20 Attitudes toward U.S. Humanitarian Economic Aid per Scenario (White respondents
only)

Observed (Mean)
N

Eastern European Countries
No Picture
Black Picture White Picture Hispanic Picture
2.78
2.74
2.71
2.83
75
83
98
96

Observed (Mean)
N

African Countries
No Picture
Black Picture White Picture Hispanic Picture
3.12
3.22
3.02
3.16
75
85
98
98
Note: *** p <.01** p < .05 * p < .10

Table 4.21 Comparisons of Attitudes toward U.S. Humanitarian Economic Aid per Observed
Picture and Level of Group Consciousness (White respondents only)
Eastern European Countries
Contrast
Std. Error
High Group Cons. v Low Group Cons.
0.11
0.08

t-value
1.36

African Countries
Contrast
High Group Cons. v Low Group Cons.
0.07

t-value
0.77

Note: *** p <.01** p < .05 * p < .10
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Std. Error
0.09

Table 4.22 Attitudes toward U.S. Humanitarian Economic Aid per Observed Scenario and Level
of Group Consciousness (White respondents only)
Eastern European Countries
Low

N

High

African Countries
N

Difference

t-value

Mean

Low

N

N

Difference

t-value

3.16

38

-0.08

-0.39

39

3.48

46

-0.56

-3.15*

3.07

46

2.98

52

0.08

0.50

3.29

42

3.07

56

0.21

1.18

Conditions

Mean

Mean

No Picture

2.65

37

2.83

38

-0.25

-1.24

3.08

37

Black Picture

2.58

38

2.87

45

-0.29

-1.80*

2.92

White Picture

2.78

46

2.65

52

0.13

0.81

Hispanic Picture

2.78

40

2.88

56

-0.10

-0.61

High
Mean

Note: *** p <.01** p < .05 * p < .10
Table 4.20 lists descriptive statistics of attitudes among White Americans as they relate to
U.S. humanitarian economic aid given the race of the victims in their scenario. The table reveals
that across conditions, Whites give only moderate support toward increasing humanitarian
economic aid levels to Eastern European countries. On the other hand, the model relating to
African countries shows that across conditions, White Americans are generally supportive of
increasing humanitarian economic aid there.
The Table 4.21 shows results from the pairwise means comparison between White
Americans with high group consciousness and those with low group consciousness. This table
shows that White Americans with high levels of group consciousness are .11 points more likely
than those with low group consciousness to support increasing U.S. humanitarian economic aid
to countries in Eastern Europe. The table also reveals that White Americans with high levels of
group consciousness are .07 points more likely than those with low group consciousness, to
support increasing U.S. humanitarian economic aid to this area of the world. Though not
reaching statistical significance, these finding do point in my expected direction, and thus add
some support to the notion that social identity affects political views even in regards to foreign
policy among whites.
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Table 4.22 presents t-test results of attitudes related to humanitarian economic aid to
different regions between White Americans with low group consciousness and high group
consciousness. This table shows that for White Americans with low group consciousness, the
mean level to support an increase in humanitarian economic aid to Eastern European countries
ranges from 2.58 to 2.75 points across conditions. For White Americans with high group
consciousness, the table shows that support to increase this type of aid to Eastern European
countries ranges from 2.65 to 2.88 points across conditions.
Looking at the model in Table 4.22 relating to African countries, we see that the mean to
support increasing U.S. humanitarian economic aid to this area ranges from 2.92 to 3.29 points
across conditions for White Americans with low group consciousness. For White Americans
with high group consciousness, the mean ranges from 2.98 to 3.48 points across conditions.
Probing deeper, the table shows that when observing Black victims in their scenario, White
Americans with high levels of group consciousness are .29 points more likely than those with
low group consciousness to support increasing U.S. humanitarian economic aid to Eastern
European countries. The mean associated with those who observed a picture of Black victims
and with low group consciousness is the lowest level (i.e. want to see increased aid) of support
out of all the conditions in this model. On the other hand, the average associated with those who
observed a picture of Black victims and with high group consciousness constituted the second
highest level of support out of all the conditions in this model for increasing U.S. humanitarian
economic aid to Eastern European countries. This finding is statistically significant at the .05 and
adds support to my hypothesis. When given the condition of observing no picture at all, White
Americans with high group consciousness are .25 points less likely than those with low group
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consciousness to support a policy increasing humanitarian economic aid to Eastern European
countries.
Looking now at the model relating to African countries in Table 4.22, in the condition of
observing a picture of Black victims, White Americans with low group consciousness are .56
points more likely than those with high group consciousness to support increasing U.S.
humanitarian economic aid to this area of the world. Although not in the direction of my
expectations, this figure is statistically significant at the .01 level and provides further evidence
of the influential role of social identity in attitude formation regarding foreign policy. Here,
White Americans that observed a picture of Black victims and with low group consciousness
(and not those with high group consciousness as expected), exhibited the lowest levels of support
to increase this type of aid to African countries. White Americans that observed a picture of
Black victims and with high group consciousness, exhibited the highest level of support. When
observing a picture of White victims, White Americans with high group consciousness showed
the lowest level of support for increasing U.S. humanitarian economic aid to African countries
than any other high group consciousness category. Among those who observed a picture of
White victims, White Americans with high group consciousness were .08 more likely than those
with low group consciousness to support increasing U.S. humanitarian economic aid to countries
in Africa. Though this figure does not reach conventional levels of statistically significance, it
does point in my expected direction.
Conclusion
The results in this chapter show that social identity does in fact influence American
political attitudes when it comes to foreign policy. Though it has been well-documented how
social identity helps to shape political attitudes regarding domestic politics and public policy,
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here I show its influence in the realm of foreign policy as well. This chapter reveals that both
African Americans and White Americans succumb to the influences of social identity when
formulating their thoughts and opinions about American foreign policy. The experiment
conducted in this chapter helps to tease-out the effects that social identity plays. For instance,
among those receiving the Black condition, Blacks were .25 points more likely than Whites to
place the predominately Black nation of Sudan as America’s top humanitarian priority. Also
when receiving the Black condition, Whites are .22 points more likely than Blacks to place the
predominately White nation of Ukraine as America’s top humanitarian priority.
I also reveal differences between ingroups. In particular, Black ingroup members were
.35 more likely than White ingroup members to believe Sudan should be America’s top
humanitarian priority. Also, White ingroup members were more likely than Black ingroup
members to believe Ukraine should be the country’s top humanitarian priority.
Significant differences in political attitudes were also uncovered between race groups
regarding whether certain areas around the world should receive an increase in humanitarian
economic aid. I find White Americans who observed a picture of Black victims in their scenario
were .29 points less likely than African Americans that received the same condition to exhibit
support for increasing U.S. humanitarian economic aid to African countries. Also, Black
members were .49 points more likely than White ingroup members to support increasing
humanitarian economic aid to African countries. This finding supports hypothesis 2.
This chapter further explored the role social identity may play in influencing political
attitudes regarding U.S. foreign policy by seeking to uncover any statistically significant
differences in foreign policy attitudes within race groups. I find that Blacks with higher levels of
group consciousness are .08 points less likely than other Blacks to believe Ukraine should be
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America’s top humanitarian concern, and Blacks with high levels of group consciousness are .31
points less likely than those with low group consciousness to support increasing U.S.
humanitarian economic aid to countries in Eastern Europe. In terms of White Americans, the
results reveal those who received the Black condition and have high group consciousness are .29
points more likely than those with low group consciousness to support increasing U.S.
humanitarian aid to Eastern European countries.
Each of these findings are important and add depth to our understanding of how social
identity plays a part in formulating views toward U.S. foreign policy. Social identity, especially
as expressed through group consciousness, is a dimension that scholars have hitherto paid little
attention as it relates to public opinion and foreign policy. If America is to continue upholding its
responsibilities on the world stage as the indispensable nation then her citizens must continue to
find ways to promote sound and healthy foreign policies. This project inches us a step closer in
this direction by gaining more insights into understanding how Americans form their views
toward foreign policy.
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CHAPTER FIVE
EXPLORING SOCIAL LINKS TO FOREIGN POLICY USING THE 2016 CCES
A person thinks, politically, as he is, socially.
- (Lazarsfeld, Berelson, and Gaudet, 1944)
The above quotation illustrates what has arguably become a truism uncovered by the social
revolution in political science. Namely, people are products of their social environment and their
social relations play a large role in developing their cognitive framework towards political
phenomena. What has not been carefully analyzed, however, is whether one’s social
conditioning has any influence on how they perceive and form their political attitudes as it
relates to foreign policy. This chapter moves us a step further in understanding this issue domain.
If one’s social identity influences their attitudes toward foreign policy, this may be another cue
or shortcut that people use to help them mentally navigate this complex issue area.
Hypotheses
The hypotheses in this chapter follow from those presented in the previous chapter. The
dependent variables are different and allow another test of these hypotheses.
H1a: White Americans will be more likely to prefer policies directed towards Europe than Black
Americans.
H1b: Black Americans will be more likely to prefer policies directed towards Africa than White
Americans.
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H2a: White ingroup respondents (Whites receiving the Europe condition) will be more likely to
support policies directed towards Europe than Black ingroup respondents.
H2b: Black ingroup respondents (Blacks receiving the Africa condition) will be more likely to
support policies directed towards Africa than White ingroup respondents.
Data and Methods
The data I use come from the 2016 Cooperative Congressional Election Study (CCES).
The CCES is a nationally stratified sample survey administered on an annual basis from
September to October. This annual study represents a concerted effort by political scientists
nation-wide to gather survey data in congressional elections (Ansolabehere, 2012). The N for
this survey was 1,000 respondents. The CCES has a large sample for common content and
smaller, 1,000 person samples for specific content brought by universities. The survey is useful
because it makes inquiries regarding a range of topics including general political attitudes,
demographic factors, foreign policy, and political information.
The CCES wields several advantages over other national surveys. Firstly, the smaller
samples brought by universities allow teams to ask respondents a set of questions designed by
themselves. Secondly, this survey contains a nationally representative sample of African
American respondents (N=126) that matches the population size. The CCES survey is
representative of the entire U.S. population and makes up for a limitation of the student-based
survey in the previous chapter. This representation not only provides generalizability, but it also
affords me the opportunity to critically investigate how social identity influences the foreign
policy attitudes of people from across the demographic spectrum.
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To determine if social identity plays a role in informing people’s political attitudes
toward foreign policy, I run a series of t-tests between and within different race groups on their
responses toward a battery of foreign policy-related questions. The methodology follows that
used in the previous chapter.
Dependent Variables
I include the list of dependent variables for this part of the chapter in Table 5.1 below.
These dependent variables cover a few different areas of the United States’ humanitarian foreign
policy. By understanding people’s preferences related to how the U.S. should formulate its
humanitarian foreign policy, we can gain deeper insights into the political nature of social
identity and the implications it may have on our political process. I selected these questions to
determine American attitudes as it relates to how U.S. foreign policy resources should be
prioritized and allocated across various countries and regions around the world.
Table 5.1 Questions Operationalizing Attitudes toward U.S. Humanitarian Foreign Policy
C.) Genocide

1) In the future, do you think that the
U.S. has a moral obligation to use
military force in a) Africa b) in Latin
America c) in Europe d) abroad, if
necessary, to prevent one group of
people from committing
genocide against another?
1) Yes
2) No
3) Don’t know
-

D.) Peacekeeping

I recode as follows: 1=Yes, 0=No or
Don’t know

2) In a general sense, do you favor or
oppose the use of U.S. troops as part
of international peacekeeping forces
to enforce peace agreements between
a) two countries in Africa b) two
110

countries in Latin America c) two
countries in Europe d) two other
countries?
1) Favor
2) Oppose
3) Don’t know
-

I recode as follows: 1=Favor,
0=Oppose or Don’t know

Independent Variables
The key independent variables are similar to those in the previous chapter as well. I base
the analysis on the following variables:
Race: Social identity as expressed through race is accounted for by controlling for the particular
race group each respondent identifies as belonging to. The particular race groups observed in this
study are White Americans and African Americans. Each race group is accounted for with
dichotomous variables.
Racial Identification: Respondents are asked the extent to which they identity with their
race. The question operationalizing racial identification is as follow: To what extent do you think
of yourself as being [Race]? The following coding scheme was used for respondent’s answers:
1=A great deal, 2=Somewhat, 3=Very Little, and 4=Not all.
Racial Group: I also gauge the extent to which people feel part of a racial group. The
question operationalizing this notion is, “Do you believe that members of your race have
common political, social, and economic interests?” I coded responses as follow: 1=Yes, 2=No
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Group Consciousness: One set of social identity variables here are index variables
created by combining the variables for racial identification, group identification, and race.
Namely, I created 2 categories of the group consciousness variable: High Group Consciousness,
and Low Group Consciousness.
The High Group Consciousness variable was created by including respondents who said
they identified with their race a great deal or somewhat, and also that believes members of their
race share common political, social, and economic interests. The Low Group Consciousness
variable was created by including all those respondents who did not say they identified with their
race a great deal, and who also do not believe members of their race share common political,
social, and economic interests.
Conditions: Each respondent is asked to answer questions in regards to two humanitarian
situations. The two humanitarian situations contain four conditions from which respondents give
answers in response to. Each respondent is assigned to one of the conditions. The two
humanitarian situations and the conditions from which respondents answered to are as follows:
1) In the future, do you think that the U.S. has a moral obligation to use military force a)
in Africa b) in Latin America c) in Europe d) abroad, if necessary, to prevent one
group of people from committing genocide against another?
2) In a general sense, do you favor or oppose the use of U.S. troops as part of
international peacekeeping forces to enforce peace agreements between two countries
in a) Africa b) two countries in Latin America c) two countries in Europe d) two other
countries?
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Respondents were randomly assigned to one of the four conditions: Africa condition,
Latin America condition, Europe condition, or abroad condition. The abroad condition serves as
the control group similar to the no picture condition in the previous chapter. Each respondent
had the same treatment effect for both of the dependent variable questions.
Results

Table 5.2 Percentages of Those Who Believe U.S. Has Moral Obligation to Assist in Preventing
Genocide (Only Black and White Respondents)
Genocide Overall
Black

N

White

0.45

126

0.47

N

Difference

t-value

716

0.01

0.29

Note: *** p <.001** p < .01 * p < .05

Table 5.3 Percentages of Those Who Favor U.S. Military Involvement in International
Peacekeeping (Only Black and White Respondents)
Peacekeeping Overall
Black

N

White

0.34

126

0.32

N

Difference

t-value

714

-0.02

-0.36

Note: *** p <.001** p < .01 * p < .05
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Table 5.4 Percentages of Those Who Believe U.S. Has Moral Obligation to Assist in Preventing
Genocide (Only Black and White Respondents w/Conditions)
Africa
Black
0.54

Black
0.33

Black
0.41

Black
0.54

N
28

N
36

N
27

N
35

White
0.36

N
151

Difference
-0.17

t-value
-1.71*

White
0.41

Latin American
N
191

Difference
0.08

t-value
0.90

White
0.50

Europe
N
204

Difference
0.09

t-value
0.90

White
0.58

2 Other Areas
N
170

Difference
0.03

t-value
0.36

Note: *** p <.001** p < .01 * p < .05
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Table 5.5 Percentages of Those Who Favor U.S. Military Involvement in International
Peacekeeping (Only Black and White Respondents w/Conditions)

Black
0.29

N
28

White
0.27

2 African Countries
N
150

Difference
-0.02

t-value
-0.21

Black
0.28

N
36

White
0.27

2 Latin American Countries
N
191

Difference
-0.01

t-value
-0.07

White
0.36

2 European Countries
N
204

Difference
-0.01

t-value
-0.13

White
0.40

2 Other Areas
N
169

Difference
-0.03

t-value
-0.35

Black
0.37

Black
0.43

N
27

N
35

Note: *** p <.001** p < .01 * p < .05
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Table 5.6 Comparison of Support Levels Toward Genocide Within Race Groups by Condition
African Americans
Latin America v. Africa
Europe v. Africa
Abroad (General) v. Africa
Europe v. Latin America
Abroad (General) v. Latin America
Abroad (General) v. Europe

Contrast
-0.20
-0.13
0.01
0.07
0.21
0.14

Std. Error
0.13
0.13
0.13
0.13
0.12
0.13

t-value
-1.62
-0.96
0.06
0.59
1.77
1.06

Contrast
0.05
0.14
0.21
0.09
0.16
0.08

Std. Error t-value
0.05
0.92
0.05
2.56**
0.06
3.84***
0.05
1.74
0.05
3.13**
0.05
1.49

White Americans
Latin America v. Africa
Europe v. Africa
Abroad (General) v. Africa
Europe v. Latin America
Abroad (General) v. Latin America
Abroad (General) v. Europe

Note: *** p <.001** p < .01 * p < .05
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Table 5.7 Comparison of Support Levels Toward Peacekeeping Within Race Groups by
Condition
African Americans
Latin America v. Africa
Europe v. Africa
Abroad (General) v. Africa
Europe v. Latin America
Abroad (General) v. Latin America
Abroad (General) v. Europe

Contrast
-0.01
0.08
0.14
0.09
0.15
0.06

Std. Error t-value
0.12
-0.07
0.13
0.66
0.12
1.18
0.12
0.76
0.11
1.33
0.12
0.48

Contrast
0.01
0.09
0.13
0.09
0.12
0.04

Std. Error t-value
0.05
0.11
0.05
1.82
0.06
2.48**
0.05
1.82
0.05
2.52**
0.05
0.8

White Americans
Latin America v. Africa
Europe v. Africa
Abroad (General) v. Africa
Europe v. Latin America
Abroad (General) v. Latin America
Abroad (General) v. Europe

Note: *** p <.001** p < .01 * p < .05

Table 5.2 lists overall levels of support exhibited by Blacks and Whites concerning
whether they believe the United States has a moral obligation to use military force to prevent a
genocide. Overall, Whites are slightly more inclined than Blacks to support having the U.S.
military involved to prevent genocides from occurring overseas although this is not a statistically
significant difference. Table 5.3 lists overall levels of support exhibited by Blacks and Whites
concerning whether they believe the United States should contribute troops toward an
international peacekeeping force. Here, we see that Blacks are slightly more inclined than Whites
to believe U.S. troops should be part of an international peacekeeping coalition although this is
not a statistically significant difference.
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Table 5.4 incorporates the experimental conditions as it relates to whether the U.S. has a
moral obligation to prevent a genocide. In Table 5.4, the mean level of support among Whites to
believe the U.S. has a moral obligation ranges from 36% to 58% across conditions. White
Americans exhibit their greatest levels of support when it comes to Europe and in other areas in
general. Their lowest levels are manifested when it comes to Africa and Latin America. The
table also shows that support among Blacks range from 33% to 54% across conditions. Blacks
exhibit their greatest levels of support when it comes to Africa and in other countries in general,
while they exhibit their lowest levels when it comes to Europe.
Table 5.4 also shows the mean level of support among Blacks to believe the U.S. has a
moral obligation to use military force to prevent a genocide in Africa is .54, while for Whites it is
.36. Black Americans then are 17% more likely than White Americans to acknowledge the U.S.
has a moral obligation to prevent a genocide from occurring in Africa. The t-value associated
with this figure is statistically significant at the .05 level, thus providing support for hypotheses
1. We also notice that Whites are 28% more likely than Blacks to agree the U.S. has a moral
obligation to use military force to prevent a genocide from occurring in Europe. Though the tvalue associated with this figure is not statistically significant, the figures do point in the
expected direction.
These findings are in alignment with my expectations because as the results show, Blacks
are mostly in favor of believing the U.S. has a moral obligation to use military force in Africa.
For Whites, although they expressed their greatest level of support in believing the U.S. has a
moral obligation to use military force to prevent a genocide from occurring in a non-specified
area, Europe comes in a close second.
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Table 5.5 shows results between Blacks and Whites regarding their beliefs on whether the
U.S. should contribute troops as part of an international peacekeeping force to enforce peace
agreements around the world. This table shows the mean level among Blacks to believe the U.S.
should contribute U.S. troops for this purpose range from 28% to 43% across conditions. Black
Americans express their highest levels of approval in regards to the U.S. contributing troops as
part of an international peacekeeping force to enforce peace agreements between two countries
in Europe and two countries in a non-specified area.
The average level of support among White Americans in Table 5.5 range from 27% to
40% across conditions. Whites exhibit their highest levels of approval when it comes to two
countries in Europe and two countries in a non-specified area. For the most part, the above
figures are as I expect. Again, none of the models in this table reach statistical significance.
However, White Americans tend to be more likely to express support for allowing U.S. troops to
help maintain peace agreements in areas where members of their own race are the majority.
Tables 5.6 – 5.7 lists results from the pairwise means comparisons. My aim here was to
determine if there are any significant differences within each racial group according to the
condition they received in the experiment. According to Table 5.6, the level of support among
those that believe the U.S. has a moral obligation to prevent a genocide is less in Europe and
Latin America than in Africa. These figures are not statistically significant, but they do point in
my expected direction and are suggestive evidence of my overall theory. Table 5.6 also shows
that among White Americans, the level of support among those that believe the U.S. has a moral
obligation to prevent a genocide is greater when it comes to Europe and abroad in general than it
is when it comes to Africa. These figures are both statistically significant and shows that White
Americans are less likely to approve of policies that may benefit predominately Black areas.
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Lastly, the table shows that support among Whites is greater when it comes to somewhere abroad
in general, than in Latin America. This figure is also statistically significant.
Table 5.7 shows that among African Americans, the level of support among those who
believe the U.S. military should assist in peacekeeping efforts is greater when it comes to doing
so between two countries in Europe and two other countries in general, than for when it comes to
Africa. These figures are not statistically significant however, they are interesting (I will explain
why later in the discussion section). The table also shows support is less when it comes to Latin
America than it is when it comes to Africa. Among White Americans, Table 5.7 shows that the
level of support among those who believe the U.S. military should assist in peacekeeping efforts
is greater when it comes to Europe and Latin America than it is for Africa. Though not
statistically significant, the figures are suggestive. The table also shows that support among
White Americans is greater when it concerns two countries in general than specifically for two
countries in Africa.
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Table 5.8 Percentages of Those Who Believe U.S. Has Moral Obligation to Assist in Preventing
Genocide (Blacks Only, by Group Consciousness Overall)

High Group Cons
0.34

N
126

Low Group Cons
0.32

Genocide Overall
N
716

Difference
-0.02

t-value
-0.36

Note: *** p <.001** p < .01 * p < .05

Table 5.9 Percentages of Those Who Favor U.S. Military Involvement in International
Peacekeeping (Blacks Only, by Group Consciousness Overall)

High Group Cons
0.46

N
68

Low Group Cons
0.21

Peacekeeping Overall
N
57

Note: *** p <.001** p < .01 * p < .05
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Difference
-0.25

t-value
-2.95***

Table 5.10 Percentages of Those Who Believe U.S. Has Moral Obligation to Assist in Preventing
Genocide (Blacks Only, by Group Consciousness w/Conditions)
Africa
High Group Cons

N

Low Group Cons

N

Difference

t-value

0.67

15

0.38

13

-0.28

-1.50

Latin American
High Group Cons

N

Low Group Cons

N

Difference

t-value

0.47

17

0.21

19

-0.26

-1.67*

Difference

t-value

-0.17

-0.84

High Group Cons

N

Low Group Cons

0.50

14

0.33

Europe
N
12

2 Other Areas
High Group Cons

N

Low Group Cons

N

Difference

t-value

0.55

22

0.54

13

-0.01

-0.04

Note: *** p <.001** p < .01 * p < .05
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Table 5.11 Percentages of Those Who Favor U.S. Military Involvement in International
Peacekeeping (Blacks Only, by Group Consciousness w/Conditions)
2 African Countries
High Group Cons

N

Low Group Cons

N

Difference

t-value

0.33

15

0.23

13

-0.10

-0.58

2 Latin American Countries
High Group Cons

N

Low Group Cons

N

Difference

t-value

0.41

17

0.16

19

-0.25

-1.72

Difference

t-value

-0.40

-2.23

High Group Cons

N

Low Group Cons

0.57

14

0.17

2 European Countries
N
12

2 Other Areas
High Group Cons

N

Low Group Cons

N

Difference

t-value

0.50

22

0.31

13

-0.19

-1.10

Note: *** p <.001** p < .01 * p < .05

Table 5.8 lists overall levels of support exhibited by Blacks concerning whether they
believe the United States has a moral obligation to use military force to prevent a genocide
according to their level of group consciousness. Overall, Blacks with high group consciousness
are more inclined than those with lower levels to support having the U.S. military involved to
prevent genocides from occurring overseas. Table 5.9 lists overall levels of support exhibited by
Blacks concerning whether they believe the United States should contribute troops toward an
international peacekeeping force per their level of group consciousness. Here again, Blacks with
high levels of group consciousness are more inclined than other Blacks to believe U.S. troops
should be part of an international peacekeeping coalition.
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Table 5.10 displays averages among African Americans regarding their attitudes toward
the U.S. having the moral obligation to use military force to prevent a genocide from occurring
in different areas around the world per their level of group consciousness. I observe Blacks with
high levels of group consciousness in comparison to all other Blacks. Recall, Blacks with high
levels of group consciousness are those who identity with their race a great deal and also believe
that members of their race have common political, social, and economic interests. Table 5.10
shows that the average level of support among Blacks with high group consciousness range from
47% to 67% across conditions. African Americans with high levels of group consciousness show
strong support for believing the U.S. has a moral obligation in this sense in regards to Africa and
other areas abroad in general. Their lowest levels of support are in regards to Europe and Latin
America.
Table 5.10 shows a somewhat different story with respect to all other African Americans.
The average level of support among African Americans who do not have high levels of group
consciousness range from 21% to 54% across conditions. Here we see that African Americans
with lower levels of group consciousness exhibit strong support to believe the U.S. has this
moral obligation in Europe. Support among this group falls below 40% with respect to Africa,
Latin America, and to other countries in general. Blacks with high levels of group consciousness
are 26% more likely than other Blacks to believe the U.S. has a moral obligation to help prevent
a genocide in Latin America. The t-value associated with this figure is statistically significant at
the .05 level. Table 5.10 also shows that Blacks with high levels of group consciousness are 28%
more likely than Blacks with lower levels of group consciousness to believe the U.S. has a moral
obligation to use force to prevent a genocide in Africa. Though this figure does not reach
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conventional levels of statistical significance, it does follow the pattern of my general
expectations.
Table 5.11 displays averages among African Americans regarding their attitudes toward
contributing U.S. troops to be part of an international peacekeeping force to enforce a peace
agreement between different areas around the world. The mean level of support among Blacks
with high group consciousness range from 33% to 57% across conditions. The average level of
support among Blacks with lower levels of group consciousness range from 16% to 31% across
conditions. Interestingly, we notice that Blacks with high levels of group consciousness express
their greatest level of support for the condition of contributing U.S. troops to enforce a peace
agreement between two countries in Europe as well as two countries in a non-specified area.
Support among African Americans with lower levels of group consciousness is below 40% for
each condition.
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Table 5.12 Percentages of Those Who Believe U.S. Has Moral Obligation to Assist in Preventing
Genocide (Whites Only, by Group Consciousness Overall)

High Group Cons
0.44

N
140

Low Group Cons
0.47

Genocide Overall
N
572

Difference
0.04

t-value
0.81

Note: *** p <.001** p < .01 * p < .05

Table 5.13 Percentages of Those Who Favor U.S. Military Involvement in International
Peacekeeping (Whites Only, by Group Consciousness Overall)

High Group Cons
0.29

N
139

Low Group Cons
0.34

Peacekeeping Overall
N
571

Note: *** p <.001** p < .01 * p < .05

126

Difference
0.05

t-value
1.10

Table 5.14 Percentages of Those Who Believe U.S. Has Moral Obligation to Assist in Preventing
Genocide (Whites Only, by Group Consciousness w/Conditions)
Africa
High Group Cons

N

Low Group Cons

N

Difference

t-value

0.24

33

0.40

118

0.16

1.65*

Latin American
High Group Cons

N

Low Group Cons

N

Difference

t-value

0.39

36

0.42

154

0.03

0.36

Difference

t-value

-0.01

-0.07

High Group Cons

N

Low Group Cons

0.50

36

0.49

Europe
N
166

2 Other Areas
High Group Cons

N

Low Group Cons

N

Difference

t-value

0.60

35

0.57

134

-0.03

-0.27

Note: *** p <.001** p < .01 * p < .05
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Table 5.15 Percentages of Those Who Favor U.S. Military Involvement in International
Peacekeeping (Whites Only, by Group Consciousness w/Conditions)
2 African Countries
High Group Cons

N

Low Group Cons

N

Difference

t-value

0.19

32

0.29

118

0.10

1.14

2 Latin American Countries
High Group Cons

N

Low Group Cons

N

Difference

t-value

0.28

36

0.27

154

0.01

-0.06

Difference

t-value

-0.06

0.77

High Group Cons

N

Low Group Cons

0.31

36

0.37

2 European Countries
N
166

2 Other Areas
High Group Cons

N

Low Group Cons

N

Difference

t-value

0.37

35

0.41

133

0.03

0.37

Note: *** p <.001** p < .01 * p < .05

Table 5.12 list overall levels of support exhibited by Whites concerning whether they
believe the United States has a moral obligation to use military force to prevent a genocide,
according to their level of group consciousness. Overall, Whites with high group consciousness
are less inclined than those with lower levels to support having the U.S. military involved to
prevent genocides from occurring overseas. Table 5.13 lists overall levels of support exhibited
by Whites concerning whether they believe the United States should contribute troops toward an
international peacekeeping force. Here again, Whites with high levels of group consciousness are
less inclined than other Whites to believe that U.S. troops should be part of an international
peacekeeping coalition.
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Table 5.14 displays means among White Americans regarding their attitudes toward the
U.S. having the moral obligation to use military force to prevent a genocide from occurring in
different areas around the world per their level of group consciousness. Looking firstly at White
Americans with high levels of group consciousness, their mean level of support ranges from 24%
to 60% across conditions. The mean among those with lower levels of group consciousness
ranges from 40% to 57% across conditions. Whites with high levels of group consciousness
exhibit their highest levels of support when it comes to preventing a genocide in Europe and in
two other non-specified areas. They express their least amount of support when Africa is given
as a condition. Whites with high levels of group consciousness are 16% less likely than Whites
with lower levels of group consciousness to believe the U.S. has a moral obligation to help
prevent a genocide in Africa. The t-value associated with this figure is statistically significant at
the .05 level, thus adding further credence to hypothesis 2.
Table 5.15 displays averages among White Americans regarding their attitudes toward
contributing U.S. troops as part of an international peacekeeping force to enforce a peace
agreement between two different countries in certain regions around the world. Table 5.15 shows
that for White Americans with high levels of group consciousness, the mean level to support
using U.S. troops for this purpose ranges from 19% to 37% across conditions. Whites with low
group consciousness express their highest level of support for using U.S. troops to enforce a
peace agreement between two countries in a non-specified area as well as in Africa. Those with
lower levels of group consciousness range from 27% to 41%. As expected, Whites with high
levels of group consciousness exhibit their lowest levels of support for contributing U.S. troops
for peacekeeping efforts in Africa. They express their highest levels of support towards
contributing U.S. troops in peacekeeping operations in Europe and in two other non-specified
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areas. Whites with lower levels of group consciousness express their highest levels of support in
regards to Europe and two other non-specified areas, while their lowest level is in regards to
Latin America.
Discussion
This chapter highlights several interesting findings regarding social identity and how it
influences people’s attitudes toward U.S. foreign policy. The results yield several statistically
significant results. For instance, in Table 5.2, African Americans were more likely than White
Americans to believe the U.S. has a moral obligation to prevent a genocide from occurring in
Africa. In fact, out of every area around the world, Africa is where White Americans showed
their least amount of support toward this notion. This could be picking up symbolic racism
among Whites and racial solidarity among Blacks as these findings show clearly that political
attitudes here are drawn along racial lines. Table 5.4 shows that for White Americans, the
difference in the level of support among those that believe the U.S. has a greater moral obligation
to prevent a genocide in Europe and somewhere abroad in general than in Africa is statistically
significant. This finding not only confirms the results in Table 5.2, but it also exemplifies that
among White Americans there is a strong preference to put the interests of other regions around
the world before Africa’s.
The results in this chapter show that African Americans are more likely to support U.S.
troops joining a peacekeeping operation in Europe and somewhere abroad in general than in
Africa. At first blush this may seem a bit odd, upon further reflection however it begins to make
more sense. Peacekeepers do not have the best reputation on the African continent. Not only this,
but sometimes peacekeeping operations among many minority groups around the world seems to
be code for modern colonialism and/or imperialism (Marten, 2004; Walton, 1985). Thus, for
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African Americans, opposing peacekeeping troops in Africa exhibits a sense of racial solidarity.
I find White Americans are more likely to support U.S. troops to assist in a peacekeeping
operation somewhere abroad in general than specifically in Africa. This difference in level of
support is statistically significant and provides further evidence to hypothesis 1. This finding
seems to suggest that White Americans desire to have as little involvement as possible as it
relates to this area of our nation’s humanitarian foreign policy.
Besides race, we also see that group consciousness has an influence on people’s foreign
policy views. Group consciousness heightens the level of awareness of similarities that one has
with their ingroup while also increasing the level of awareness toward the dissimilarities that one
has with people of other social groups. It also produces more affectation towards one’s ingroup.
The results in this chapter bear this out. I also find African Americans with high group
consciousness are more likely than those with low group consciousness to believe the U.S. has a
moral obligation to prevent a genocide in Africa. This finding isn’t statistically significant, but it
is quite suggestive of my overall theory. In fact, this is the highest level of support that is
expressed by Blacks towards an area on the entire table. The results in this chapter shows that
among Whites, those with high group consciousness are less likely than those with low group
consciousness to believe the U.S. has a moral obligation to prevent a genocide in Africa. This
finding is statistically significant. Interestingly, this is the lowest level of support that is
expressed by Whites towards an area on the entire table. These results suggest social identity
seems to influence foreign policy views in two ways. One is by increasing the level of support
toward policies beneficial to ingroup members, and two is by increasing the level of opposition
toward policies beneficial to non-ingroup members.
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Conclusion
The results in this chapter provide evidence of the powerful influence of social identity in
promoting a sense of racial solidarity as Americans think in terms of foreign policy, and also in
promoting a sense of opposition towards other race groups. As hypothesized, race groups
expressed racial solidarity by exhibiting greater levels of support for U.S. humanitarian foreign
policy in areas primarily inhabited by people of their own race while at the same time expressing
greater levels of opposition in other areas. In addition, a higher sense of group consciousness
makes White and Black Americans more likely to exhibit racial solidarity in the realm of U.S.
humanitarian foreign policy. Thus, just as we have seen with different areas concerning domestic
policy, social identity also influences the foreign policy attitudes of Americans.
Consistent with hypothesis 1, I find Black Americans are more likely than White
Americans to believe the U.S. has a moral obligation to use military force to prevent a genocide
in Africa. Also, though not statistically significant, the results also support my expectations that
White Americans are more likely than Black Americans to believe the U.S. has this moral
obligation when it comes to preventing genocide in Europe.
When it comes to group consciousness, I find Whites with high amounts of group
consciousness are less likely than other Whites to believe the U.S. has a moral obligation to use
military force to prevent a genocide from occurring in Africa. This finding is consistent with
hypothesis 2. I also found that Blacks with high levels of group consciousness are more likely
than other Blacks to believe the U.S. has a moral obligation to prevent a genocide from occurring
in Latin America.
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These findings show strong support for each of my hypotheses. They also add to our
understanding of the nature of social identity, as well as its role in influencing attitudes related to
U.S. foreign policy. Future appraisals of public attitudes toward U.S. foreign policy should find
ways to incorporate reliable measures for social identity if we hope to gain a more accurate
assessment of public opinion in this domain.

133

CHAPTER SIX
CONCLUSION
The results presented in this dissertation are a sobering wake-up call. Social identity plays
an even larger role in shaping political views toward U.S. foreign policy than previously
realized. Instead of arriving at political choices through our own free agency, the results
presented here show that preferences are formed because of our membership in a group. This
research project illustrates the powerful influence the force of social identity has on our political
thought processes. Even further, the more identified the individual to the group, the more likely
he or she will express racial solidarity towards U.S. foreign policy. Bearing this knowledge in
mind, there are a few positive implications that we can take from these findings.
One, people are passionate about those who share certain commonalities with them. Such
commonalities may include race, history, sense of oppression or achievement, and other
elements that may lead people to think of themselves as part of a larger group. If exercised
properly, this passion could lead them to advocate for specific foreign policies that may bring
peace and stability to desperate regions around the world.
A second positive implication is that because social identity matters, it could be used as a
tool to encourage citizens to learn and become more familiar with different groups and areas
around the world. If people are willing to support policies that benefit others they socially
identify with, then perhaps people are also willing to learn more about other cultures, traditions,
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and heritages. Educating ourselves about other people and countries will go far in ensuring that
U.S. citizens advocate for proper and more effective foreign policies.
The underlying assumption associated with these positive implications is that the wishes
of U.S. citizens can actually impact the nation’s foreign policy. An informed, concerned, and
active citizenry has been shown since the early Greek period to have an influence in
government’s domestic and foreign affairs. Now in the age of the internet, new and social media,
mass information and expectations, this influence has only increased. Citizens must use this
power to create mass mobilization efforts and instantaneous global updates, in a responsible
manner. As leaders of the free world, it will be up to American citizens to chart the ethical path
of where we take and how we use these new technological tools.
Major Contributions
A major contribution of this dissertation is that it adds another factor for scholars to
assess as it relates to how Americans form their political attitudes toward foreign policy. Social
identity can be seen as another cue or shortcut device that people with limited information can
use to make sound choices in the political arena. Other such cues include partisanship, ideology,
and gender (and a host of others), but with this study, we can also add social identity to the list
when thinking about foreign policy. By extending the research in this direction, scholars have
plenty avenues from which to begin uncovering more information about the power of social
identity.
Another major contribution is that it gives policymakers more insight into what the public
cares about. If our democracy is to survive triumphant in a highly competitive international
environment, then it is up to its people to ensure that it does so. From this study, policymakers
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have at least the rudimentary tools needed to combat political apathy among the public. A vibrant
democracy needs an informed and engaged citizenry. If social identity awakens one’s sense of
political activity, then perhaps responsible policymakers can use it as a tool to generate more
participation from the public especially during periods where a serious national dialogue become
essential.
This leads to another major contribution. An important nexus between the public and
politician’s behavior toward foreign policy are the issues which link them together. Thus,
another major contribution of this study concerns the relevance of foreign policy issues which
may evoke one’s sense of social identity and how these issues could potentially influence the
political atmosphere during elections. If people tend to make decisions predicated on their social
identity, then perhaps politicians may use this knowledge as part of a new political campaign
strategy to garner votes and support. In an increasingly competitive and zero-sum election
atmosphere, priming social identity and invoking foreign policy issues may not be a far stretch.
Another implication of this research reveals that issues concerning race and ethnicity
continues to play a key role in American political life. People care deeply for issues affecting
their own race and ethnic group while they are dismissive on issues concerning others. Even after
the election of the nation’s first African American president, we still have a long way to go in
fulfilling a post-racial society. The election of President Barack Obama in 2008 and his
subsequent leadership while in office does show that America has matured tremendously.
Scholars must now continue their quest to uncover glitches in our political system so that we
may improve on the progress society has made to date.
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Strengths and Weaknesses
This dissertation lends itself to a number of strengths and weaknesses. This analysis
increases our understanding of the role that social identity plays in shaping political attitudes
toward foreign policy. Given that foreign policy issues are becoming increasingly important to
political candidates and officeholders, it is wise that political scientists and observers critically
assess the context in which the American people form their views toward foreign policy. A
second strength of this research is that it opens an additional channel for political scientists to
understand how race and ethnicity continues to influence life in American politics. Race and
ethnicity, long a dynamic which has been examined within the domestic context, has the
potential to answer a host of serious and important questions dealing with issues related to public
opinion and political behavior in the context of foreign policy.
A weakness of this research concerns the limitation and availability of important data
from which to meaningfully investigate this political phenomenon. Many of the major national
surveys do not contain nationally representative samples of minorities, making it very difficult to
confidently generalize important findings. I compensated for this handicap by utilizing a diverse
handful of datasets. Even in this however, I would have been more comfortable if I had access to
an oversample of African Americans and other minorities in each dataset. Perhaps some of the
insignificant findings were an indication of nothing more than simply not enough respondents
included. The small sample size could be a reason for the models not to fully realize the strength
of the variables of interest. Another limitation of this study concerns the range of foreign policy
issues. This study only covers a handful of foreign policy issues. Perhaps I am observing how
social identity influences political attitudes related to the issues included in this study only.
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Because I rely heavily on survey data in this study, it is important that I also cover the
potential for social desirability bias. Previous research shows that many survey respondents
proffer answers they believe to be the most socially acceptable (Goffman, 1959; Schlenker and
Weigold, 1989). This is because they wish to be perceived in a positive light and thus adapt their
answers accordingly even if this adaptation deviates from their true feelings. In fact, several
studies show that African Americans report more favorable attitudes toward Whites when the
interviewer is White than they would if the interviewer were African American (Anderson,
Silver, and Abramson, 1988; Campbell, 1981). This dynamic has also been shown to occur
among Whites when the race of the interviewer is African American as opposed to White
(Finkel, Guterbock, and Borg, 1991). This is important to my study because it speaks directly to
the heart of my research agenda. Fortunately, I have taken important steps to reduce the
influence of such bias. One of the datasets utilizes random digit dialing, and another is performed
online so that the race of the interviewer is not a factor at all.
Future Research
The results I find in this research project yield several interesting questions and venues
for future scholarship to pursue. Firstly, given that social identity does indeed influence political
attitudes toward U.S. foreign policy, researchers may ask what types of foreign policies invoke
one’s sense of social identity the most. Relatedly, scholars may also ask which foreign policy
choices and decisions most influence social groups. This is important because not every social
group is heavily political, but having a good understanding of the issues and the influence these
issues have on different social groups is not only an exercise in good statecraft, but it is also an
illustration of good leadership. Secondly, now that evidence shows that high levels of social
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identity is powerful enough to even influence political views toward foreign policy, future
research could analyze what leads to variation in levels of social identity within groups.
Additionally, future scholarship should begin moving the discussion away from whether
social identity may influence political attitudes on foreign policy, and towards whether these
attitudes have any substantive influence on people’s political behavior. Having a strong and
cohesive group consciousness is one matter, but does this social identity and its attendant set of
attitudes influence political behavior? Another aspect for future research to consider is whether
social identity is a dynamic phenomenon. It would be interesting to know whether socially
identifying with a group is a feeling that waxes and wanes, or if it remains stable over time.
Related to this point, future research may continue to disaggregate responses of low identifying
members of a group from high identifying members. This will help contextualize the power of
social groups and provide a better perspective of their relative strength.
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European Countries
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Figure 7. Black and White Feelings of Warmness toward
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African Countries
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Middle Eastern Countries
Figure 15. Black and White Feelings of Warmness toward
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Figure 19. Black and White Feelings of Warmness toward
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Tables A1 – A21 t-test Results Comparing Feelings of Warmness among Blacks and Whites
toward Different Countries Around the World

North American Countries
Table A1. t-test Results Comparing Blacks and Whites Feelings of Warmness toward Mexico
Mexico
White
Black
Combined
Difference

N
867
95
962
-

Mean
45.52
50.18
45.98
-4.66

SE
0.85
2.31
0.80
2.69

t
-1.73

df

p

-

-

960

0.08

South American Countries
Table A2. t-test Results Comparing Blacks and Whites Feelings of Warmness toward Brazil
Brazil
White
Black
Combined
Difference

N
1872
224
2096
-

Mean
56.05
56.66
56.11
-0.61

SE
0.50
1.52
0.47
1.53

t
-0.40

df

p

-

-

2094

0.69

Table A3. t-test Results Comparing Blacks and Whites Feelings of Warmness toward Venezuela
Venezuela
White
Black
Combined
Difference

N
840
109
949
-

Mean
41.27
47.33
41.97
-6.06

SE
0.85
2.16
0.79
2.49

t
-2.44

df

p

-

-

947

0.015

Central American Countries
Table A4. t-test Results Comparing Blacks and Whites Feelings of Warmness toward Cuba
Cuba
White
Black
Combined
Difference

N
854
115
969
-

Mean
37.08
42.76
37.75
-5.68

SE
0.81
2.33
0.77
2.36

161

t
-2.40

df

p

-

-

967

0.017

European Countries
Table A5. t-test Results Comparing Blacks and Whites Feelings of Warmness toward France
France
White
Black
Combined
Difference

N
895
90
985

Mean
55.84
58.32
56.07
-2.48

SE
0.81
2.61
0.77
2.68

t

df

p

-0.92

983

0.355

Table A6. t-test Results Comparing Blacks and Whites Feelings of Warmness toward Germany
Germany
White
Black
Combined
Difference

N
892
106
998

Mean
65.36
54.37
64.19
10.99

SE
0.75
2.44
0.073
2.33

t

df

p

4.71

996

0.001

Table A7. t-test Results Comparing Blacks and Whites Feelings of Warmness toward Great
Britain
Great
Britain
White
Black
Combined
Difference

N
1878
231
2109

Mean
0.89
0.83
0.88
0.07

SE
0.01
0.02
0.01
0.02

t

df

p

3.01

2107

0.001

Table A8. t-test Results Comparing Blacks and Whites Feelings of Warmness toward Russia
Russia
White
Black
Combined
Difference

N
1869
225
2094
-

Mean
48.09
46.8
47.96
1.29

SE
0.50
1.53
0.48
1.54
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t
0.83

df

p

-

-

2092

0.404

African Countries
Table A9. t-test Results Comparing Blacks and Whites Feelings of Warmness toward South
Africa
South Africa
White
Black
Combined
Difference

N
859
110
969
-

Mean
52.66
59.31
53.41
-6.65

SE
0.74
2.50
0.72
2.26

t
-2.94

df

p

-

-

967

0.003

Asian Countries
Table A10. t-test Results Comparing Blacks and Whites Feelings of Warmness toward China
China
White
Black
Combined
Difference

N
1879
222
2101
-

Mean
43.43
50.30
44.16
-6.87

SE
0.53
1.44
0.50
1.62

t
-4.23

df

p

-

-

2099

0.001

Table A11. t-test Results Comparing Blacks and Whites Feelings of Warmness toward Indonesia
Indonesia
White
Black
Combined
Difference

N
854
99
953
-

Mean
46.95
49.1
47.17
-2.15

SE
0.69
2.01
0.66
2.15

t
-1.01

df

p

-

-

951

0.317

Table A12. t-test Results Comparing Blacks and Whites Feelings of Warmness toward Japan
Japan
White
Black
Combined
Difference

N
1877
225
2102
-

Mean
61.96
53.50
61.05
8.46

SE
0.55
1.61
0.53
1.70
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t
4.98

df

p

-

-

2100

0.001

Table A13. t-test Results Comparing Blacks and Whites Feelings of Warmness toward South
Korea
South Korea
White
Black
Combined
Difference

N
1866
221
2087
-

Mean
53.76
47.27
53.07
6.49

SE
0.58
1.69
0.55
1.77

t
3.66

df

p

-

-

2085

0.001

Table A14. t-test Results Comparing Blacks and Whites Feelings of Warmness toward North
Korea
North Korea
White
Black
Combined
Difference

N
880
111
991
-

Mean
23.62
35.25
24.92
-11.63

SE
0.76
2.41
0.74
2.31

t
-5.03

df

p

-

-

989

0.001

Middle Eastern Countries
Table A15. t-test Results Comparing Blacks and Whites Feelings of Warmness toward Iran
Iran
White
Black
Combined
Difference

N
840
116
956
-

Mean
24.29
30.74
25.07
-6.45

SE
0.78
2.23
0.74
2.26

t
-2.86

df

p

-

-

954

0.004

Table A16. t-test Results Comparing Blacks and Whites Feelings of Warmness toward Iraq
Iraq
White
Black
Combined
Difference

N
933
101
1034
-

Mean
33.41
40.2
34.07
-6.79

SE
0.77
2.57
0.74
2.49

t
-2.72

df

p

-

-

1032

0.006

Table A17. t-test Results Comparing Blacks and Whites Feelings of Warmness toward Israel
Israel
White
Black
Combined
Difference

N
889
98
987
-

Mean
58.65
51.62
57.95
7.03

SE
0.94
2.76
0.89
2.98
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t
2.35

df

p

-

-

985

0.019

Table A18. t-test Results Comparing Blacks and Whites Feelings of Warmness toward Pakistan
Pakistan
White
Black
Combined
Difference

N
1872
224
2096

Mean
56.05
56.66
56.11
-0.61

SE
0.50
1.52
0.47
1.53

t
-0.40

df

p

-

-

2094

0.69

Table A19. t-test Results Comparing Blacks and Whites Feelings of Warmness toward Palestine
Palestine
White
Black
Combined
Difference

N
862
114
976
-

Mean
31.13
41.61
32.35
-10.48

SE
0.76
2.21
0.73
2.24

t
-4.67

df

p

-

-

974

0.001

Table A20. t-test Results Comparing Blacks and Whites Feelings of Warmness toward Saudi
Arabia
Saudi
Arabia
White
Black
Combined
Difference

N
872
112
984
-

Mean
38.84
43.53
39.37
-4.69

SE
0.75
2.34
0.72
2.26

t
-2.08

df

p

-

-

982

0.038

Table A21. t-test Results Comparing Blacks and Whites Feelings of Warmness toward Turkey
Turkey
White
Black
Combined
Difference

N
867
95
962
-

Mean
48.09
45.69
47.86
2.40

SE
0.71
2.37
0.68
2.29
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t
1.05

df

p

-

-

960

0.294

Table A22 Logistic Regression Results of Race on Attitudes toward European or
Majority White Countries

White
Black
Age
Education
Gender
Income
Partisanship
Ideology
Constant

Observations

Canada
0.471
(0.37)
0.0728
(0.52)
-0.00778
(0.04)
0.0982
(0.11)
-0.0228
(0.26)
0.0801
(0.18)
0.0972
(0.39)
-0.0983
(0.38)
1.244*
(0.67)

Germany
-0.318
(0.35)
-0.912*
(0.47)
0.128**
(0.06)
0.037
(0.07)
-0.409*
(0.21)
-0.0397
(0.13)
0.0525
(0.29)
-0.137
(0.29)
2.001***
(0.59)

Great Britain
0.435
(0.31)
-0.268
(0.42)
0.0501
(0.07)
0.192*
(0.11)
-0.430**
(0.22)
-0.0153
(0.14)
0.406
(0.32)
0.219
(0.31)
1.472**
(0.64)

Israel
-0.834**
(0.41)
-0.915*
(0.51)
0.468***
(0.15)
0.0555
(0.07)
0.216
(0.23)
0.0182
(0.14)
-0.0231
(0.40)
0.445
(0.39)
0.324
(0.74)

Russia
-0.262
(0.26)
-0.319
(0.36)
0.0822
(0.07)
0.0895
(0.05)
0.0289
(0.15)
0.0566
(0.10)
-0.0262
(0.23)
-0.444*
(0.23)
1.098**
(0.47)

546

572

1,040

539

1,033

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table A23 Logistic Regression Results of Race on Attitudes toward African or Majority Black
Countries

White
Black
Age
Education
Gender
Income
Partisanship
Ideology
Constant

Observations

Brazil

Nigeria

-0.198
(0.20)
0.019
(0.28)
0.0147
(0.02)
0.0354
(0.03)
0.107
(0.13)
-0.0569
(0.08)
0.183
(0.19)
-0.175
(0.19)
0.0888
(0.37)

-0.4
(0.31)
0.840*
(0.44)
-0.0167
(0.03)
-0.00816
(0.05)
0.348*
(0.19)
-0.181
(0.11)
0.900***
(0.33)
0.540*
(0.32)
-1.406**
(0.62)

1,033

535

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table A24 Logistic Regression Results of Race on Attitudes toward Asian Countries
(

White
Black
Age
Education
Gender
Income
Partisanship
Ideology
Constant

Observations

China

India

Japan

South Korea

0.0461
(0.35)
-0.532
(0.47)
0.0251
(0.05)
0.162
(0.12)
-0.333
(0.23)
0.514***
(0.16)
0.608*
(0.36)
-0.00912
(0.35)
1.139
(0.71)

-0.158
(0.22)
-0.235
(0.32)
0.0191
(0.02)
0.0947**
(0.04)
-0.227
(0.14)
0.0934
(0.09)
-0.0732
(0.21)
-0.527**
(0.21)
1.120***
(0.42)

0.392
(0.32)
0.122
(0.45)
0.0469
(0.07)
0.223*
(0.12)
-0.266
(0.21)
-0.0488
(0.14)
0.481
(0.31)
-0.0831
(0.30)
1.273**
(0.59)

-0.481**
(0.22)
-0.115
(0.32)
0.00933
(0.02)
0.0774*
(0.04)
-0.0225
(0.14)
0.0327
(0.08)
-0.313
(0.21)
-0.214
(0.20)
1.145***
(0.40)

1,040

1,032

1,038

1,035

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table A25 Logistic Regression Results of Race on Attitudes toward Middle Eastern Countries

White
Black
Age
Education
Gender
Income
Partisanship
Ideology
Constant

Observations

Afghanistan
-0.403
(0.28)
-0.256
(0.39)
-0.00409
(0.02)
0.187***
(0.06)
0.865***
(0.18)
0.0599
(0.11)
0.181
(0.27)
-0.0496
(0.26)
-1.320**
(0.53)

Iraq
-0.365
(0.27)
-0.405
(0.39)
0.00983
(0.02)
0.114**
(0.05)
0.469***
(0.18)
-0.0193
(0.10)
0.097
(0.27)
0.219
(0.27)
-0.407
(0.49)

Iran
-0.057
(0.29)
-0.486
(0.40)
0.0304
(0.02)
0.157**
(0.06)
0.772***
(0.18)
0.073
(0.11)
0.131
(0.27)
-0.215
(0.26)
-1.368**
(0.54)

Pakistan
-0.33
(0.32)
-0.758*
(0.43)
0.0259
(0.02)
0.0298
(0.05)
0.398**
(0.18)
0.045
(0.11)
0.246
(0.29)
-0.586**
(0.29)
0.297
(0.54)

Saudi Arabia
-0.16
(0.35)
-0.319
(0.48)
0.278*
(0.15)
0.188*
(0.11)
0.0885
(0.21)
0.0387
(0.15)
0.119
(0.31)
-0.12
(0.31)
0.0235
(0.68)

Turkey
-0.0166
(0.26)
0.242
(0.37)
0.0534*
(0.03)
0.0307
(0.04)
0.0113
(0.17)
-0.245**
(0.10)
0.101
(0.26)
0.0415
(0.26)
0.141
(0.50)

586

591

570

582

571

555

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table A26 Logistic Regression Results of Race on Attitudes toward a Hispanic Country

White
Black
Age
Education
Gender
Income
Partisanship
Ideology
Constant

Observations

Mexico
-0.253
(0.30)
-0.405
(0.41)
0.0154
(0.03)
0.150*
(0.08)
-0.102
(0.19)
0.13
(0.12)
0.073
(0.30)
-0.256
(0.30)
0.64
(0.60)
570

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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2010 Global Views Questionnaire Conducted by the Chicago Council of Global Affairs
POS 2010 Questionnaire
/Version 9/
In this survey, we'd like your opinions about some important foreign relations issues. There is no
right or wrong answer and please answer the questions based on your knowledge. If you do not
know the answer to a question, you can simply skip it and go on to the next question
[GRIDS; NUMBER BOXES; RANGE 0-100]
BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS
Q45 (1-21): Please rate your feelings toward some countries and peoples, with
one hundred meaning a very warm, favorable feeling, zero meaning a very cold,
unfavorable feeling, and fifty meaning not particularly warm or cold. You can
use any number from zero to one hundred, the higher the number the more
favorable your feelings are toward that country or those people. [use
thermometer graphic]
[RANDOMIZE]
45/1. Pakistan [goes to a random 1/2 of respondents]
45/2. Germany [goes to a random 1/2 of respondents]
45/3. Mexico [goes to a random 1/2 of respondents]
45/4. Israel [goes to a random 1/2 of respondents]
45/5. Great Britain
45/6. China
45/7. Saudi Arabia [goes to a random 1/2 of respondents]
45/8. France [goes to a random 1/2 of respondents]
45/9. Brazil
45/10. India
45/11. Japan
45/12. Russia
45/13. Venezuela [goes to a random 1/2 of respondents]
45/14. Iran [goes to a random 1/2 of respondents]
45/15. Cuba [goes to a random 1/2 of respondents]
45/16. Iraq [goes to a random 1/2 of respondents]
45/17. Palestinian Authority [goes to a random 1/2 of respondents]
45/18. South Africa [goes to a random 1/2 of respondents]
45/19. North Korea [goes to a random 1/2 of respondents]
45/20. South Korea
45/21. Indonesia [goes to a random 1/2 of respondents]
45/22. Turkey [goes to a random 1/2 of respondents]
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[SP; GRIDS]
BASE: ALL RESPONDENTS
Q160 (1-18): Here is a list of countries. Thinking about the role each of these
countries plays in the world, how important is each country to the United
States?
1.
2.
3.
4.

Very important
Somewhat important
Not very important
Not at all important

[RANDOMIZE]
160/1. Iraq [goes to a random 1/2 of respondents]
160/2. Germany [goes to a random 1/2 of respondents]
160/3. Japan
160/4. Mexico [goes to a random 1/2 of respondents]
160/5. Israel [goes to a random 1/2 of respondents]
160/6. Canada [goes to a random 1/2 of respondents]
160/7. Brazil
160/8. Russia
160/9. Afghanistan [goes to a random 1/2 of respondents]
160/10. Great Britain
160/11. Saudi Arabia [goes to a random 1/2 of respondents]
160/12. China
160/13. India
160/14. Iran [goes to a random 1/2 of respondents]
160/15. Pakistan [goes to a random 1/2 of respondents]
160/16. Nigeria [goes to a random 1/2 of respondents]
160/17. Turkey [goes to a random 1/2 of respondents]
160/18. South Korea
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SOCIAL IDENTITY AND ATTITUDES ON FOREIGN POLICY EXPERIMENT – PRETEST/POST-TEST SCRIPT.
Pretest Questions
As part of a research project we are conducting a brief survey about political attitudes and
foreign policy. Please answer the following questions, which should take approximately 6-12
minutes. Your participation is entirely voluntary, and would be greatly appreciated. Your
responses are wholly anonymous and confidential.
1. On a scale of 1-10, how do you feel about
the United Nations? The higher the number,
the more favorable you feel toward the United
1 2
Nations. The lower the number, the less
Cold
favorable you feel toward the United Nations.
An answer of 5 would indicate you feel
neither favorably nor unfavorably toward the
United Nations. Circle the number that best
corresponds to your feelings.
2. On a scale of 1-10, how do you feel about
international peacekeepers? The higher the
number, the more favorable you feel toward
international peacekeepers. The lower the
number, the less favorable you feel toward
international peacekeepers. An answer of 5
would indicate you feel neither favorably nor
unfavorably toward international
peacekeepers. Circle the number that best
corresponds to your feelings.
3. On a scale of 1-10, how do you feel about
the United States giving humanitarian aid to
needy countries? The higher the number, the
more favorable you feel toward the United
States giving humanitarian aid to needy
countries. The lower the number, the less
favorable you feel toward the United States
giving humanitarian aid to needy countries.

3

4

5 6
Neutral

7

8

9

10
Warm

1 2
Cold

3

4

5 6
Neutral

7

8

9

10
Warm

1 2
Cold

3

4

5 6
Neutral

7

8

9

10
Warm
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An answer of 5 would indicate you feel
neither favorably nor unfavorably toward the
United States giving humanitarian aid to
needy countries. Circle the number that best
corresponds to your feelings.

4. How interested are you in information about what's going on in government and politics?
_____ Extremely interested
_____ Very interested
_____ Moderately interested
_____ Slightly interested
_____ Not interested at all
5. Generally speaking, do you consider yourself a Republican, a Democrat, an independent, or
what?
______ Strong Democrat
______ Democrat
______ Independent leaning Democrat
______ Independent
______ Independent leaning Republican
______ Republican
______ Strong Republican
______ Don’t Know, or Apolitical
6. Who is the speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives?
______ Harry Reid
______ Paul Ryan
______ Mitch McConnell
______ Nancy Pelosi
______ John Boehner
______ Don’t know
7. Do you know which party has a majority in the House and Senate of the U.S. Congress?
______ Republicans
______ Democrats
______ The Democrats control the House and the Republicans control the Senate
______ The Republicans control the House and the Democrats control the Senate
______ Don’t know
8. Who is the Chairman/Chairwoman of the Federal Reserve Board?
______ Eric Cantor ______ Janet Yellen
______
Ben Bernanke ______ Alan Greenspan
______ Mary Jo White
______ Don’t know
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9. Which of the following individuals is a Justice on the U.S. Supreme Court?
______ Mitch McConnell
______ Harry Reid
______ Joseph Biden
______ Stephen Breyer
______ Colin Powell
______ Don’t know
10. Generally speaking, do you consider yourself a Conservative, a Liberal, middle of the road,
or what?
______ Strong Liberal
______ Liberal
______ Moderate leaning Liberal
______ Moderate/Middle of the road
______ Moderate leaning Conservative
______ Conservative
______ Strong Conservative
______ Don’t Know, or Apolitical
11. How often do you watch one of the major national news networks on television?
______ Regularly
______ Sometimes
______ Hardly Ever
______ Never
12. How often do you read a daily newspaper (other than the school newspaper)?
______ Regularly
______ Sometimes
______ Hardly Ever
______ Never
For each of the following, indicate your answer to given the question. Please only check one
response for each statement.
13. How often do you believe that what happens generally to people of your race will affect what
happens in your life?
______ Regularly
______ Sometimes
______ Hardly Ever
______ Never
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14. How often do you feel people of your race should work together to gain greater economic
and political power?
______ Regularly
______ Sometimes
______ Hardly Ever
______ Never
15. How often do you believe people of your race have similar economic interests?
______ Regularly
______ Sometimes
______ Hardly Ever
______ Never
16. How often do you believe people of your race have similar political interests?
______ Regularly
______ Sometimes
______ Hardly Ever
______ Never
17. How often do people treat you differently (in a disrespectful or discriminatory way) because
of your
membership in your racial group?
______ Regularly
______ Sometimes
______ Hardly Ever
______ Never
Answer each of the following questions to the best of your ability
18. What is your gender?

______ Female

______ Male

19. How old are you? ____________
20. What is your race?
______ Caucasian
______ African-American
______ Other

______ Non-white Hispanic
______ Asian

21. In which state did you grow up (name only one state)?
_____
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Background Information on Humanitarian Crises

A group of people has been referred to as one of the "most oppressed ethnic groups on
Earth." They suffer vicious attacks and systematic abuse by their government. They are
constantly harassed and their basic rights as citizens are repeatedly denied. More than 140,000
fled the country after their homes and towns or villages were burnt to the ground. Thousands of
this group have been killed and they are constantly targeted by government forces.
Condition 1: Picture of Black victims
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Condition 2: Picture of White victims
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Condition 3: Picture of Hispanic victims

Condition 4: No Picture
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Post-test Questions
Because the United States does not have an unlimited budget for foreign operations, it must
prioritize the humanitarian crisis situations it chooses to become involved with. Given this
understanding, please indicate which humanitarian crisis situation you believe the United States
should involve itself with FIRST.
1.)
______To be part of an international force to enforce a peace agreement between
Sudan and South Sudan?
______To be part of an international force to help stop the killing in Ukraine
______To become part of international force to help stop the killings in Myanmar
(Burma)

For the following questions, please indicate whether you believe US humanitarian-related
economic aid to the given areas should be increased, decreased, kept about the same, or stopped
altogether. Check only one response for each statement.
2.)
Do you believe US humanitarian-related economic aid to Eastern European countries
should be increased, decreased, kept about the same, or stopped altogether?
______Increased
______ Decreased
______ Kept About the Same
______ Stopped Altogether
3.)
Do you believe US humanitarian-related economic aid to African countries should be
increased, decreased, kept about the same, or stopped altogether?
______Increased
______ Decreased
______ Kept About the Same
______ Stopped Altogether
4.)
Do you believe US humanitarian-related economic aid to Latin American countries
should be increased, decreased, kept about the same, or stopped altogether?
______Increased
______ Decreased
______ Kept About the Same
______ Stopped Altogether
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5.)
Do you believe US humanitarian-related economic aid to Asian countries should be
increased, decreased, kept about the same, or stopped altogether?
______Increased
______ Decreased
______ Kept About the Same
______ Stopped Altogether

6.)
Do you believe US humanitarian-related economic aid to Middle Eastern countries
should be increased, decreased, kept about the same, or stopped altogether?
______Increased
______ Decreased
______ Kept About the Same
______ Stopped Altogether

Thank you very much for your participation in our survey. In accordance with University of
Mississippi guidelines, we would like to assure you that your participation will be kept strictly
confidential. If you are interested in the results of this survey, you may call or email A. Hannibal
Leach.
Please Do Not Write Your Name Anywhere on the Survey It Is Designed to Be Completely Anonymous
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University of Mississippi (UMS) 2016 CCES Pre-Election Survey
{UMS341 and UMS342 should appear on the same page, and their order should be randomized.
Also, the context - Africa / Latin America / Europe / generic - should be randomly assigned but
kept the same for both questions.}
UMS341
SINGLE CHOICE
Foreign - Force
Special Instructions: Randomize order of response options. Also, this is an experiment. The text
in brackets should be randomized with equal (1/4) probability.
In the future, do you think that the U.S. has a moral obligation to use military force [in Africa / in
Latin America / in Europe / abroad], if necessary, to prevent one group of people from
committing genocide against another?
1
2
3

Yes
No
{FIXED} Don’t know

UMS342
SINGLE CHOICE
Foreign - Peacekeeping
Special Instructions: Randomize order of response options. Also, this is an experiment. The text
in brackets should be assigned to match that of UMS341.
In a general sense, do you favor or oppose the use of U.S. troops as part of international
peacekeeping forces to enforce peace agreements between [two countries in Africa / two
countries in Latin America / two countries in Europe / two other countries]?
1
2
3

Favor
Oppose
{FIXED} Don’t know
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{UMS343 and UMS344 should appear on the same page, with UMS343 always appearing first.}
UMS343
SINGLE CHOICE
Race - Identity
Special Instructions: Randomly reverse order of response options. Also, please pipe in
respondent’s race based on profile/common content response.

To what extent do you think of yourself as being {$Race}?
1
2
3
4

A great deal
Somewhat
Very Little
Not at all

UMS344
SINGLE CHOICE
Race - Group
Special Instructions: Randomly reverse order of response options.
Do you believe that members of your race have common political, social, and economic
interests?
1
2

Yes
No
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Selected Working Papers________________________________________________________
“The Ethnic Connection: Economic Preferences and Cultural Affinity”
“The American People and their Government: An Examination of Public Attitudes towards the
Role of Government"
“There’s Something About Culture: An Empirical Examination of Race, Political Culture, and
Public Opinion”
“Support for Strengthening International Institutions within the Democratic Party Varies by
Race”
“Who’s for Humanitarian Intervention? Race and Support for US Military Involvement for
Humanitarian Purposes Abroad”
Conference Activities
2016

“Support for Strengthening International Institutions Varies by Race.” Annual
Meeting of the Southern Political Science Association, San Juan, Puerto Rico,
January 7-9, 2016.
“Political Culture and International Views.” Annual Meeting of the Southern
Political Science Association, San Juan, Puerto Rico, January 7-9, 2016.
“Who’s for Humanitarianism: Race, Religion, and Support for US Military
Involvement for Humanitarian Crises Abroad.” Annual Meeting of the Southern
Political Science Association, San Juan, Puerto Rico, January 7-9, 2016.

2015

“The American People and their Government: An Examination of Public
Attitudes towards the Role of Government.” Annual Meeting of the Southern
Political Science Association, New Orleans, LA, January 15-17, 2015.
“The Ethnic Connection: Economic Preferences and Cultural Affinity.” Annual
Meeting of the Southern Political Science Association, New Orleans, LA, January
15-17, 2015.
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Other Scholarly Presentations, Events, and Expert Commentary
May, 2016. “A Few Words on Civilian-Military Relations.” PA Times Online.
April, 2016. “The Keys to Effective Communication in Public Organizations.” PA Times Online.
March, 2016. “Inside the 2016 Presidential Elections.” PA Times Online.
February, 2016. “Public Administration in the Era of Globalization.” PA Times Online.
January, 2016. “Leadership Challenges in 2016.” PA Times Online.
September, 2015. Facilitated Scholarly Lecture. “Pope Francis’s Visit to the United States, and
his Tenure Date.” Address given by Dr. Bruce Morrill, the Edward A. Mallory Chair of
Catholic Studies and Professor of Theological Studies at Vanderbilt University.
University Club of Nashville Summer Lecture Series. Nashville, TN
August, 2015. Facilitated Scholarly Lecture. “Affordable Care Act Case Decided: Marriage
Equality and the American Legal Tradition." Address given by Dr. John Vile, Dean and
Professor of Political Science at Middle Tennessee State University. University Club of
Nashville Summer Lecture Series. Nashville, TN
July, 2015. Facilitated Scholarly Lecture. “Lost in the Ivy.” Address given by Dr. Roosevelt
Noble, Senior Lecturer in the Department of Sociology at Vanderbilt University.
University Club of Nashville Summer Lecture Series. Nashville, TN.
June, 2015. “The Need for More Research in Judicial Politics.” PA Times Online.
May, 2015. “Marine Tapped to Head Joint Chiefs of Staff.” PA Times Online.

May, 2015. Facilitated Scholarly Lecture. “Mapping The Theo-Political Claims of the SelfCalled "Islamic State" Against the Biography of the Prophet Muhammad (Peace be upon
him)." Address given by C.A. Chase, Doctoral Student at Fordham University. University
Club of Nashville Summer Lecture Series. Nashville, TN.
April, 2015. “Why “Mad Men” Is Great for the Public.” PA Times Online.
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March, 2015. “A Look Inside the Obama Administration’s 2016 Budget Proposal.” PA Times
Online.
February, 2015.” The National Foreign Policy Agenda – Phase I.” PA Times Online.
January, 2015. “State of the Union Preview.” PA Times Online.
December, 2014. “Holder, Lynn and the Politics of Change.” PA Times Online.
November, 2014. “A Post Election Analysis of the Federal Bureaucracy.” PA Times Online.
September, 2014. “U.S. & Africa Initiative Creates Light at the End of the Tunnel.” PA Times
Online.
August, 2014. “The Measure of Diplomacy: An Important Look at the State Department’s
Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review.” PA Times Online.
July, 2014. “Examining the Stress Test: Thoughts on Former Treasury Secretary Geithner’s New
Memoir.” PA Times Online.

Other Leadership Positions______________________________________________________
2015-present Member, Fund Development Committee, F.H. Jenkins Elementary School
2015- 2016

Chairman, American Society for Public Administration (Mississippi Chapter).

2014-2015

Vice-Chair, American Society for Public Administration (Mississippi Chapter).

2014-present Member, Board of Directors, University Club of Nashville at Vanderbilt

Professional Service____________________________________________________________
2013-2014

Department Senate Representative, Graduate Student Government,
University of Mississippi

2014-2015

Vice-President, University of Mississippi Black Graduate and Professional
Student Association
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Memberships__________________________________________________________________
• American Committee on Foreign Relations,
• United Nations Association (Nashville Cordell Hull Chapter)
• American Political Science Association
• American Society for Public Administrators
• National Forum for Black Public Administrators
Skills_________________________________________________________________________
• Computer Languages and Packages: Stata, R
• Microsoft Office: Excel, PowerPoint, Word, Outlook
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